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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
 
The National Academy of Science (NAS 2001) reported that since the early 
1970s, water quality management in the United States hinged on the control of point 
sources of pollution and the use of effluent-based water quality standards. The quality of 
U.S. water bodies generally improved as point sources (for instance, wastewater 
treatment plants and industrial dischargers) complied with requirements of the 1972 
Clean Water Act.  Polluters have been required to meet effluent-based standards for 
criteria pollutants spelled out in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permits issued by respective states with the approval of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). However, the NPDES program failed to 
achieve water quality goals of “fishable and swimmable” waters largely because of 
unsuccessfully controlled pollution coming from unregulated non-point sources. The 
Clean Water Act did not consider pollutants such as nutrients and sediment (often 
associated with non-point sources) as criteria pollutants. These unsuccessfully controlled 
nutrient- and sediment discharges from non-point sources continue to jeopardize water 
quality and the environment across the United States such that the focus of water quality 
management has shifted from effluent-based to ambient-based water quality standards. 
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency implements the Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL) program with the objective of attaining ambient water quality standards by 
controlling both point and nonpoint sources of pollution (NAS, 2001; Younos, 2005). 
 
Degradation of water quality and the environment is a major concern in the Eucha-
Spavinaw basin. Spavinaw Lake and downstream Lake Eucha supply drinking water to 
Tulsa and surrounding communities in Oklahoma. Excessive amounts of nutrients 
coming from the watershed into the lakes promote growth of algae that degrade the water 
quality. The Oklahoma Conservation Commission (OCC, 1997) pointed out that the 
major nutrient of concern is phosphorus which runs off from cropland in the watershed 
on which poultry litter is applied as fertilizer. It is estimated that annually about 41 tons 
of phosphorus and 959 tons of nitrogen entered Lake Eucha from the watershed in the 
early 1990s.  Poultry is the main industry in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
  
Studies conducted by the USDA Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) show that 
annual average total meat consumption (red meat, poultry, fish) in the United States 
increased substantially in the period from 1950 to 2000. Per capita total meat 
consumption was estimated at 195 pounds in the year 2000, representing an increase of 
41.2 percent above average annual consumption recorded in the 1950s. A closer look at 
the per capita consumption levels of the individual meat categories (see Figure 1) 
suggests that each person ate an average of 4 pounds more fish and shellfish, 7 pounds 
more red meat and 46 pounds more poultry in 2000 than in the 1950s (USDA-ERS, 
2000). However, the total amount of red meat consumed by each person increased 
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substantially between the 1950s and 1960s and continued to rise at a slower rate until it 
reached a maximum of 129.4 pounds in the 1970s. USDA-ERS (2000) attributed this 
increase in consumption of red meat to rising consumer incomes and lower real prices for 
meats during that period. Per capita consumption of red meat then declined from the 
1970s onwards due to nutritional concern among consumers about fat and cholesterol in 
their diet that necessitated substitution of other meats (poultry and fish) for red meats in 
order to lower total fat and saturated fat intake. Though per capita consumption of poultry 
increased steadily between the 1950s and 1970s, the increase was substantial thereafter 
such that the average total annual consumption reached 68.4 pounds by the year 2000 
from 19.8 pounds in the 1950s.  Per capita consumption of fish and shellfish increased 
steadily between the 1950s and 2000 (USDA-ERS, 2000).  
 
Meat Consumption in the United States , 1950-2000.
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Figure 1  Average Annual Meat Consumption Per Capita in the U.S., 1950-2000. 
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The continuous growth in the demand for poultry since the 1950s resulted in the rapid 
expansion of the poultry industry in the United States. It is estimated that the number of 
poultry farms in the U.S. reached 51,423 in 1997, with recorded production of 
approximately 8 billion birds (See Table 1). However, in half a decade later, the number 
of poultry farms and birds produced had risen to 67,256 and about 9 billion, respectively. 
This represents about 14.4 percent increase in poultry production by the year 2002. 
Broiler production accounts for about 92 percent and 93 percent of U.S. total poultry 
production in 1997 and 2002, respectively.  The States of Arkansas and Oklahoma 
combined produced about 1.3 billion and 1.5 billion birds in 1997 and 2002, respectively. 
These production levels represent about 16 percent of the national poultry production in 
the respective years. Arkansas produced about 84 percent of the combined total poultry 
production for the two states in the years 1997 and 2002.  On the basis of dry manure 
estimation assumptions suggested by Sims et al. (1989), the American nation produced 
roughly 41 million tons of dry poultry manure in 1997. The national manure production 
reached 47 million tons by 2002, an increase of about 14.4 percent. Evers (1996) reported 
that farmers use more than 95 percent of national poultry litter as crop and pasture 
fertilizer. The states of Oklahoma and Arkansas combined produced about 6.5 million 
and 7.4 million tons of poultry manure in 1997 and 2002 respectively representing 
approximately 16 percent of the national dry poultry manure production in the respective 
years.  
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Table 1  Poultry and Dry Manure Production in the U.S., 1997 and 2002.  
 
  
No. of Farms No. of Birds Dry Manure (tons) 
1997 US AR OK US AR OK US AR OK 
Layers 12,789 853 423 194,945,215 12,985,428 3,330,062 1,364,617 90,898 23,310 
Broilers 27,737 3,882 751 7,366,526,456 1,046,510,017 197,077,480 36,095,980 5,127,899 965,680 
Pullets 4,052 315 110 142,094,811 13,849,439 1,797,309 383,656 37,393 4,853 
Turkeys 6,845 291 73 307,605,599 25,453,838 1,748,693 3,352,901 277,447 19,061 
Total 51,423 5,341 1,357 8,011,172,081 1,098,798,722 203,953,544 41,197,153 5,533,637 1,012,904 
              
2002             
Layers 18,621 643 635 202,947,490 9,124,085 3,027,523 1,420,632 63,869 21,193 
Broilers 32,006 3,520 871 8,500,313,357 1,181,907,700 231,877,714 41,651,535 5,791,348 1,136,201 
Pullets 8,193 324 373 174,916,701 14,811,501 3,316,431 472,275 39,991 8,954 
Turkeys 8,436 292 115 283,247,649 28,459,783 933,382 3,087,399 310,212 10,174 
Total 67,256 4,779 1,994 9,161,425,197 1,234,303,069 239,155,050 46,631,842 6,205,419 1,176,522 
Source : Adapted from US Census of Agriculture, 1997 and 2002 
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The Eucha-Spavinaw watershed is located in the northeastern Oklahoma and western 
Arkansas (Ancev, 2003). Table 2 shows this watershed drains 245,591 acres in Mayes 
County and Delaware County, Oklahoma (64.2 percent), and Benton County, Arkansas 
(35.8 percent). However, the watershed covers about 1 percent of Mayes, OK, 17 percent 
of Benton, AR and 30 percent of Delaware, OK.  
Table 2  Eucha - Spavinaw Watershed Area by County. 
 
County / State 
 
Area of County 
(acres) 
County Area  
in the watershed  
(acres) 
Share of Total 
County Area  
(%) 
Benton, AR 
Delaware, OK 
Mayes, OK 
534,424 
511,698 
425,768 
87,952 
153,171 
4,468 
16.5 
29.9 
1.0 
Total 1,471,890 245,591 47.4 
 Source: Adapted from Ancev (2003);  
Storm et al.(2002) found that just over half of the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed area is 
occupied by forests while pastures account for 42.7 percent (see table 3). They classified 
pastures into three categories: hayed, poorly- and well-maintained pastures. They found 
53.8 percent of the pastureland was well-maintained, that 30.9 percent was hayed, that 
15.2 percent was poorly-managed and that 2.7 percent of the watershed area was used for 
row crop. Brushy rangeland, urban and water together occupied 3.7 percent of the 
watershed area (Storm et al. 2002). 
Table 3  Land Use in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
Land Use Watershed Area Covered (%) 
Forest 
Hayed Pastures 
Well Managed Pastures 
Poorly Managed Pastures 
Brushy Rangeland 
Urban 
Water 
Row Crop 
50.9 
13.2 
23.0 
6.5 
0.3 
1.5 
1.9 
2.7 
 Source: Storm et al. (2002) 
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Problem Statement 
 
Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) are being implemented to prevent eutrophication 
of public water supplies by phosphorus runoff from manure applications in many 
watersheds in the United States. Agricultural pollution attributed to excessive land 
application of poultry manure as fertilizer is a serious environmental problem for surface 
water quality in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed situated on the border of the states of 
Oklahoma and Arkansas as shown in Figure 2 below. The Eucha-Spavinaw watershed 
has been troubled by water pollution for years and has created considerable controversy 
between the two states. The city of Tulsa, Oklahoma and the Tulsa Metropolitan Utility 
Board filed a lawsuit in December 2001, naming several poultry integrators as defendants 
(Oklahoma Water Resources Board, OWRB, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Oklahoma Conservation Commission 
 
Figure 2  Poultry and Swine Operations in the Lake Eucha Watershed.  
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The Eucha-Spavinaw watershed is of interest because Lake Eucha and Spavinaw Lake 
are currently on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 303(d) Impaired Water List 
due to low dissolved oxygen and excessive phosphorus from municipal point source 
discharges, agriculture, and other unknown sources (ODEQ, 2004). The Oklahoma Water 
Quality Standard specifies the designated beneficial uses of Lake Eucha and Spavinaw 
Lake as including public and private water supply, aquatic community, agricultural 
irrigation, recreation and aesthetics, and sensitive drinking water supply (OWRB 2004; 
2006). There is rapid urban expansion in an adjacent watershed, historical growth of 
poultry production and very little cropland within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
rate at which poultry litter is currently being produced and land applied is most likely to 
lead to excessive phosphorus runoff levels from agricultural land into the water bodies 
during storm events in the watershed. Most of the non-point nutrient pollution comes 
from poultry manure fertilized pastures (OWRB, 2002; Storm et al., 2003).  
 
Eutrophication threatens the Tulsa metropolitan water supply. Excessive phosphorus 
loading has led to excessive algae blooms in Lake Eucha and Spavinaw Lake that cause 
oxygen depletion in both lakes. Excessive levels of phosphorus and algal growth impair 
the designated aesthetics, recreational and drinking water beneficial uses of the two lakes 
by causing undesirable taste and bad odor. Municipal water treatment facilities that treat 
the water to achieve established drinking water standards find it difficult and 
prohibitively expensive to remove the bad taste and odor in drinking water. The City of 
Tulsa reported additional water treatment costs due to excessive algae exceeding $72.78 
per million gallons. Should their current treatment system be unable to eliminate the taste 
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and odor problems, the City of Tulsa will have to either increase water treatment costs or 
abandon lake Eucha and Spavinaw lake as a water supply entirely and look for alternative 
drinking water supply such as Lake Hudson. The additional costs of using Lake Hudson 
water was estimated to exceed $7,000 per day whereas the cost of abandoning lakes 
Eucha and Spavinaw as a water supply and using Lake Hudson was estimated to exceed 
$250 million (City of Tulsa 2006; OWRB, 2006).  
 
There is also a public health risk associated with excessive phosphorus and algae levels in 
both lakes.  Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw are reported as supporting sufficiently large 
amounts of Bluegreen algae. This algae species release microcystins that can cause liver 
damage; other forms can be neurotoxic and cytotoxic. Both lakes are also impacted by 
increases in disinfection byproduct precursors such as total organic carbon (City of Tulsa 
2006; OWRB, 2006). 
 
There is need for phosphorus reduction programs and nutrient management plans to 
reduce both point and nonpoint source nutrient pollution in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed, especially that coming from agriculture. Therefore best management practices 
(BMPs) to reduce phosphorus loading in the watershed are of high interest, not only to 
poultry integrators and farmers using poultry manure, but also to municipal authorities, 
recreation managers, regulators, policy makers and the general public. Although several 
studies have analyzed nitrogen and phosphorus loading in the watershed, few studies 
have analyzed the role of grazing management systems as a profitable economic 
enterprise and a phosphorus reduction strategy under stochastic conditions from a 
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watershed where large quantities of litter were available for use as fertilizer on pastures to 
achieve the recommended phosphorus load reductions for the watershed at minimum cost 
to society. The research to be undertaken in this dissertation addresses the question, 
“What is the most efficient set of litter and grazing management practices that can be 
used to maximize net agricultural income while meeting the recommended phosphorus 
load reductions for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed within specified margins of safety?” 
The answer to this question will help the many interested groups identify least-cost BMPs 
and policy instruments to implement to reduce water pollution from phosphorus runoff in 
the watershed.  The results of this study will allow all affected parties to make better 
decisions concerning cost effective phosphorus pollution abatement from non-point 
sources in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
 
Objectives of the Study 
 
This study analyses the economic and environmental impacts of watershed-scale adoption 
of various pasture management practices in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The main 
focus is on maximizing net agricultural income from grazing while meeting specified 
environmental-improving phosphorus pollution restrictions for the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed at least social cost within specified margins of safety. The specific objectives 
are: 
a) To develop an integrated biophysical - economic optimization model for cost 
efficient non-point source pollution abatement in the Eucha - Spavinaw 
watershed. 
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b) To determine the least cost mix, location, and magnitude of grazing management 
practices to reduce phosphorus loading under various phosphorus loading targets 
and margins of safety for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
c) To determine the optimal transportation pattern for poultry litter under various 
phosphorus loading targets and margins of safety for the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed.  
d) To determine the efficiency of changes in pasture management practices in 
reducing phosphorus runoff relative to the use in a possible litter-to-energy power 
plant under various phosphorus loading targets and margins of safety for the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed with and without an alum-treated poultry litter option.  
e) To determine the effect of different soil types, hydrology and management 
practice variables on phosphorus runoff in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.   
 
Contribution of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation research developed a comprehensive decision-support tool, an integrated 
biophysical-hydrologic – economic watershed model, with the ability to reflect the 
dynamic interactions of essential biophysical, hydrologic, agronomic, and economic 
components and to explore both the economic and environmental consequences of a wide 
variety of management practices and policy choices for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
The study built on, improved and extended some of the hydrological and economic 
studies that have been conducted in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed and provided a 
simple and more realistic framework that combined GIS-based hydrological simulations 
with mathematical programming to effectively determine optimal amounts of control at 
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non-point pollutant sources to meet the recommended phosphorus load reductions for a 
watershed at minimum social cost. The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model 
that has been used to simulate effects of various BMPs on nutrient and sediment 
discharges in watersheds allowed researchers to use consistent scientific methods to 
estimate the effects of each possible management practice in a given hydraulic response 
unit (HRU). An HRU refers to an area of land representing a combination of a major soil 
type and land use within a subbasin. However, the SWAT simulation is not an 
optimization model. This study introduced optimization into the analysis by integrating 
SWAT simulation model with a mathematical programming model to determine site-
specific management practices that would meet the recommended phosphorus load 
reductions for the watershed at minimum social cost.  
 
Studies that have investigated the economic feasibility of converting litter-to-energy and 
commercially saleable fertilizer in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed focused on private 
firm-level costs and benefits and did not take into account pollution from point and non-
point sources in their analyses. This study built on this previous research work and  
incorporated non-point source polluters in the watershed to capture societal costs and 
benefits consistent with meeting the recommended phosphorus load reductions for the 
watershed.  We developed and applied an integrated biophysical and economic 
methodology to determine the costs of investing in abatement efforts and converting 
litter-to-energy in the watershed.  
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The research determined management practices for particular areas within the watershed 
that would effectively control phosphorus pollution in a way that is least costly to society 
using an updated SWAT model, recent and larger datasets with much greater spatial 
detail. This improved on a few studies in the watershed that had employed a similar 
approach but at a lesser degree of spatial detail. The results obtained from the simulation 
of the long term effects of management practices on the amount of phosphorus runoff and 
production levels of land in specific areas in the watershed would provide farmers and 
watershed managers with information to aid them make better decisions about production 
methods and levels that can sustain both water quality of the lakes and productivity of the 
farmland.   
  
We incorporated both environmental impacts and costs of meeting recommended 
phosphorus load reductions in the analysis and demonstrated that TMDL programs can be 
improved by using economic analysis of costs and benefits to set and implement TMDL 
goals and standards so as to achieve efficient targeting of pollution reductions while 
distributing costs among polluters (both point and non-point sources) equitably. This 
watershed-level economic study of agricultural pollution would serve as an additional 
resource in the growing public debate surrounding agricultural pollution in the watershed 
and the implementation of market-based mechanisms in environmental policy.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background 
 
Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw make up a single surface water system. They are two 
impoundments on Spavinaw Creek with Lake Spavinaw downstream (approximately four 
miles) of Lake Eucha.  Lake Eucha (established in 1952) receives a great majority of its 
water and nutrients from Spavinaw Creek.  Lake Spavinaw (impounded in 1924) receives 
most of its water and nutrients from the Lake Eucha dam discharge; therefore, Lake 
Eucha provides a continuous water supply to Lake Spavinaw (Oklahoma Conservation 
Commission, OCC, 1997). The Tulsa Metropolitan area and other small communities 
receive their drinking water from the Lake Eucha-Spavinaw complex (Oklahoma Water 
Resources Board, OWRB, 2002).    
 
Prior to the creation of Lake Eucha, the general land usage of the watershed was farming 
corn, wheat, and oats (Kesler, 1936). In the western Arkansas portion of the watershed, 
apple and peach orchards along with vineyards were abundant. Nearly 80 percent of the 
watershed’s land area was scrub timber before Lake Eucha was created (Kesler, 1936).  
Since Lake Eucha was created, the primary land use is forest and pasture, and is in the 
Ozark Plateau of northwest Arkansas and northeastern Oklahoma where the underlying 
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geology is karstic.  Agricultural practices in the Eucha-Spavinaw basin include grazing 
cattle, small dairy production, confined animal operations (poultry and swine), land 
application of animal wastes and some row crop production. Land within the watershed 
has been used to support the commercial poultry industry, with the capacity to produce 
over 84 million birds, along with some 1500 tons of phosphorus rich waste per year 
(Tulsa Metropolitan Utility Authority, TMUA, 2001).    
 
The Eucha-Spavinaw system is designated by the OWRB (1996, 2002) as a system for 
public water supply along with recreation, fish and wildlife, and aesthetics (OCC, 1997; 
TMUA, 2001).  These designated uses are important because they ultimately determine 
the “acceptable” pollution level. The Eucha-Spavinaw basin contains two rural 
wastewater treatment plants situated in Gravette and Decatur, Arkansas. The facility at 
Gravette treats water from a residential community and has a design discharge of 0.56 
million gallons per day (mgd). The stream receiving the point source discharge is an 
intermittent system which frequently has no surface flow entering Spavinaw Creek. The 
Decatur facility treats wastewater from a residential community and a poultry processing 
plant. This facility discharges approximately 1.6 mgd (OCC, 1997) into the receiving 
stream (Columbia hollow) and Spavinaw Creek.  While point source pollution is a 
significant contributor to reservoir nutrient loading, nonpoint sources still contribute a 
greater proportion of the nutrients entering the Eucha-Spavinaw water system (OCC, 
1997).   
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A diagnostic study of Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw conducted by OWRB (2002) indicated 
these lakes are eutrophic (i.e. Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw are nutrient-enriched and 
display high or excessive levels of algal production). Phosphorus was the limiting 
nutrient during most of the project period. The annual phosphorus budget analysis for 
Lake Eucha showed that 93 percent of the phosphorus entering the lake originated in the 
drainage basin, and most of that entered the lake through Spavinaw Creek, the lake’s 
main tributary. The remaining 7 percent of the phosphorus entering the lake came from 
lake sediments. On an annual basis, the phosphorus in the discharge from Lake Eucha 
accounts for about 85 percent of the phosphorus entering Spavinaw Lake (OWRB, 2002).   
 
Several agricultural best management practices (BMPs) have been implemented in other 
watersheds in the United States to deal with non-point source nutrient pollution of water 
bodies. A BMP is a practice or combination of practices chosen the most effective, 
economical, and practical means of preventing or reducing the amount of pollution 
generated by nonpoint sources to a level compatible with state and local water quality 
goals. It is a BMP (instead of just an "MP") because: it works; it is possible to use it (i.e., 
not unduly complicated); and it is a "good buy" compared to alternatives.  However, the 
selection of an appropriate BMP will depend greatly upon the site conditions (land use, 
topography, slope, water table elevation, and geology) (Cestti, Srivastava and Jung, 
2003). In general, these practices are designed to effectively use agricultural chemicals; 
increase ground cover, decrease the velocity of surface runoff, and improve the 
management of livestock waste. Controlling erosion is an essential aspect of preventing 
nutrient non-point source pollution of surface waters as eroding soil particles will carry 
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excess nutrients, particularly phosphorus, into water bodies (Cestti, Srivastava and Jung, 
2003). To address agriculture nutrient non-point source pollution, farmers can use either 
structural measures (i.e. waste containment tanks / lagoons, sediment basins, terraces, 
diversion, fencing, tree plantings) or managerial ones (i.e. nutrient budgeting, rotational 
grazing, and conservation tillage). In either case, good management is always a necessary 
condition for reducing farm pollution (Gale et al., 1993). 
 
Agriculture best management practices can be grouped according to their functions. The 
USEPA (1993) guidelines identify the following categories: 
• Managing sedimentation. Measures to control the volume and flow rate of surface 
water runoff, keep the soil in place, and reduce soil transport. Such BMPs include 
permanent vegetative cover, strip cropping systems, terrace and diversion 
systems, grazing and cropland protection systems, waterway and stream 
protection systems, conservation tillage systems, sediment retention and erosion.    
• Managing nutrients. Measures to help to keep the nutrients in the soil, minimizing 
their movement into the water bodies. Such measures include permanent 
vegetative cover, animal waste management systems, strip cropping systems, 
terrace system, grazing and cropland protection systems, conservation tillage 
systems, tree plantings and fertilizer management.  
• Managing pesticides. Measures to reduce non-point source contamination from 
pesticides, by helping limiting pesticide use and managing its application. Such 
BMPs include strip cropping systems, terrace systems, and pesticide management 
plans.  
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• Managing confined animal facility. Measures to reduce or limit the discharge 
from confined animal facilities. Animal waste management systems fall in this 
category. 
• Managing livestock grazing. Measures to reduce impacts of grazing on water 
quality. BMPs in this category include permanent vegetative cover, diversion 
systems, grazing land protection systems, waterway and stream protection 
systems, conservation tillage systems, and tree plantings or riparian forest buffer.  
 
Wheat Production and Management Practices Used in Oklahoma 
 
Krenzer (1994) reported that more than 6 million acres of cropland in Oklahoma are 
seeded to winter wheat every year for grain-only, forage-only, or as a dual purpose 
forage and grain crop. Wheat forage has high nutritive value and provides excellent 
weight gains for livestock. Forage is available at different times of the year depending 
on the forage system. Forage-only systems have wheat forage available for grazing by 
livestock in late fall, winter and early spring. These are times when other forage 
sources would be low in quantity and quality. Dual purpose systems have wheat 
forage available for grazing by livestock from mid-November. Livestock graze on the 
wheat until development of the first hollow stem. This allows the wheat to mature and 
produce a grain crop, usually harvested in June (Krenzer, 1994).   
 
Krenzer (2000) noted that wheat production practices differ according to intended 
use. Recommended planting dates for forage-only wheat are usually 2-6 weeks before 
planting dates for grain-only wheat. Forage-only wheat also has greater seeding rates 
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than grain-only wheat (Krenzer 2000). Hossain et al (2004) surveyed Oklahoma 
wheat, wheat pasture and wheat pasture livestock producers to determine production 
methods, management practices, and lease arrangements they use. The study found 
that Oklahoma farmers planted 6.1 million acres to wheat in the fall of 1999. About 
61 percent of the wheat acres were grazed mostly to stocker cattle and cows and /or 
replacement heifers.  The average stocking rates were 2.1 acres / steer and 2.0 acres / 
heifer whereas the animals gained about 2 lbs on average daily.  Statewide, 20 percent 
of the wheat acreage was intended for forage only, 49 percent for dual purpose, and 
31 percent for grain only, but due to weather constraints use was 22 percent, 39 
percent, and 39 percent, respectively.  Farmers intended and actually used more 
acreage for forage-only than for dual purpose and grain-only in 1999-2000. 
Respondents indicated average target planting dates of September 13 for forage-only, 
September 20 for dual purpose, and October 2 for grain-only.  Average reported 
seeding rates were 94lb/acre for forage-only, 84 lb / acre for dual purpose, and 77 
lb/acre for grain-only. Nitrogen use averaged 69 lb/acre, 69 lb/acre, and 63 lb/acre for 
forage-only, dual purpose, and grain-only, respectively.  Approximately 886,000 
steers and 466,000 heifers were stocked on Oklahoma wheat pasture during the 1999-
2000 season. On average, the beginning weights for steers and heifers were 460 lb 
and 447 lb, respectively (Hossain et al., 2004).    
 
Possible Uses of Poultry Litter 
 
Most poultry houses use wood shavings or sawdust as bedding material. The mixture of 
manure, feed, feathers, and bedding material from these houses is commonly referred to 
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as "poultry litter." Several studies conducted in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed indicate 
that poultry litter application rates to agricultural land to supply crop nutrient are high and 
exceed crop nutrient requirements. For instance, Storm et al. (2003) showed that there is 
a high correlation between phosphorus loading and litter application in the Eucha-
Spavinaw basin. They estimated the average annual total phosphorus loading in the 
watershed at 47.6 metric tons. However, a study conducted by Ancev (2003) determined 
that the socially optimum phosphorus loading for the area falls between the range of 23 to 
26 tons per year. Thus, there is greater need to reduce phosphorus loading in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed.  The OWRB (2004) recommended reductions in annual total 
phosphorus loading into lakes Eucha and Spavinaw by 54 and 47 percent, respectively. 
The literature suggests several ways of using or disposing of poultry litter that may be 
adopted to abate phosphorus pollution. The following sections outline some of the 
possible poultry litter disposal practices.    
 
Use of Fresh Poultry Litter as Fertilizer 
 
Several studies have determined that poultry litter is rich in nutrients and organic matter. 
USDA (1995) estimated that annual litter from a typical broiler housing 22,000 birds 
contains as much phosphorus as is in the sewage from a community of 6,000 people. 
Given that land application of litter is relatively simple and inexpensive compared to 
commercial fertilizers, farmers use poultry litter as a low-cost crop fertilizer with the 
potential of returning essential nutrients and organic matter to the soil to improve its 
structure and fertility. However, poultry litter is generally applied to meet the nitrogen 
requirement of the crop. The problem that arises from such a practice is excessive 
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application of phosphorus owing to the lower nitrogen-to-phosphorus ratio in poultry 
litter compared to most crop nutrient requirements. In some areas, farmers have been 
encouraged to apply poultry manure on the basis of the soil test phosphorus (STP) index 
to reduce the chances of phosphorus runoff. The STP index represents the required 
amount of phosphorus beyond which additional phosphorus will not increase the 
maximum yield. That means the soil has sufficient phosphorous for plant uptake at that 
index such that continued application of manure above this level may lead to 
phosphorous runoff during a storm event. Evers (1998) estimated that 95 percent of U.S. 
poultry litter is applied to agricultural land as fertilizer.  Controlling the runoff from the 
farms is a very important component of the total program to control pollution from non-
point sources. It is further observed that land application is confined to areas near poultry 
production. The poultry are produced in spatially concentrated areas to minimize feed 
and transportation costs (Cestti et al., 2003; Storm et al. 2003).      
 
Use of Alum-Treated Poultry Litter as Fertilizer 
 
A study has found that adding aluminum sulfate to poultry litter provides benefits for 
both the farmer and the environment (Cestti et al., 2003). Addition of alum to poultry 
litter traps the nitrogen in the fertilizer. This in turn, reduces nitrogen losses through 
ammonia volatilization and increases the level of nitrogen available to plants.  The alum 
would also tie up soluble phosphorous in the fertilizer. This chemical process transforms 
the soluble phosphorus into more stable aluminum phosphate compounds that are 
insoluble and thereby significantly reducing the potential for soluble phosphorus runoff 
once the litter is applied to agricultural land. The aluminum phosphate compounds are 
 22 
also not readily available for plant and algae uptake in water bodies.  Though alum can be 
applied directly to agricultural land, research has shown that the alum can easily be added 
to litter in the poultry house in alum-to-litter ratio of 1 part alum to 10 parts litter (Moore 
and Miller, 1994; Moore 1999 and Moore et al., 2000).  However, despite these 
beneficial effects of alum-treated litter, this practice may not be sustainable given the 
high cost of litter management owing to both large quantities of litter to be treated and 
availability and price of the aluminum sulfate. Simpson (1998) found that financial 
incentives such as a cost-sharing, tax credit, tax incentive and low interest rate loans have 
been offered to farmers in various States to encourage them adopt this litter management 
practice.   
 
Use of Composted Poultry Litter as Fertilizer  
 
As the poultry industry expands in eastern Oklahoma and western Arkansas, farmers are 
faced with the challenge of disposing of increasing volumes of poultry litter. Walker 
(2002) recommended composting as one option that producers may consider as a way of 
increasing the value and potential markets for their litter, while moving excess nutrients 
from their operations. Composting is a simple, natural process (an aerobic degradation of 
biodegradable organic waste) poultry producers can use to produce a marketable product. 
Composted poultry litter has few, if any, odors. It is a more stable and more consistent 
material than fresh litter, so is less likely to damage plants. Many potential on-farm and 
off-farm uses and markets exist for compost as an organic fertilizer, including the nursery 
industry, organic growers and vegetable producers, homeowners, golf courses, highways 
and land reclamation. The off-farm removal of poultry litter as compost is an 
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environmentally sound method of removing excess nutrients from many land-limited 
operations, and can be an important way of protecting agricultural land and surface 
waters from the excessive loading of litter nutrients. Studies conducted by Tyson (1994) 
and Preusch et al.(2002) found that composted litter releases nitrogen more slowly and 
over a longer period of time than fresh litter, with only 10 percent of the total nitrogen in 
the composted litter available for plant uptake in the first year, compared to 30-50 percent 
in the fresh broiler litter. Thus, composting has the potential of limiting nitrogen leaching 
to ground water through formation of more stable organic components. Composted 
broiler litter produces less phosphorus runoff than fresh broiler litter. However, economic 
analysis studies conducted by VerVoort and Keeler (1998) and Kelleher et al. (2002) 
showed that the practice of using composted broiler litter lead to a loss of nutrients 
(especially nitrogen) required by plants and was much more expensive compared to the 
alternative of applying fresh broiler litter directly to cropland owing to increased demand 
for land and additional equipment and labor costs.  
 
Use of Poultry Litter as Cattle Feed Ingredient 
 
Broiler litter can be good feed source for cattle during the winter or times of drought, 
particularly for brood cows and stocker cattle. Good-quality broiler litter is approximately 
equal to good-quality alfalfa hay, based on nutrient analysis. Broiler litter fed to cattle is 
usually mixed with a more palatable feed, such as corn. Any number of palatable feeds in 
addition to corn can be used to mix with broiler litter, such as wheat, milo, commercial 
grain mixes, and soybean hulls to increase consumption. Diets containing broiler litter 
can produce acceptable levels of performance by beef cattle. Using a lower-energy-based 
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diet, Cross and Jenny found gains of feedlot steers were similar between cattle fed diets 
containing corn silage with either 0, 10, or 30 percent broiler litter substituted for corn 
silage. A study conducted by McCaskey et al. (1994) found that beef steer gains were 
2.53 pounds per day on a concentrate diet as compared with 2.12 pounds per day on a 
diet of 50 percent broiler litter and 50 percent corn. Burdine, et al. (1993) and  
Bagley, et al.(1994) report that animal performance was the same with broiler litter diets 
mixed with either corn or soybean hulls. These studies demonstrated that beneficial uses 
of broiler poultry litter as a cattle feed, among others, include environmental protection 
through responsible use of an animal by-product, increased sale value of the by-product 
for poultry producers, and economic benefit for production of beef cattle as a low-cost 
protein feed source. Despite these benefits, the feeding of poultry litter, however, was not 
a widespread practice. It was estimated that less than 1 percent of the total amount of 
poultry litter generated in the United States was fed to cattle. However, fresh broiler litter 
should be processed to ensure its safety from potentially harmful pathogens (Davis, 1999;  
U.S. FDA, 2004). 
 
Use of Poultry Litter as a Bio-Fuel Source 
 
Studies have shown that energy production from poultry litter is one potentially 
beneficial use. Poultry litter is increasingly becoming one of the readily available 
agricultural by-products from which renewable energy can be created. The process is 
such that poultry litter is transported to the power plant where it is combusted in a furnace 
at high temperature. The heat produced heats water in a boiler to produce high pressure 
steam that drives a turbine and generator to produce electricity. A report by Fibrominn 
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(2002) indicated that their poultry litter fired power plant in Benson, Minnesota utilized 
approximately 500,000 tons of poultry litter per year to produce 50 MW of electricity. 
When poultry litter is combusted to produce electricity, a nutrient-rich ash is produced 
and can be used as fertilizer. Alternatively, as demonstrated in a study conducted by 
Kelleher et al. (2002), the poultry litter may be degraded and stabilized under anaerobic 
conditions by microbial organisms to produce methane that can be used to replace natural 
gas or fuel oil as a fuel for boilers to produce steam and electricity. This process also 
produces stable methane sludge that can be used as fertilizer. Therefore, energy 
conversion in poultry litter fired power plants does not only provide electricity, it also 
produces ash or methane sludge that is cheaper to transport to other locations for use as a 
concentrated nutrient-rich fertilizer compared to fresh poultry litter.  
 
Shipping Surplus Poultry Litter to Deficit Areas  
 
Transportation of poultry litter out of problem areas is another alternative for reducing 
excessive application of nutrients to cropland. A study conducted by Pelletier et al. 
(2000) to examine the economic feasibility of litter transport, and the potential for a cost-
share program to encourage shipment from litter-rich regions in Virginia concluded that 
if poultry-producing farms must apply litter on a phosphorus basis, more litter will be 
available for sale. They found that in regions of intense poultry production and limited 
land application alternatives, litter prices will likely be lower, unless new litter markets 
become available. A study conducted in Northern Arkansas found that both surface and 
groundwater can be improved by transporting litter from areas where there is high poultry 
concentration to areas with lower potential for contamination (Govindasamy and 
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Cochran, 1995). These studies, however, revealed that farmers who prefer using poultry 
litter as fertilizer needed high volumes of the manure to cover cropland given its low 
nutrient content. Thus, it might not be economical to transport such large quantities of 
poultry litter beyond immediate areas for use as crop fertilizer. Cost-share programs have 
been designed in some States to encourage shipment from litter-rich regions (Simpson, 
1998; Pelletier et al., 2000; Ancev, 2003). 
 
A combination of some of these management practices could be implemented by 
agricultural production enterprises in a given watershed to reduce nutrient loadings to 
levels that are consistent with the set TMDL for the area. The next section provides an 
overview of the TMDL development process in the state of Oklahoma.   
 
The Total Maximum Daily Load Development Process in Oklahoma 
 
TMDLs are required under Section 303(d), “List of Impaired Waters,” of the Federal 
Clean Water Act (CWA) for U.S. water bodies that are not attaining ambient water 
quality standards after application of the technology-based effluent limitations required 
by the Act (Younos, 2005).  By definition, a TMDL specifies the allowable pollutant 
loading from all contributing sources (that is, point sources, non-point sources, and 
natural background) at a level necessary to attain the applicable water quality standards 
with seasonal variations and a margin of safety that takes into account any lack of 
knowledge concerning the relationship between the sources of the pollutant and water 
quality (USEPA, 2003; Younos, 2005). In essence, a TMDL defines the assimilative 
capacity of the waterbody to absorb a pollutant and still meet water quality standards. 
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The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) defines the TMDL process as the plan to 
develop and implement the TMDL (NAS, 2001). The objective of a TMDL is to allocate 
allowable loads among different pollutant sources so that the appropriate control actions 
can be taken to achieve water quality standards. All states must determine the required 
reductions in pollutant loadings from point and non-point sources to meet the state water 
quality standards (Younos, 2005). Not only do approaches to creating a TMDL for a 
particular pollutant vary throughout the nation, but also the approaches to developing a 
TMDL vary between pollutants. Because of the wide range of approaches to TMDLs in 
the United States, no one standard approach can be cited as the best criterion for setting  
TMDLs in the United States. States, territories, and authorized tribes have limited 
autonomy, and thus can create TMDL development approaches best suited to the unique 
nature of their own water quality conditions and water quality standards (Younos, 2005). 
However, NAS (2001) outlined conceptualized basic steps in the TMDL process as 
shown in Figure 3 below. It can be noted from Figure 3 that generally the major 
components of TMDL development are assessment of existing conditions of all 
waterbodies, determination of maximum allowable loads, allocation of loadings among 
point and nonpoint sources, and implementation of the TMDL plan. 
 28 
 
Source: Adapted from NAS (2001); Younos ( 2005). 
 
Figure 3  Conceptualized Basic Steps of the TMDL Process. 
 
 
The Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) holds the statutory authority to develop 
Oklahoma’s Water Quality Standards (OWQS), a set of rules (Oklahoma Administrative 
Code, Title 785, Chapter 45) that provide the baseline against which the quality of waters 
of the state are measured. At the beginning of the TMDL process, the OWRB identifies 
all waterbodies for the state and develops water quality standards for each waterbody. 
The Department of Environmental Quality is expected to gather available data and 
information on the conditions of the water body, pollutant, and pollutant sources 
throughout typical geographical and temporal conditions with reasonable certainty. The 
standards comprise of three components: beneficial uses, criteria and anti-degradation 
policy.  Every waterbody has multiple designated beneficial uses (e.g., fish and wildlife 
propagation, drinking water, or recreation) that are assigned by the OWRB. A 
waterbody’s beneficial uses are determined statistically or through the use attainability 
Identify All Waterbodies for the State 
Listing of All Impaired Waterbodies 
Determine Designated Use / Develop Water 
Quality Standard For Each Waterbody 
Planning To Calculate a TMDL 
Implementation of the TMDL 
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analysis, a procedure that requires obtaining physical, chemical, and biological field 
measurements. These measurements are compared to a set of conditions that describe a 
waterbody’s ability to support different beneficial uses. If a waterbody currently supports 
or has the potential to support a particular use, that use is designated to the waterbody in 
the Oklahoma Water Quality Standards.  The current list of beneficial uses include : fish 
and wildlife propagation, public and private water supply (drinking water) or emergency 
water supply ; primary body contact recreation or secondary body contact recreation; fish 
consumption, agriculture, and hydroelectric power generation; industrial and municipal 
process and cooling water, navigation and aesthetics (Oklahoma Department of 
Environmental Quality , ODEQ, 2004). 
  
Once the beneficial uses for a waterbody are determined, the OWRB determines the 
specific water quality criteria that apply to the waterbody. The criteria can be numerical 
or narrative. Numerical criteria are associated with specific numerical values, usually in 
the form of concentration of a particular water quality characteristic (usually measured in 
milligrams per liter, mg/L, or micrograms per liter, µg/L). Some numerical criteria are 
dependent on other factors such as season, temperature, pH, or hardness. Narrative 
criteria are only defined by description of the desired condition (e.g. to be aesthetically 
enjoyable, Spavinaw creek must be free from floating materials and suspended 
substances that produce objectionable color and turbidity). In cases where a single 
constituent is associated with more than one beneficial use or has more than one criterion, 
the most stringent of the applicable criteria is what drives a TMDL. The last component 
of the Oklahoma Water Quality Standards (OWQS) is the anti-degradation policy. This 
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policy describes the conditions under which a waterbody’s quality may or may not be 
decreased.  Special designations in the OWQS are used to define how the anti-
degradation policy is applied. These designations include Outstanding Resource Waters 
(ORW), High Quality Waters (HQW), and Sensitive Water Supplies (SWS). The 
limitations associated with each special designation are described in the OWQS. To fully 
assess a waterbody, each one of its designated beneficial uses must be assessed. Once 
each of the beneficial uses has been assessed, an overall category can be assigned. The 
OWRB places an assessed waterbody into one of five categories described below: 
Category 1 -  all beneficial uses assessed and attained 
Category 2 - some beneficial uses assessed, no impaired uses 
Category 3 - not enough information to assess beneficial uses 
Category 4 - one or more uses impaired, but no TMDL required 
Category 5 - one or more uses impared, TMDL required.   
 
Category 5 waterbodies make up the State’s 303(d) List of Impaired Waters.  Listing of 
an impaired waterbody is done by a comparative analysis of existing water quality data to 
the relevant water quality standard. If known, the cause, source and extent of the 
impairment(s) are identified in this process. The OWRB establishes a priority ranking for 
the waterbodies on the list and dates by which TMDLs should be developed to address 
causes of impairment based on the availability of data needed, severity of impairment, 
presence of endangered or threatened species, public health issues, public interest, and 
efficiency in public participation. Listing of waters for TMDL development is an 
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integrated process involving monitoring, water quality standards, and Oklahoma 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (OPDES) permits (NAS, 2001; ODEQ, 2004). 
Next in the sequence is the planning step in which the TMDL is calculated. The OWRB 
determines a numerical quantity representing an estimate of the maximum amount of 
pollutant loading a water body can receive over time from both point and non-point 
sources without violating the Oklahoma Water Quality Standards with an adequate 
margin of safety. Then this maximum permissible pollutant load is allocated among 
various point sources, nonpoint sources, natural background sources and a margin of 
safety (MOS) in the watershed according to the following equation: 
TMDL  =   WLA  +  LA  +  MOS      (1) 
where TMDL is loading capacity of the receiving water body (an estimate of the 
maximum amount of pollutant loading a water body can receive over time without 
violating water quality standards); WLA is wasteload allocation (the portion of a 
receiving water body’s loading capacity that is allocated to existing and future point 
sources; LA is load allocation (the portion of a receiving water body’s loading capacity 
that is allocated to existing and future nonpoint sources and to natural background source; 
and MOS is margin of safety (the prescribed mechanism to account for the uncertainty in 
determining the amount of pollutant load and its effect on water quality (ODEQ, 2004). 
Hydrological, biological, chemical, and pollutant fate and transport data are required to 
calculate a water body’s loading capacity. Before pollutant loads are allocated among 
sources, the location and types of sources, and the current and projected pollutant load for 
each source are identified. Current loading and source contributions are established by 
measuring pollutant loads directly, calculating or estimating loads from water quality and 
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flow data, estimating loads with mathematical models, or using a combination of these 
methods. The data needed for pollutant source analysis may include watershed and 
subbasin boundaries, hydrologic interaction between surface water and groundwater, 
locations of stream segments, locations of pollutant sources, types of pollutant sources, 
anticipated growth of discharges, meteorological/rainfall data and runoff coefficients, 
land uses and land cover, and soil types. Information on factors that influence water  
quality such as permitted industrial and municipal wastewater discharges, concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs), waste application sites, cropland, forestry 
operations, industrial storm water runoff, urban runoff, construction activities, and other 
sources such as natural background may be collected and used to determine cause-and-
effect relationships in a given watershed (NAS, 2001; ODEQ, 2004).  
 
There are three common methods for allocating pollutant loads; equal percent removal, 
equal effluent concentrations, and a hybrid method. Equal percent removal exists in two 
forms. In one, the overall removal efficiencies of the sources are set so that they are all 
equal. In the other, the incremental removal efficiencies beyond the current discharge are 
equal. The equal effluent concentration method is similar to equal percent removal and 
requires that influent concentrations at all sources must be the same. With the hybrid 
method, the criteria for waste reduction may not be the same from one source to another. 
One source may be allowed to operate unchanged while another may be required to 
provide the entire load reduction. More generally, however, a proportionality rule may be 
assigned that requires the percent removal to be proportional to the input source loading 
or flow rate (ODEQ, 2004).      
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The public participation process starts shortly after the TMDL project starts. A public 
notice is placed in the Oklahoma Register and local newspaper(s) announcing the start of 
TMDL development. Staff from the participating agencies attends stakeholder and focus 
group meetings upon request. The ODEQ has the statutory authority to lead the 
development of TMDLs. It conducts the initial review and approval process for TMDLs 
before sending them to the EPA. After completion of the public participation process, the 
ODEQ submits the completed TMDL report to EPA for approval. EPA has 30 days for 
this approval process. The EPA has to review and approve the TMDLs conducted for 
waterbodies that appear on the State’s 303(d) list before any TMDL can be implemented. 
Following EPA approval, the results of the TMDL must be incorporated in the State’s 
Water Quality Management Plan, also called the 208 Plan after the Clean Water Act 
section that requires it. The Implementation Plan will go through a similar public 
participation process as the TMDL (ODEQ, 2004).  
 
The last step in the process is the implementation of the TMDL. This is conducted 
through a variety of mechanisms and programs. In Oklahoma, the recommendation for 
point sources and non-point sources are applied in different ways. Point sources are 
regulated through the Oklahoma Pollution Discharge Elimination System (OPDES) 
program. The 208 Plan contains information about all of the regulated point sources in 
the state. Wasteload allocations for each point source are made part of the 208 Plan and 
permittees must have a wasteload allocation before a discharge permit is issued. OPDES 
permits must be in compliance with the TMDLs. Non-point source implementation is 
managed by the Oklahoma Conservation Commission (OCC) through Watershed Base 
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Plans. Non-point source pollution controls are implemented on a voluntary basis. The 
primary mechanisms used by the OCC are incentive programs for the installation of Best 
Management Practices and public education and outreach programs. TMDLs set the stage 
for the implementation of voluntary and existing regulatory reduction measures to reduce 
the pollutant loads for the attainment of water quality standards (ODEQ, 2004;  
Younos, 2005).  
 
 Potential Contribution of Economic Models in TMDL Program 
 
The TMDL process as outlined in the previous section includes specific steps that must 
be followed in identifying impaired water bodies, setting and implementing the TMDLs. 
All states must set water quality standards for water bodies based on designated uses and 
numeric and / or narrative criteria. However, the institutional context within which the 
current design and implementation of TMDL plans take place does not recognize that 
watershed stakeholders may have multiple and diverse objectives related to improving 
water quality and thus constrains the way they can be achieved effectively and efficiently.  
Neither does the current TMDL process recognize that setting a pollution standard that 
maximizes net social benefits requires an economic valuation of both abatement and 
damage costs that occur within and beyond the watershed. The current TMDL process 
requires that a TMDL be set first, and then waste load allocations be determined next. 
This approach is not consistent with the maximization of net social benefits in the 
watershed, a condition that requires minimization of the sum of total pollution treatment 
costs and total environmental damage costs. Economic theory suggests that setting of 
efficient pollution standards and the determination of waste load allocations to polluters  
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(that incorporates transfer coefficients that reflect proportions of emissions from each 
polluter) must be done simultaneously taking into account both treatment and 
environmental damage costs for a given pollutant in the watershed (Tietenberg, 2003). 
The use of economic optimization models integrated with environmental models allow 
environmental benefits and costs of TMDL standards to be assessed, both treatment and 
damage costs to be considered, while simultaneously determining the desired standard 
and allocation of pollution reductions among sources to minimize costs of reducing 
pollution to society. The integrated environmental-economic approach to TMDL setting 
and implementation has the ability to take into account multiple and diverse watershed 
stakeholder objectives and responses. Thus, the current TMDL design and 
implementation process may be improved by using economic analysis of costs and 
benefits to set and implement TMDL goals and standards efficiently. A number of 
influences are cited in the literature regarding phosphorus pollution in watersheds. The 
next section highlights such influences in the case of the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
 
Legislative, Regulatory and Legal Influences 
 
There are several factors that are cited to have contributed to the current problem of 
phosphorus pollution in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. Commentators point to 
legislative, regulatory and legal developments in Oklahoma and Arkansas, among other 
factors, as major influences on nutrient pollution in the watershed. Hipp (2002) attributes 
the rapid growth of the poultry industry in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed to the 
relaxation of laws prohibiting corporate farming in the two states. This led to increased 
corporate swine and poultry farms in the area. Corporate swine farms are primarily 
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concentrated in Western Oklahoma though some are located in the study area. Poultry 
farms are concentrated in both Eastern Oklahoma and Western Arkansas. The intensity of 
use within the specified areas increases the number of birds and swine and thus litter. The 
litter from these concentrated animal feeding enterprises caused public concerns related 
to odor and water quality. Because of these concerns, the Oklahoma-Arkansas River 
Compact Commission adopted a goal to reduce phosphorus pollution in the nearby 
Illinois River by 40 percent.  
 
In 2001, the Oklahoma Poultry Waste Transfer Act was enacted to provide tax relief to 
those who transport poultry waste from the regions where it is abundant and creates 
environmental problems to regions where phosphorus is in deficit. The OWRB (1996) 
designated public and private water supply, cool water aquatic community agricultural 
irrigation, primary body contact recreation, and aesthetics as beneficial uses for the Lakes 
Eucha and Spavinaw.  However, OWRB (2002) conducted a water quality study whose 
results indicate that several of the designated beneficial uses of the lakes were impaired, 
most importantly the water supply and recreational uses. The OCC (1997) and OWRB 
(2002) identified the main cause of impairment as external phosphorus loading from non-
point agricultural sources and a municipal point source in Arkansas. Crop production, 
swine, poultry and cattle production agricultural enterprises have been cited as the main 
contributors to excessive phosphorus pollution in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
Municipal discharges have been identified as the major point source of phosphorus 
pollution in the area. A variety of these upstream uses accumulate in a number of 
downstream ecological effects, such as eutrophication and species extinction 
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(OWRB, 2002). Due to the unidirectional flow of water and matter from the catchment to 
the lakes, the ecological and economic effects of measures may be distributed unevenly 
across space in the watershed. Since the watershed is shared by two states, there are 
structural, legal and administrative issues that limit possibilities for regulating 
phosphorus pollution in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
 
Taylor et al. (2004) pointed out that most policies to reduce agricultural nutrient run-off 
have relied upon voluntary technology-based approaches rather than market-based 
approaches such as tradable permits or taxes, such as the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Environmental Quality Incentive Program. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) currently lists thirty-seven water quality 
trading markets, in existence or development, that allow privately owned point sources to 
meet their regulatory burden through the purchase of non-point source abatement offsets 
from landowners (USEPA 2002). Woodward (2003) observed that market-based 
programs for pollution control were rapidly on the rise in the United States. Not only 
were SO2 permits bought and sold on the Chicago Board of Trade, but volatile organic 
compounds, nitrogen oxides, and other air pollutants were traded in local markets 
throughout the country. Markets involving water pollution trading rights are also growing 
in number and scope. In 1996, the U.S. Environmental Agency (EPA) released a draft 
framework for water pollution trading that implicitly sanctioned the development of 
nutrient trading programs. An Environomics report to the EPA, titled “A Summary of 
U.S. Effluent Trading and Offset Projects”, listed 16 market-based programs for 
controlling water pollution in various stages of implementation and nine more programs 
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that are under development (Environomics, 1999). Despite this burgeoning interest, the 
experience with effluent trading was quite limited. According to the Environomics report, 
less than 10 trades had actually taken place in the nation’s history of effluent trading. 
Only one or two trades had taken place in each of the trading programs in existence for 
more than a decade. The experience suggested that there were characteristics of water 
pollution problems that posed serious barriers to trading such as verifiability, transaction 
costs of the trading process, or both.  Several studies identified transaction costs in 
pollution trading markets as a significant factor in determining success or failure of 
pollution abatement efforts.   
 
Transactions Costs in Pollution Trading Markets 
 
O’Neil et al. (1983) considered transaction costs to include those required for monitoring 
of emissions, enforcement of environmental standard, and information costs associated 
within a tradable market system. They claimed that often a permit system where no trades 
occur is likely to be less costly than a technology standard.  A later study conducted by 
Stavins (1995) confirmed transaction costs are not negligible for permit markets, but 
concluded that even if transaction costs prevent a permit system from realizing a high 
number of trades, the aggregate costs of compliance will be less costly than a command-
and-control policy. However, he pointed out that it is difficult to know, a priori, whether 
the transactions costs of market based solutions will be greater or less than non-market 
solutions. Therefore, options need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to incorporate 
transactions costs in policy evaluation.  The literature on transaction costs and 
environmental policy cites several factors that influence the level of transaction costs 
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such as the number and diversity of agents, available technology, policy under 
consideration, and the amount of abatement or the size of the transaction (Coase, 1960; 
Stavins, 1995; Thompson, 1996 and McCann and Easter, 1999). 
  
Thompson (1996) proposed an institutional transaction cost framework that could be used 
to measure and incorporate transaction costs in policy evaluation. McCann and Easter 
(1999) applied the framework with modifications in their study to determine transaction 
costs of implementing various agricultural pollution reduction policies. They defined 
transactions cost to include research, information gathering and analysis; enactment of 
enabling legislation including lobbying costs; design and implementation of policy; 
support and administration of the on-going program; monitoring / detection; and 
prosecution / inducement costs. McCann and Easter (1999) measured the magnitude of 
transaction costs associated with policies to reduce agricultural non-point source 
pollution in the Minnesota River. Their findings indicate that taxes may have advantages 
with respect to transaction costs and abatement costs compared to educational programs 
on BMPs, the requirement for conservation tillage on cropped land, and expansion of a 
permanent conservation easement program. Gangadharan (2000) studied the Regional 
Clean Air Act Incentives Market (RECLAIM), a program which uses emissions trading 
to reduce smog creating pollutants in Los Angeles. The study measured the impact of 
transaction costs (defined to include search costs and information costs) on trading 
probabilities of firms in RECLAIM. Results showed that transaction costs are substantial 
in the initial years of the program; search costs and information costs are high, as the 
firms do not participate in similar input and output markets; the presence of transaction 
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costs reduces the probability of trading by about 32 percent. The study concluded that 
transaction costs are significant in explaining non-participation of some firms in the 
market (Gangadharan, 2000). A similar view was held by Stavins (1995) and Nagurney 
and Dhanda (2000) who emphasized that transaction costs can obstruct performance 
efficiency of the permit market by impeding the trading process of permits. This occurs 
when information requirements significantly raise transaction costs in the trading process 
because parties to an exchange must find one another, communicate, and exchange 
information (Stavins, 1995). The preceding discussion suggests that the success of 
tradable emissions permit system required that attention be paid to technology of 
monitoring pollutants, ensuring effective monitoring of the quantity and quality of 
effluents, define transactions, establish emission ceilings and have effective enforcement 
systems. Emphasis is also laid on the necessity to have enough buyers and sellers, clear 
rules, especially for transactions and emission limits. Effluent limits must depend 
partially on installed technology and require minimum pollution control, which will allow 
for effluents with different treatment cost; there must be a future trading market with 
enough buying and selling potential; it is important for the smooth and efficient 
functioning of the market that the permit market be very broad and deep and transactions 
costs must be low; and enforcement must be credible and sustainable over time.  
 
Agriculture and Water Quality Standards 
Watershed management involves the making of informed choices about the desired level 
of economic activities and ecosystem functioning in the catchment. Information on the 
economic and ecological effects of measures as well as their spatial distribution is 
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therefore needed. Agricultural production has increasingly been identified as a leading 
cause of water quality impairment in the United States (USDA and USEPA, 1998; Poe et 
al. 2004).  Agricultural sources of pollution are generally classified as non-point sources. 
Tietenberg (2000) observed that point sources discharge into surface waters at a specific 
location through a pipe, outflow or ditch while non-point sources pollute the waters in a 
more diffuse and indirect way. Loehr (1984) further noted that non-point source pollution 
is intermittent and affected by random meteorological events while pollution from point 
sources is more or less constant and dependent on the level of production activities. 
 
Poe et al. (2004) stressed that non-point source pollution, particularly from agriculture, is 
the largest reason that the United States is not meeting “fishable / swimmable” objectives 
of the 1972 Clean Water Act. This means that there is a growing need for environmental 
policy instruments that are effective and efficient in generating significant reductions in 
nutrient runoff from farming. However, as Poe et al. (2004) noted, the development of 
such policies is complicated by the disperse nature of agricultural runoff. The conveyance 
of nutrients from farming practices to waterways, across and through the physical 
landscape, makes identifying the contribution of individual sources difficult and costly.  
Farm-specific emissions are difficult to measure, the relationship between emissions and 
ambient water pollution levels is stochastic and difficult to model, and there are adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. 
 
The major economic policy question is how to create incentives for both point and non-
point sources to cost-effectively meet water quality standards. Economic theory suggests 
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that cost-effective environmental policy should impose the same Pigouvian tax rate or 
quota price on all polluters (Poe et al., 2004). The cost-effective solution would result 
from equating marginal abatement costs across pollution sources on condition that 
marginal damage costs are independent of the pollution source.  
 
Segerson (1988) established that socially efficient outcomes can be achieved through 
ambient-based approaches. These approaches regulate non-point source polluters based 
on ambient concentrations. Incentive schemes are designed such that a group of polluters 
(also called collective or team contractors) pays penalties if ambient pollution at a 
common monitoring point exceeds a water quality target or receives subsidies if pollution 
is below the target. Similar recent auction experiments conducted by Taylor et al. (2003) 
tested the effectiveness of team contracts as a strategy to induce farm-level nutrient 
abatement in a watershed. The contract for nutrient reduction tied the payments of 
individual farmers to the collective performance of the entire group in a small sub-
watershed. Farmers receive a monetary reward when their collective abatements 
(measured at a common monitoring point) are equal or greater than the collective bid 
quantity, otherwise they are penalized for under-abating (payments are withheld). The 
liability of each polluter depends upon the abatement effort of all polluters as well as 
stochastic environmental factors such as weather. The study establishes that the bidding 
mechanism that allows individual farmers to decide both the technology they will use for 
pollution abatement as well as the quantity, could be efficient in meeting pollution 
targets. An important theoretical assumption underlying these ambient-based approaches 
is that firms undertake non-cooperative Nash behavior. 
 43 
However, the results from Taylor et al.’s (2003) work should be treated with caution. The 
study used a relatively small data set comprising of two groups of agricultural producers, 
and three groups of students at Ohio State University in testing the effectiveness of the 
team contract bidding mechanism. The students and agricultural producers are two 
different groups with different characteristics. More experiments with farmers would 
provide more relevant information to determine the extent to which they know how their 
individual farming practices (and their neighbors’) contribute to water quality.  It is 
important to note that this study did not adequately consider stochastic environmental 
factors such as weather. Also, the participants in this study had difficulties understanding 
the contract and were not informed of the Nash equilibrium strategies. Neither did the 
study take into consideration the socioeconomic and structural differences of the 
participants. The need to consider such differences is demonstrated in an earlier study 
conducted by Renwick and Archibald (1998) using household-level panel data for two 
communities in Southern California. The authors assess the performance of alternative 
demand side management (DSM) price and non-price policy instruments in terms of their 
effectiveness in reducing aggregate demand and distribution of water savings among 
households. The findings suggest that even though DSM policies are effective in 
reducing aggregate demand, the magnitude of the reduction in demand associated with 
different policy instruments varied significantly with the characteristics of the 
households. The composition of aggregate demand (or program participants) matters in 
the assessment of the potential for policies as a water resource management tool   
(Renwick and Archibald, 1998). However, this study did not address the lags in 
responsiveness of aggregate demand to policy changes; neither does it account for 
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interaction effects on demand of different policy instruments used during the study 
period. In reality, it is most unlikely that there will be no interaction among different 
policy instruments used and that no lags in responsiveness to policy changes will occur in 
a setting used in this study. Therefore, more research is needed to measure policy 
interaction effects on demand and determine the circumstances under which potential 
synergistic policy interaction would yield maximum reduction in aggregate demand or 
maximum water savings by households than if each policy were implemented in 
isolation.  This would apply as well to environmental policy instruments geared at 
providing incentives to farmers to reduce nutrient discharges into ambient water bodies. 
 
 Romstad (2003) warned that theoretical team mechanisms are difficult to implement 
because they impose a high information requirement on the regulatory agency or point 
source. The contractor needs to possess privately held, farm-level abatement cost 
information in order to set the appropriate incentives.  Though these experimental 
economic studies have established that ambient-based pollution mechanisms are effective 
in meeting pollution targets, their effectiveness is limited to small group settings of 
homogeneous, non-cooperative agents. However, there is a policy concern because this 
“theoretical non-cooperative agents” assumption may not be appropriate under field 
settings where a small group of firms with similar interests are likely to collude.  
Poe et al. (2004) investigated the performance of ambient-based approaches under 
conditions of group cooperation. They used different programs that included mechanisms 
such as tax and subsidy, fixed penalty, tax only, subsidy only and combined approach.  
The study establishes that when firms are allowed to cooperate, as is likely in a real world 
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setting where a small group of polluting firms face the threat of potentially large tax 
liabilities or the possibility of large subsidies, the experimental outcomes deviate quite 
substantially from non-cooperative settings and corresponding theoretical predictions. 
Kebede et al. (2002) used an integrated economic-environmental model to assess the 
point source pollution from major industries in Northern Alabama. They apply an input-
output economic model with pollution emission coefficients to assess direct and indirect 
pollutant emission for several major industries. This approach provides a useful analytical 
tool for direct and cumulative emission estimation and generates insights on the 
complexity in choice of industries or enterprises. A variation of this approach was 
developed and applied by Schou, Skop and Jensen (2000). Their method combines a 
partial equilibrium sector model for agriculture, farm accounts statistics, a GIS-based 
procedure for spatial disaggregation of agricultural production structure, a procedure for 
calculating farm economic input, and a nitrate loading model.  The method is applied by 
analyzing two alternative tax policies in terms of their effects on farm value, nitrate 
leaching, and nitrate loading of costal waters. Scheren, Zanting and Lemmens (2000) 
applied a system of pollution inventory methods to estimate waste loads from pollution 
sources on the basis of functional variables and pollution intensities and use penetration 
factors to incorporate the effects of treatment facilities and natural ‘purification’ in rivers 
and wetlands. 
 
Point – Non Point Source Pollution Trading 
 
“Among the most important EPA initiatives to address agricultural and other nonpoint 
source contributions to water quality problems is the Total Maximum Daily Load 
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(TMDL) program. The program requires states to develop and implement watershed-
based plans for water resources that are too polluted to meet designated uses. In many 
watersheds, achieving designated uses will require that states tackle long unregulated 
nonpoint sources. As the leading nonpoint source, agriculture will likely be a major target 
of TMDL initiatives (USEPA, 2002). There is substantial interest in using point-nonpoint 
trading to achieve nonpoint source reductions. Several fully implemented and pilot point-
nonpoint trading programs have emerged over the past decade, the best-known being Tar-
Pamlico (NC), Cherry Creek (CO), Dillon Reservoir (CO), and Fox River Basin (WI).” 
(Horan and Shortle, 2005, AJAE 87(2): 340). 
 
Lake Dillon, Colorado is a high water quality reservoir used for recreation purposes. It is 
the first point-nonpoint trading program in the U.S. (Jarvie and Solomon, 1998). The 
state of Colorado used a total phosphorus standard of 7.4 µg / L to allocate a total annual 
phosphorus load of 4,610 kg per year for the watershed. The state implemented controls 
for existing urban nonpoint sources rather than upgrading their publicly owned treatment 
works (POTWs) discharging to the lake and approved a water quality management plan 
with a trading ratio of 2:1. The Lake Dillon point-nonpoint trading program did not allow 
for the purchase or sale of phosphorus credits. However, it demonstrated that trading can 
simultaneously allow development in the watershed and still improve or maintain lake 
quality (EPA 1992; Jarvie and Solomon, 1998).   
 
The Tar-Pamlico river basin experienced high levels of nitrogen and phosphorus 
emissions in the 1980s.  Sixty-six percent of the phosphorus came from nonpoint sources 
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while 25 percent came from waste water treatment plants. Eighty-three percent of the 
nitrogen came from nonpoint sources. The Tar-Pamlico river basin was classified as 
Nutrient Sensitive Waters due to rapid eutrophication in the basin. Municipal plants in the 
basin formed the Tar-Pamlico basin association and worked with the State of North 
Carolina to develop a nutrient budget and reduction strategy for the basin. The 
dischargers in the Tar-Pamlico basin had an option to either trade 10-year life reduction 
credits at a 3: 1 trade ratio with other point sources or pay to implement best management 
practices at nonpoint sources to reduce the basin’s nutrient load (Hall and Howett, 1994; 
NCDEM, 1995; and Jarvie and Solomon, 1998).    
 
From the preceding discussion, the lesson learned is that “point-nonpoint trading works 
as follows: Pollution sources are required to hold permits that define their allowable 
discharges. For metered point sources, the permits define allowable measured discharges. 
Because nonpoint discharges are generally unobservable, the permits define allowable 
“estimated” discharges, where the estimates are derived from models linking observable 
land use and management practices to nonpoint loads. With tradable permits, each source 
can adjust its allowances by buying or selling permits subject to rules governing trades. 
Among these rules is a trading ratio that defines how many nonpoint source permits trade 
for one point source permit.” (Horan and Shortle, 2005, AJAE 87 (2): 340).   
 
Jarvie and Solomon (1998) pointed out some of the conditions whose presence might 
increase the likelihood of a successful implementation of an effluent trading program. 
There must be a need for improved water quality in the watershed coupled with an 
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existence of a strong economic incentive for effluent sources in the basin to engage in 
trading. The point-nonpoint effluent trade must not bring additional risk for point sources 
in the watershed to reduce effluent at nonpoint sources not under their control. Trading 
may be encouraged if there were community benefits resulting from the effluent trade. 
Previous studies have shown that trading programs that had public support were most 
likely to be implemented with much success. Cost-effective improvements in water 
quality may be achieved if all these conditions were present in a given basin (Jarvie and 
Solomon, 1998). 
 
The Need for Environmental Policy 
 
Policymakers must understand why environmental policy is needed. A basic 
microeconomic principle is that the equating of marginal benefits and marginal costs will 
maximize total net benefits. Thus, free markets will lead to a socially efficient allocation 
of resources. However, it is important that policymakers understand what kind of costs 
and benefits are generated by the good or service in question. When private costs are 
identical to social costs, and private benefits are identical to social benefits, then the free 
market will produce optimum welfare and resources will automatically be allocated 
efficiently. Evidence abound in economic literature suggests that markets are not 
necessarily perfectly competitive in the real world. There exist circumstances that create 
a disparity between private costs and social costs, and private benefits and social benefits.  
Several reasons are identified, based on the preceding argument, why environmental 
policy is necessary. The reasons include market and policy failures that are interlinked 
with the evolution of property rights. Market failure is a technical term that is used to 
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refer to conditions under which the free market does not produce optimal welfare and 
fails to allocate resources efficiently. The market clearing forces do not maximize social 
net benefits by equating marginal social benefits with marginal social costs. Important 
examples of such failure include external effects (externalities), public goods, common 
pool resources, poorly defined or defended property rights, imperfectly competitive 
markets, and imperfect (or asymmetric) information (Khan, 1998; Freeman, 2003; 
Sterner, 2003).  
 
Some environmental problems have arisen from a failure of political rather than 
economic institutions to allocate environmental resources efficiently. Policies reflect 
economic interests, and in some cases, there may not be a single policy that is "optimal" 
for every group in society. However, improper incentives are the root cause of policy 
failure. Inappropriate government intervention in the economy may be a source of 
disparity between private and social values. This divergence between private and social 
costs, or private and social benefits, may lead to non-optimal social welfare. Sterner 
(2003) distinguished two types of policy failure: corrupt policy and bad policy. The 
former is a policy that claims to be in the interest of the whole country but actually serves 
the interest of one group. Policy resulting from special interest groups is most likely to 
fall in this category. Special interest groups use the political process to engage in rent 
seeking, defined as the use of resources in lobbying and other activities directed at 
securing protective legislation (Tietenberg, 2000).  A bad policy is one that intends to 
enhance welfare in a reasonable way but fails due to ineptitude (Sterner, 2003). Public 
policies and the actions of individuals and firms can lead to changes in the flow of 
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services from natural resources, thereby creating benefits and costs. Public policy will 
lead to misallocation of environmental goods and services if property rights are affected 
in such a manner that results in a divergence between private and social costs and 
benefits in the economy (Freeman, 2003).   
 
Jones (2002) pointed out that the economics of goods and services depends on their 
attributes. Goods and services that are excludable allow their producers to capture the 
benefits they produce; goods and services that are not excludable involve substantial 
‘spillovers” of benefits that are not captured by producers. Such spillover costs or 
benefits, unintended consequences, or unintended side effects (either beneficial or 
detrimental) associated with market transactions are called externalities. Examples 
include soil erosion caused by unsuitable agricultural practices. The silting of dams and 
the destruction of coral reefs are real costs, but these costs are not borne by the 
individuals or corporations that cause the damage. These externalities lead to a 
divergence between private and social costs and benefits. This results in a misallocation 
of resources in the economy. Goods and services with positive spillovers tend to be 
underproduced by markets because not all preferences are revealed. The marginal private 
benefits are less than marginal social benefits in this case. This provides an opportunity 
for government intervention to improve welfare. Goods with negative spillovers may be 
overproduced by markets. The marginal private costs are less than marginal social costs 
in this case. Examples include water pollution and a factory the smoke from which has 
harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties. Such situations can be seen as 
consequences of incomplete property rights: if waterways and air had owners with a right 
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to clean water and clean air respectively, then those owners could sue those who caused 
the soil erosion and air pollution and thus internalize the effects. Government regulation 
may be needed if property rights cannot be well defined. The tragedy of the commons is a 
good example (Stavins, 2000; Sterner, 2003).    
 
Several common environmental resources such as clean water, clean air, tropical forests, 
world’s fisheries, natural scenic landscape, and biological biodiversity are examples of 
public goods. Tietenberg (2000) defined public goods as those that exhibit both 
consumption indivisibilities and nonexcludability. These goods or services are enjoyed in 
common. Once the good or service is provided, even those who fail to pay for it cannot 
be excluded from enjoying the benefits it confers. One person’s consumption of a good 
does not diminish the amount available for others. The market tends to undersupply 
public goods because it is hard to exclude those who do not pay and each person is able 
to become a free rider on the other’s contribution. When this happens it tends to diminish 
incentives to contribute, and the contributions are not sufficiently large to finance the 
efficient amount of the public good. Sterner (2003) emphasized that political processes 
are needed, such as the election of a government that collects taxes and finances public 
goods. He further noted that common pool resources also have costly exclusion, but the 
goods produced with these resources are consumed individually (as private goods). 
Examples include firewood and fodder, and the resources are often managed as common 
property. Free riding and other mechanisms that lead to the undersupply of public goods 
may also lead to the overuse of common pool resources unless institutions are strong 
enough to limit access by the users.  
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Imperfect competition is the term used for markets where individual actions of particular 
buyers or sellers have an effect on market price. In such markets, the marginal revenue of 
the firm becomes different from the market price, and this tends to generate an 
equilibrium where marginal social cost is not equal to marginal social benefit. 
Noncompetitive markets, monopolies, and oligopolies usually result in nonoptimal 
supply of good and services. These market structures usually result in lower-than-normal 
production and higher-than-normal prices. That is, situations where too little of the good 
or service is sold at too high a price compared with outputs and prices usually achieved 
under perfectly competitive market conditions (Tietenberg 2000; Sterner, 2003). Thus, 
imperfect markets contribute to environmental problems by inefficiently allocating 
environmental resources to competing uses. Many extractive industries may be 
characterized by imperfect competition. Some industries, such as electric power and 
natural gas distribution, are regulated monopolies. Other industries, such as oil and coal, 
are regarded by the general public as oligopolistic (only a few sellers who have price-
setting ability) (Khan, 1998).   
 
Asymmetric or imperfect information is another cause of market failure. This is a 
situation where some segment of the market - consumers or producers or both - does not 
know the true costs or benefits associated with the good or service. Economists typically 
point out that there are no "free lunches" yet commonly assume that information is freely 
available to everyone. This does not necessarily hold in the real world. Empirical 
evidence suggests information is costly, and lack of information stops the market from 
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operating perfectly. Under these circumstances, the forces of supply and demand are most 
likely not to equate marginal social benefits with marginal social costs. Imperfect 
information may be an important factor when dealing with global warming, acid rain, the 
effect of exposure to hazardous chemicals in the home (pesticides, asbestos, detergents, 
radon, etc), air and water pollution. Because policymakers do not have reliable data on 
pollution damages and abatement costs, for instance, they cannot design policies that are 
both efficient (with respect to resource allocation) and fair (in sharing the burdens of all 
the costs involved). Understanding information asymmetries would help policymakers 
design policy instruments to address monitoring difficulties, and promote social goals 
such as equity without destroying incentives for work and efficiency (Khan, 1998; 
Sterner, 2003). 
 
Policy Instruments Used for Environmental and Natural Resources Policy 
 
Given market and policy failures outlined in the previous section, this section presents the 
main categories of policy instruments used for environmental and natural resources 
policy. However, Sterner (2003) warned that no policy instrument will work perfectly 
(although some will work better than others) if the economy is not competitive and if the 
bureaucracies are not honest, well-informed, and sufficiently well funded to carry out 
their responsibilities. Various kinds of policy instruments are applicable in the area of 
natural resource management (water, fisheries, land, forests, agriculture, biodiversity, and 
minerals) and in pollution control (air, water, and solid and hazardous wastes).  The 
policy instruments may be divided into four categories: using markets, creating markets, 
environmental regulation, and engaging the public (World Bank, 1997; Sterner 2003) as 
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shown in table 4 below. As can be seen from table 4, the first category of policy 
instruments, "using markets," includes subsidy reduction; environmental charges on 
emissions, inputs, or products; user charges (taxes or fees), performance bonds, deposit-
refund systems, and targeted subsidies. 
 
Table 4  Classification of Instruments in the Policy Matrix. 
 
Using Markets 
 
 
Creating Markets 
 
Environmental  
Regulation 
 
Engaging  
the Public 
 
Subsidy reduction 
 
Environmental taxes and 
charges 
 
User charges 
 
Deposit-refund systems 
 
Targeted subsidies 
 
 
Property rights and 
decentralization 
 
Tradable permits and rights 
 
International offset systems 
 
 
 
 
Standards 
 
Bans 
 
Permits and quotas 
 
Zoning 
 
Liability 
 
Public 
participation 
 
Information 
disclosure 
Source: Adapted from World Bank 1997; Sterner 2003. 
 
 
The first category of instruments also includes instruments such as refunded emissions 
payments and subsidized credits. There are many forms of subsidies, from tax 
expenditures, to more classical direct, budget-financed payments in support of certain 
activities (or people). A per-unit pollution subsidy is an incentive that pays the polluter a 
fixed amount of money for each unit of pollution that is reduced. The polluter will reduce 
pollution to the point where the per-unit subsidy is equal to the marginal cost of 
abatement. Under the tax system, pollution is reduced until the point where the per-unit 
tax is equal to marginal abatement cost. Therefore, if the amount of the per-unit subsidy 
is equal to the amount of the per-unit tax, the two systems will generate identical 
behavior on the part of an individual polluter.  Subsidies may apply to payment for 
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certain “services,” prices for certain inputs or technology, loans, or access to credit 
markets. The most practical argument against subsidies is that they are too expensive as a 
policy instrument, especially in developing countries where the opportunity cost of public 
funds is high. Baumol and Oates (1988) argue that while taxes and subsidies have 
equivalent effects on an individual polluter, they have quite different effects on the 
number of polluters. Subsidies make firms more profitable, so there will be more firms 
under a subsidy system than under a tax system. A subsidy system whose aim was to 
reduce the amount of pollution per polluter in the watershed could actually result in an 
increase in the amount of pollution if a large number of firms entered the market due to 
the increased profitability generated by the subsidy.  The deposit-refund system 
instrument encompasses a charge on some particular item and a subsidy for its return. 
The polluters (i.e. those who do not return the item) pay a charge, whereas those who 
return the item collect a refund and thus pay nothing. A deposit-refund system is similar 
to a tax, but instead of making the individual pay for undesirable acts as they occur, the 
individual pays up front and then is rewarded if he or she acts properly. The refund is 
paid when the potential polluter demonstrates compliance by returning the item that 
carries the refund, thus making the monitoring of illegal disposal unnecessary.  Deposit-
refund systems have been used mainly for waste management and recycling of beverage 
containers, tires, batteries, and containers of toxic household products (Khan,1998; 
Tietenberg, 2000; Sterner, 2003). A refunded emissions payment encompasses a charge, 
the revenues of which are returned to the aggregate of taxed firms. Thus, polluters pay a 
charge on pollution, and the revenues are returned to the same group of polluters, not in 
proportion to payments made but in proportion to another measure, such as output. The 
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net effect of the payment and refund is that the firms with above-average emissions make 
net payments to the cleaner-than-average firms.      
 
A pure environmental charge is referred to as a Pigouvian tax if it is set equal to marginal 
social damage (e.g. of some pollution). At least under several classical assumptions 
(including fully informed, honest, welfare-maximizing regulators and appropriate 
concepts of property rights), they have certain optimality properties. However, in many 
cases, the pure environmental tax is hard to use (e.g. if pollution is unobservable). The 
reasons for this difficulty include the lack of understanding of the multiservice and public 
good characteristics of ecosystems. The available proxies or substitutes (such as input or 
output taxes) are more or less suitable. Setting the level of tax or charge is far from 
trivial. It is important that an environmental protection agency set the tax or charge equal 
to marginal damages at the optimal pollution level, which may be different from marginal 
damages at the time of the decision itself. However, taxes have a couple of 
disadvantages, one of which is the relatively complex legal process involved in passing 
and modifying tax laws, which can make the tax instrument somewhat blunt. 
Furthermore, many politicians have encountered considerable resistance to environmental 
taxes, and local or sectoral charges typically are more readily acceptable.  
 
The second category of policy instruments, "creating markets," consists of mechanisms 
for delineating rights. The most fundamental of these mechanisms has particular 
relevance in developing and transitional economies: the creation of private property 
rights for land and other natural resources. A mechanism that is relevant at the local level 
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is common property resource management. Special kinds of property rights in 
environmental or natural resource management are emissions permits and catch permits. 
In an international context, such mechanisms are often referred to as "international offset 
systems." One way to control aggregate levels of emissions or harvest is to set a total 
number of permits or quotas to adapt to the assimilative capacity of the environment or 
the sustainable harvest yield, respectively. Setting totals while allowing for some 
dynamics in the economy due to population growth, changing technology, mobility, and 
economic growth means that the allocated permits must be transferable. Otherwise, the 
allocation of all available rights would make all new activities impossible by definition. 
Tradability also allows the efficiency of the market mechanism to be harnessed to ensure 
that marginal benefits and costs are equalized. The resulting instrument is called tradable 
emissions permits in pollution management and individual transferable quotas in fisheries 
management. Similarly, transferable grazing rights, development rights, and other 
mechanisms apply to other areas of natural resources management. The creation of 
tradable permits helps remove the externalities implied by the absence of property rights 
or the “public good” character of the environment. Essentially, this mechanism creates 
property rights to new resources or shares in the assimilative capacity or the sustainable 
rent production of ecosystems. The fact that these property rights internalize externalities 
and create incentives for protection means that resources have a good chance of being put 
to their most efficient use. However, severe conceptual and practical problems must be 
overcome. For the permits or quotas to work, they must acquire the characteristics of 
property rights, such as permanence and reliability. It takes time and commitment to 
develop permanence and trust, and in the case of natural resources management, a lack of 
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knowledge about the underlying ecosystems and lack of agreement about how they 
should be managed create additional difficulties (Coase,1960; Dale, 1968;  
Montgomery, 1972; Sterner, 2003).    
 
The category "environmental regulations" includes standards, bans, (non-tradable) 
permits or quotas, and regulations that concern the temporal or spatial extent of an 
activity (zoning). Licenses and liability rules also belong in this category, connecting it to 
a large area of lawmaking and to the politics of enforcement. Such instruments as liability 
bonds, performance bonds, (more generally) enforcement policies and penalties are all 
part of the instrument arsenal. One way of regulating the behavior of firms, households, 
agencies, and other agents in the economy is by prescribing the technology to be used or 
the conditions (through zoning or timing). Regulations that restrict location or timing are 
bans and zoning. A ban is a form of technology regulation in which a specific process or 
product is not allowed whereas zoning refers to a kind of regulation whereby certain 
methods or technology are banned in or limited to a certain area. Examples are bans on 
certain kinds of chemicals, fuels or energy technologies, and vehicle types. Examples in 
natural resources management include mandatory technology (or restrictions on 
technology) for management, catch, hunting, farming, and so forth. With full information 
about abatement and damage costs, the regulator could specify the necessary individual 
technologies to achieve maximum welfare.  
 
The reasons why technology standards, restrictions, and zoning are the most commonly 
used instruments are their intuitive simplicity and perhaps the short time perspective of 
many policy decisions. These kinds of regulation may also suit the interests of both 
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regulators and polluters. The technology must achieve a significant reduction in 
pollution, but at reasonable costs.  Conditions that might motivate the use of design 
standards include: technical and ecological information is complex; crucial knowledge is 
available at the central level of authorities rather than at the firm; firms are unresponsive 
to price signals and investments will have long-run irreversible effects; the 
standardization of technology holds major advantages; of only a few competing 
technologies available, one is superior; and monitoring costs are high: monitoring 
emissions is difficult, but monitoring technology is easy (Sterner, 2003). However, the 
design standard is a mandatory technology that leaves enterprises with little choice. They 
are not encouraged to explore cost-efficient ways of achieving pollution control. They 
cannot trade reductions betweens sources, and they are not given any incentive to develop 
cleaner technology. Furthermore, it typically is not feasible for a regulator to have 
knowledge about individual abatement levels or technologies for each firm. The 
information requirements and administrative costs are prohibitive. Typically, an 
environmental protection agency wants a standard technology that is the same for all and 
easy to monitor. In this case, abatement and emissions levels typically will not be 
optimal.  A regulation that imposes a certain limit to harvests or to emissions instead of 
requiring a particular technology is called a performance standard (as distinguished from 
a design standard). Performance standards are significantly different from mandatory 
technology because they give firms considerable flexibility in the choice of abatement 
method by which to meet the mandated goal. They also leave the firms a choice between 
output reduction and abatement level, and trade-offs between polluting units are possible. 
With performance standards, a firm has the additional flexibility to reduce emissions not 
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only by abatement investments but also by reducing output. This flexibility is usually part 
of the socially optimal outcome because the cost at the margin of reducing output to 
lower emissions may be smaller than the costs associated with additional investments in 
abatement. In many real-world cases, industrial pollution is controlled by licensing 
procedures that are a mixture of set emission levels (total or relative to output) and 
mandated technology. Licensing procedures do not allow for flexibility in attaining goals 
through trading between sources.  
 
Liability systems are based on defining legal liability for the damages caused by certain 
types of pollution discharges and facilitating the collection of these damages. The 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
defines legal rights to natural resources for local, state, and federal governments and 
specifies methods by which damages may be measured. The provisions of this act 
provide a means of facilitating the incorporation of the expected social cost of spills into 
the private cost calculation by potential polluters or internalizing the expected damages of 
spills. The legislation increases the probability that the firm will have to pay the social 
costs of its spills, so the firm is more likely to take appropriate safety measures. A 
variation of this system will involve defining legal liability, and then require potential 
polluters to obtain full insurance against any damages they might generate. The insurance 
industry would then require appropriate safety measures on the part of potential polluters. 
This type of system is generally utilized by generators, haulers, and disposers of toxic 
waste (Khan, 1998).  With bonding systems, a potential degrader of the environment is 
required to place a large sum of money in an escrow account. The money will be returned 
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if the environment is left undamaged (or returned to its original condition) and will 
otherwise be forfeited. The size of the bond should be large enough to provide 
appropriate safeguards by those posting the bond, or large enough that the government 
can use the funds to clean up damage if it occurs. Bonds have been employed in strip 
mining areas, where mining companies forfeit the bond if the land is not returned to its 
original condition. Other applications include companies that have leases to cut trees in 
public forests, and companies that transport oil or toxic substances (Khan, 1998). 
   
The fourth category, "engaging the public," includes such mechanisms as information 
disclosure, labeling, and community participation in environmental or natural resources 
management. Dialogue and collaboration among the environmental protection agency, 
the public, and polluters may lead to voluntary agreements or voluntary approaches, 
which have become a fairly popular instrument recently. Voluntary agreements refer to a 
form of negotiated (and verifiable) contract between environmental regulators and 
polluting firms. A firm agrees to invest, clean up, or undergo changes to reduce negative 
environmental effects. In exchange, the firm may receive some subsidies or perhaps some 
other favor, such as positive publicity, a good relationship with the environmental 
protection agency, and perhaps speedier and less formal treatment of other environmental 
controls. This agreement is formalized in a model in which the polluter agrees to adopt a 
cleaner technology in exchange for more lenient regulation.    
 
The direct production of environmental services (public goods) is another way in which 
the government can use its own personnel, know-how and resources to mitigate 
environmental market failures. Activities such as waste disposal, planting trees, stocking 
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fish, creating wetlands, providing and maintaining national parks, treating sewage, and 
cleaning up toxic sites are common examples of government direct provision of 
environmental quality. However, government production of environmental quality is 
largely an ameliorative action, and in many cases it would have been better for society if 
the environmental degradation had been prevented in the first place. It is unlikely that 
such pressing problems such as air and water pollution, global warming, and the 
depletion of the ozone would be adequately addressed by direct provision by government 
or moral suasion (governmental attempts to influence behavior without actually 
stipulating any rules that constrain behavior (Khan, 1998; Sterner, 2003).  
 
The lessons learned form the preceding discussion is that most U.S. environmental 
regulation has been in the form of command-and-control requirements. Command-and-
control approaches require groups of similar sources to use a specific control technology 
or comply with a uniform emission rate requirement.  Economists and policymakers have 
been critical of the command-and-control approach because : (i) some low cost emission 
reduction measures are not pursued; (ii) uniform requirements for broad categories of 
sources ignore differences in the costs of control at and the environmental impacts of 
emissions from different facilities;  (iii) regulators are not in a position to identify the 
most cost –effective portfolio of control measures or how that mix may change over time; 
(iv) it creates disincentives to technology development, in that new, potentially more 
efficient facilities are typically subject to more stringent requirements and that sources 
may be required to place any new emission control technology on all their facilities; and 
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(v) development of detailed technology standards has been time-consuming, politically 
controversial, and administratively costly (Hobbs and Centolella, 1995).    
 
There are two basic types of environmental regulation: emission taxes or effluent fees 
and marketable permit or allowance systems. Such systems provide affected sources the 
incentive and flexibility to achieve the lowest cost mix of pollution prevention and 
emission reduction measures. One classical solution to the problem of environmental 
externalities is a Pigouvian tax, a tax on emissions equal to the marginal environmental 
damage cost at the point where the marginal control cost and marginal damage cost 
functions intersect. To date, emission taxes have not been popular in the United States 
because of the costs which can be imposed on affected sources. Sources pay both for their 
emission reductions (with an incremental cost below the tax rate) and taxes on any 
residual emissions. Emissions taxes can increase economic efficiency by moving prices 
towards societal marginal costs and redistributing demand to less polluting substitutes.  
Marketable permit or allowance systems distribute limited authorizations to emit, which 
can be traded among sources as fungible commodities and are exhausted when a  
specified quantity of pollutant is emitted.  In some systems, unused allowances may be 
banked from period to period. Given unhindered trading, actual emission reductions are 
made by the sources which can most cost-effectively do so. The distribution of 
compliance costs, however, depends on the original distribution of allowances. 
Allowances may be either distributed to specified sources-existing sources may receive 
allowances at no cost –or sold at auction. If allowances are auctioned off, sources’ 
compliance costs may resemble their costs under an equivalent emissions tax. In some 
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marketable permit systems, a small fraction of allowances is held back from distribution 
and sold in zero revenue auction to ensure market liquidity, provide price discovery, and 
inhibit oligopoly power. In a “zero revenue” auction, auction revenues would not be 
retained by the government and may be distributed in proportion to the original 
distribution of allowances (Hobbs and Centolella, 1995). From 1977 to 1986, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency began to supplement command-and-control 
requirements with limited Emission Reduction Credit (ERC) trading programs: netting, 
offsets, bubbles, and banking. In each of the trading programs, to create a tradeable ERC 
the underlying emission reduction ha d to be: surplus to that required to meet existing 
requirements; enforceable by state and federal authorities; permanent; and quantifiable in 
comparison to an established level of baseline emissions. The cost and difficulty of 
identifying potential transactions and securing prior regulatory approval has substantially 
limited the creation and transfer of such credits. Despite limited use, these mechanisms 
reduced air and water pollution control costs  
 
The basic difference between the tax and allowance approaches is that a tax system limits 
the maximum amount that any source is likely to spend on emission reductions, while an 
allowance system ensures that emissions from covered sources will not exceed a 
specified (annual or cumulative) quantity without regard to the cost of the last unit of 
emission reduction. If policymakers had perfect knowledge, either approach could be 
structured to achieve an equivalent result. Under conditions of uncertainty, however, if 
the marginal cost of further emission reductions is rising more rapidly than the rate of 
change in the value of marginal emission reductions (i.e. slope of the marginal cost 
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function exceeds the slope of the marginal benefit function), an emissions tax approach 
may tend to produce smaller distortions from an economically efficient result  
(Baumol and Oates,1988). Researchers have used mathematical programming techniques 
in watershed studies to establish the TMDLs, discharge permit prices and efficient 
trading patterns. 
 
 
Risk Programming Models in Agriculture 
 
Various risk-programming techniques have been developed to address risk in decision 
making. A number of these models have been applied in agriculture to incorporate risk in 
farm management decisions. The various risk-programming techniques help farmers 
make production decisions or select optimal farm plans or management strategies that 
maximize net farm income under conditions of risk and uncertainty. However, most risk-
programming applications in agriculture are based on either mean-variance or 
minimization of total absolute deviations (MOTAD) decision criteria. Markowitz (1959) 
developed quadratic programming methods to address risk and uncertainty issues. 
However, application of these methods did not only prove to be computationally difficult, 
but also require certain assumptions on the part of the decision maker. Hazell (1971) 
developed the MOTAD model for farm planning under uncertainty as an alternative to 
quadratic and semi-variance programming. Hazell’s MOTAD approach uses mean 
absolute deviations as the risk measure. This model has been widely applied because it 
allows the development of a linear programming model with a parametric approach to 
risk and requires no particular assumptions about the behavior of the decision maker 
(Hazell, 1971). The MOTAD model has since become a commonly accepted approach to 
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risk modeling. However, Tauer (1983) developed the Target MOTAD, a variation of 
Hazell’s model that incorporates a safety level of income (or target income level) and a 
risk parameter that allows negative deviations from that safety (target) income level or 
represents the maximum allowable average income shortfall.  The Target MOTAD calls 
for maximization of expected income subject to the requirement that income deviations 
below the target income not exceed some specified level. This model has been used for 
computing stochastically efficient mixtures of risky alternatives. Results from several 
studies indicate that Target MOTAD is computationally efficient. The model also has 
theoretical appeal because it generates a set of efficient choice alternatives that are 
members of the second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD) efficient set (Tauer, 1983; 
MacCamly and Kliebenstein, 1987).  Teague et al. (1995) employed a farm-level risk 
programming model using a time-series of environmental risk indices to incorporate the 
stochastic, multi-attribute characteristics of environmental outcomes associated with 
agricultural production practices (Teague et al., 1995). This framework was used to 
evaluate the tradeoffs between environmental risk and net returns at farm level. 
“Environmental indices were developed which aggregated water quality effects across 
environments (surface water and groundwater) for a given form of contaminant 
(pesticides and nitrates). Restrictions on environmental outcomes were specified based on 
a target (or maximum) level of the environmental indices, and / or the acceptable level of 
compliance with that target.” (Teague et al., AJAE 77 (Feb. 1995), p. 18). The findings of 
this study suggested that expected income is sensitive to nitrate loading restrictions, and 
relatively less sensitive to pesticide loading restrictions. However, it should be noted that 
these findings could be basin and crop specific. Results also indicated that prescr
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derived using deterministic environmental risk measures may ignore significant 
probabilities of exceeding an environmental standard (Teague et al., 1995).  This study 
demonstrated that Target MOTAD could be used to find maximum expected farm income 
while insuring the probability that maximum contaminate levels (MCL) for any of several 
pollutants (pesticides, nitrates, phosphates) were not exceeded was less than a specified 
tolerance. An environmental risk income frontier can be traced out if the probability that 
a particular MCL not be exceeded can be varied upward from zero (Teague et al., 1995). 
Later, Qui, Prato and Kaylen (1998) extended Teague et al.’s (1995) farm-level Target 
MOTAD model to allow incorporation of  both economic and environmental risks in 
agricultural production at watershed-scale level. The modified Target MOTAD model 
was used to evaluate the economic and environmental tradeoffs in a watershed by 
imposing a probability-constrained objective function to capture the yield uncertainty 
caused by random allocation of farming systems to soil types and by introducing 
environmental targets to incorporate environmental risk due to random storm events. 
Using the modified Target MOTAD framework, Qiu, Prato and Kaylen (1998) 
determined the tradeoff frontier between watershed net return and sediment yield and 
nitrogen concentration in runoff in a watershed. The findings of their study showed that 
the tradeoff frontier is significantly affected by environmental risk preference (Qiu, Prato 
and Kaylen, 1998). The preceding discussion demonstrates that the desire to reflect 
uncertainty of future events within decision-making problems has led to a number of risk 
models. Many of these risk models attempt to reflect the decision maker’s expectations of 
possible outcomes and their probabilities, along with the decision maker’s attitude toward 
assuming risk (Lambert and McCarl, 1985). For the sake of compactness, the next section 
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focuses on and describes the theoretical environmental Target MOTAD model because of 
its usefulness and appropriateness to meeting the objectives of this dissertation research. 
    
Environmental Target MOTAD Model 
 
Tauer (1983) developed and describes the Target MOTAD as a two-attribute risk and 
return model. In this model, economic return is measured by the sum of the  expected 
economic returns per unit of activity multiplied by individual activity levels. The 
riskiness of returns is measured by the probability-weighted average of the negative 
deviations of the resulting economic returns from a target return level under the different 
states of nature. Risk is varied parametrically so that a risk-return frontier is traced out. 
Based on the works of Tauer (1983), Teague et al. (1995) and Qiu, Prato and Kaylen 
(1998), the theoretical Target MOTAD model may be mathematically expressed as 
follows:  
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where E(z) is the expected return of the farm plan; Cj, expected return of activity j; Xj, 
level of activity j; akj, amount of resource k used per unit of activity j; bk, level of 
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resource k available; Te, target identified for the environmental indicator (the total annual 
maximum phosphorus load) ; Vrj, value of the environmental indicator for activity j in 
state of nature r (phosphorus runoff from hru j from the state of nature r) ; dr, deviation 
above Te for state of nature r (the phosphorus runoff deviation above Te for the state of 
nature r); pr, probability that state of nature r will occur; λe, permissible level of 
compliance to Te parameterized from M to 0 (risk aversion parameter); n, the number of 
activities; K, number of resource equations or constraints; s, number of states of nature 
(state of nature r refers to the HRU specifications and weather patterns that affect 
phosphorus runoff); and M is a large number.  Equation (2) maximizes expected return of 
the solution set. Equation (3) fulfills the technical constraints. Equation (4) measures the 
revenue of a solution under state r.  If that revenue is less than the target T, the difference 
is transferred to equation (5) via variable yr. Equation (5) sums the positive deviations 
after weighing them by their probability of occurring, pr. This Target MOTAD model 
identifies farm plans which maximize net returns but maintain environmental risk below 
a critical level or target.   
 
Application of Mathematical Programming in Watershed Studies 
 
Economic optimization models seeking efficient allocation of limited resources have 
been developed and used to identify optimal management strategies conducive to 
maximization of producer income in the agricultural sector. Watershed managers have 
employed economic optimization models to determine cost efficient nitrogen and 
phosphorus pollution abatement in various watersheds in the U.S. The optimal level of 
phosphorus load can be achieved by constructing an economic model that maximizes 
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social welfare by equating estimated marginal abatement with marginal damage costs in 
the watershed. Though costs of reducing phosphorus loading fall on agricultural 
producers, industries, and municipalities in the watershed, a reduction in phosphorus 
loading may reduce costs of treating municipal water supplies and improve water quality 
in the region. It will also result in increased recreational benefits in the watershed.  
 
Westra and Olson (2001) have used mathematical programming to determine the most 
efficient methods of reducing phosphorus loading to the Minnesota River by 40 percent. 
The authors found that by targeting specific areas in the watershed, the goal could be 
reached with less reduction in income than was possible if restrictions were uniformly 
applied to all producers (Westra and Olson, 2001).  Ancev (2003) and Ancev, Stoecker 
and Storm (2003) developed an optimization model that was used to estimate the 
feasibility and cost of meeting various total maximum annual loads (TMAL) and the 
damage cost incurred by water treatment plants and recreation losses from each possible 
TMAL (Ancev, 2003). The results indicated the minimum sum of abatement costs (costs 
to reduce soluble phosphorus) from point and non-point sources plus damage costs from 
phosphorus pollution required a reduction of phosphorus loading from a current 51 tons 
to 23-26 tons per year (Ancev, 2003). The Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB 
2002) study called for an annual loading of not more than 18 tons per year. Ancev (2003) 
found that when the phosphorus load was limited to 18 tons, the marginal damage cost 
avoided from removing a kilogram of phosphorus was $11 while the cost of removing the 
kilogram of phosphorus was $27. The results also indicated that a combination of 
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methods such as treating litter with alum, litter trading within the watershed , and land 
use changes would be required to achieve this objective at least cost (Ancev, 2003). 
 
Ancev’s (2003) approach employs a static spatial programming model. His approach 
does not adequately provide for linkages between sub-basins in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed throughout the year. The flow of water and nutrients from one sub-watershed 
to the next is not linked to ensure that TMDLs are met at critical points along the streams 
within the watershed. The model does not account for total and soluble phosphorus runoff 
from each of the hydraulic response units on a monthly basis to determine the degree to 
which the TMDL is met throughout the year. The most likely points for total phosphorus 
constraints may be at the outlets of some sub-watersheds. These may particularly be 
where the low TMDLs are established for specific reaches within the watershed.   
 
Another problem with Ancev’s (2003) programming model is that it does not incorporate 
a risk analysis component. Similar studies have used models that accommodate risk 
measures to ensure the probability of exceeding the TMDL under variable weather 
conditions at various points in the watershed is less than a stated tolerance. Teague et al. 
(1995) and Qui et al. (1998) developed and demonstrated environmental risk 
programming models that minimize the cost of meeting the TMDL while insuring that 
the probability of violating the TMDL is less than a tolerance level. The work by Ancev, 
Stoecker, and Storm (2003) demonstrated that it was optimal to ship poultry litter from 
areas of excess soil test phosphorus (STP) to areas where soils were still low in 
phosphorus. However if an STP policy is adopted where producers must first test soils 
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before applying litter, this option will exist only as long as the STP remains below the 
upper limit. If litter applications were limited to agronomic rates then such buildup might 
not occur although surface accumulations of phosphorus are vulnerable to runoff. The 
model does not account for phosphorus accumulation over time from land applications of 
organic and inorganic fertilizer. It does not predict the effect on STP levels and expected 
phosphorus runoff when producers change BMPs over time.  
 
Overview of Hydrologic / Watershed Models 
 
Rao (1996) defined a model as a simplification of nature representing a set of objects and 
their relationships and often describes a phenomenon that cannot be directly observed. 
Environmental models are developed to better understand natural phenomena and to 
better manage the natural resources. There is growing concern about the negative impact 
of various economic activities on the environment. Most of these environmental problems 
have a spatial dimension. On-site monitoring of the impacts of say, agricultural activities, 
on the natural environment is labour intensive and often expensive. Therefore, simulation 
modeling of nonpoint source pollution can provide useful information for decision-
makers and planners to take appropriate land management measures and provide 
guidelines in the development and planning of agricultural management strategies (Liao 
and Tim, 1994). Watershed models abound in the hydrological literature. Numerous 
computer models have been developed to perform watershed assessments integrating 
hydrologic models with erosion models and identifying point and nonpoint pollution 
sources and assessing their impact on water quality within the watershed. Only 
hydrological models that are relevant to the problem being considered in this dissertation 
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are described. Srinivasan and Arnold (1994) pointed out that each model addresses 
specific issues along with a set of assumptions and variable input requirements. They 
described models as either non-spatially distributed (e.g CREAMS and EPIC), or 
spatially distributed (e.g SWRRB and SWAT); single event (e.g. AGNPS and 
ANSWERS), or continuous time-scale (e.g. CREAMS, EPIC, SWRRB, ROTO and 
SWAT); field-scale (e.g CREAMS, EPIC and GLEAMS), or basin-wide (e.g AGNPS, 
ANSWERS, SWRRB and SWAT) (Srinivasan and Arnold,1994). 
 
CREAMS is the acronym for Chemical, Runoff, and Erosion from Agricultural 
Management Systems, a field-scale model developed by the USDA-Agricultural 
Research Service (ARS) to simulate the impact of agricultural management systems on 
water, sediment, nutrients, and pesticides leaving the edge of a field (Knisel, 1980).  
Several other field-scale hydrology models evolved from the original CREAMS, 
including the Groundwater Loading Effects of Agricultural Management System 
(GLEAMS), and the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC). The GLEAMS 
model was developed for field-size areas to simulate pesticide groundwater loadings and 
evaluate the effects of agricultural management systems on the movement of agricultural 
chemicals within and through the plant root zone (Knisel, 1980; Leonard et al., 1987).  
The EPIC model is a continuous simulation model that can be used to determine the 
effect of management strategies on agricultural production and soil and water resources. 
The drainage area considered by EPIC is generally a field-size area, up to 100ha 
(weather, soils, and management systems are assumed to be homogeneous). The major 
components of EPIC are weather simulation, hydrology, erosion-sedimentation, nutrient 
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cycling, pesticide fate, plant growth, soil temperature, tillage, economics, and plant 
environmental control (Williams et al., 1985; Arnold et al., 1990).  
 
SWRRB is the acronym for Simulator for Water Resources in Rural Basins, a model that 
was developed by modifying the CREAMS daily rainfall model for large, complex 
basins. SWRRB operates on a daily time step and is capable of simulations up to 100 
years or more. The model provides the efficient computation of sediment yield from 
small to large, complex watersheds. Major additions to the CREAMS models include 
allowing simultaneous computations for several subbasins within a large basin and 
adding components to simulate weather, return flow, pond and reservoir storage, crop 
growth, transmission losses, groundwater, and sediment routing. SWRRB allows basins 
to be divided according to landuse, soils, and topography. Since SWRRB places a limit 
on the number of subbasins within a watershed, some lumping of input parameters is 
necessary (GSWRL). However, a model was needed in the late 1980s to estimate the 
downstream impact of water management within Indian reservation lands in Arizona and 
New Mexico. Limitations in the size and number of sub basins and the methods 
employed to model the water and sediment transported out of the sub basins in which 
both routed directly to the watershed outlet led to the development of another model. The 
Routing Outputs to Outlet (ROTO) model took output from multiple SWRRB runs and 
routed the flows through channels and reservoirs. This model overcame the SWRRB sub 
basin limitation by linking multiple SWRRB runs together.  
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The input and output of multiple independent SWRRB runs was cumbersome and 
required considerable computer storage. In order to remove the difficulty of running the 
SWRRB model multiple times and then entering the output into ROTO, these two models 
were combined to create one new model, the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). 
This allows simulations of very extensive areas but retains all of the features that made 
SWRRB a valuable simulation model. Since the early 1990s when SWAT was developed 
it has undergone continued review and expansion of capabilities. Each release has 
provided more features enabling greater analytical opportunities. In addition to the 
expanded capabilities, SWAT has also undergone extensive validation. Some of the 
features added include multiple hydrologic response units; auto-fertilization and auto-
irrigation management options; canopy storage of water; addition of carbon dioxide 
component to crop growth model for climatic change studies; potential evapo-
transpiration equation, lateral flow of water in the soil , and in-stream water quality 
equations and pesticide routing. Based on the usefulness of this tool, its users include 
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), Environmental Consulting Firms, and Universities. SWAT model has been 
widely applied in various scenarios and watersheds (Spruill et al. 2000). Previous 
applications of SWAT in other parts of the United States have shown promising results 
(Srinivasan and Arnold 1994; Rosenthal et al., 1995). The model not only provides 
opportunities to improve watershed modeling accuracy and better long-term prediction of 
hydrologic components (Arnold et al. 1998), but also allows a great deal of flexibility in 
watershed configuration (Peterson and Hamlett ,1997).  
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Rosenthal et al. (1995) tested SWAT predictions of stream flow volume for the Lower 
Colorado River Basin in Texas. The model closely simulated monthly stream flow with a 
regression coefficient of 0.75. The model underestimated stream flow volume during 
extreme events, where precipitation was scattered with high intensity. Bingner et al. 
(1997) evaluated the SWAT model in Goodwin Creek Watershed in Northern 
Mississippi. The Nash-Sutcliffe coefficients, R2, values computed with observed monthly 
flow were all close to 0.80 except one measuring station, which was predominantly in 
forest. Smithers and Engel (1996) used the SWAT model to monitor the Animal Science 
and Greenhill watersheds in west central Indiana. The model underestimated totals for 
both while simulating none or very little base flow. Possible reasons of poor simulation 
were inappropriate soil input parameters or water budgeting procedures, which resulted in 
little drainage. Several hydrological studies have been conducted on the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed. Storm et al. (2001, 2003) conducted two hydrological studies in the 
watershed. In these studies they have developed, calibrated, and further refined the 
SWAT simulation model so it successfully tracks water and phosphorus movements in 
the watershed.  Arnold (1998) points out that the SWAT model can predict the effect of 
alternative agricultural management practices on water, sediment and chemical yields 
from river basins.  
SWAT Model Limitations  
SWAT model limitations may be the result of the data we used in the model, 
inadequacies in the model itself, or our application of the model to simulate scenarios for 
which the SWAT was not designed. The SWAT model, like any other model, is a system 
of equations that represent a simplification of real world processes. Modeling requires 
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many assumptions about real world processes because we do not quite understand them. 
This lack of knowledge on all the variables involved creates a great deal of uncertainty 
associated with modeling. For example, the nutrient loading for next year is unpredictable 
as next year’s weather. There is great uncertainty associated with rainfall variability. The 
calibration of the SWAT model is based on the GIS data, water quality, and stream flow 
data. These data are not free from errors. However, methods are currently not available to 
quantify the uncertainty from sources other than weather.  Weather is the driving force 
for any hydrologic model. Great care must be taken to include as much accurate observed 
weather data as possible. The SWAT model assumes and simulates litter applications as 
simple linear nutrient additions applied to the top 10mm of the soil surface in a uniform 
manner. In reality poultry litter could be incorporated into the soil after application or 
might lie on the soil surface until rainfall moves it into the soil or washes it away. There 
is more and closer litter-surface runoff interaction in the first few storm events after 
application than simulated by SWAT. Normally there would be higher phosphorus 
concentrations in surface runoff if it rained immediately following litter application in the 
fields. The SWAT model does not adequately simulate or allow for dramatic increases in 
phosphorus concentrations when litter is applied in the field. This implies that model 
output on a daily basis or monthly basis should be used with caution. However, if the 
SWAT model was well calibrated, these phosphorus loading discrepancies would have 
less influence on an average annual basis since they are typically not additive (Storm et 
al. 2001). The SWAT model can simulate and predict the relative impacts of long term 
agricultural management and land use on water quality in receiving water bodies in a 
basin. However, the model cannot properly simulate the effects of a single storm event. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
The water quality problem resulting from excessive emissions of nutrients (e.g. 
phosphorus and nitrogen) into Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw is viewed as a case of market 
failure. The water pollution problem exists because property rights for clean water in the 
area are not clearly defined.  Polluters, especially agricultural producers using inputs that 
have adverse effects on the environment such as pesticides and fertilizers (especially 
poultry manure) do not internalize the social costs associated with the use of such inputs 
in their private cost calculations. The divergence between private and social costs gives 
the polluters an incentive to use the inputs (e.g. poultry litter) in quantities exceeding 
socially optimal levels and thus excessive phosphorus runoff into water bodies.  
However, based on Coase’s (1960) argument, agricultural enterprises (and all polluters in 
general) in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed should strive to maximize the difference 
between total benefits resulting from cleaner waters and the total cost of achieving the 
environmental quality. It is not necessary to force environmental polluters to cease 
production activities resulting in the negative externality.  
 
 
This research used a GIS-based hydrological simulation model and mathematical 
programming to assign management practices to particular areas within the watershed to 
effectively control non-point pollution at least cost to society. Estimated non-point source 
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coefficients resulting from the simulation model can be input into a mathematical 
programming model to select most efficient management practices for each location in 
the watershed so that an overall pollution target is reached at least cost (Stoecker, 
Ramariz, and Ancev 2004). This study approaches the problem of phosphorus pollution 
from the social perspective, that is, with the objective of choosing a level of phosphorus 
control that maximizes total benefits to the society. In their earlier work on pollution 
abatement, Freeman, Haveman and Kneese (1973) suggest that the conceptual framework 
for determining optimal abatement levels be based on the concept of minimizing the sum 
of total pollution abatement cost and total environmental damage cost. The concept 
assumes that there exists a social welfare function with which to work. Tietenberg (2003) 
demonstrated that general social welfare can be maximized by minimizing the sum of 
total pollution abatement cost and total environmental damage cost. This dissertation 
research is conducted based on the same concept and assumes existence of a social 
welfare function to be maximized from consumption of market or economic output and 
environmental services.  This relationship can be mathematically expressed as:                       
W = M + E                                                (6) 
Where W is the social welfare function; M is the value of the market goods and services 
consumed by society and E is the value of environmental service consumed by society. 
If we let E* be maximum potential value of environmental services from pristine 
environment, D be costs of environmental damages from production and consumption of 
market goods and services, M* be maximum value of market goods and services with no 
pollution treatment, and T be costs associated with treating pollution, then we may state 
the actual values of market goods and services and environmental services as follows: 
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   M = M* - T         (7) 
E = E* - D         (8) 
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (6) redefines the total social welfare 
function as: 
W =  ( M* - T ) +  ( E* - D ) = M* + E* - ( T + D )    (9) 
Given that M* and T* are fixed, equation (9) shows that we can maximize total welfare 
function by minimizing (T + D), the sum of pollution treatment costs and environmental 
damage costs.  If we assume that both T and D are functions of a given pollutant (p), 
equation (9) may be recast to show that total welfare function will also be a function of 
pollutant (p) as follows: 
W (p) =  M* + E* - ( T(p) + D(p) )                             (10) 
Maximizing total social welfare function in this form requires differentiating  
equation (10) with respect to p and setting the derivative equal to zero: 
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Where ∂T/∂p is the marginal treatment cost, the change in total treatment costs from an 
additional unit of pollutant treated; and ∂D/∂p is the marginal environmental damage 
costs, the change in total environmental cost due to an additional untreated unit of 
pollutant emitted into the environment.  The result in equation (12) implies that total 
social welfare is maximum when marginal treatment costs are equal to marginal 
environmental damage costs.  
The second order conditions with respect to p are:  
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Equation (13) shows that the second order derivative is non-positive and thus consistent 
with the requirement for the point of maximum of the social welfare function. The 
implicit assumption here is that both ∂2T/∂p2 and ∂2D/∂p2 are non-negative at the optimal 
point for the second order derivative to be non-positive. Equation (13) implies that the 
treatment cost function should be increasing at a non-decreasing rate as the amount of 
pollution treatment increases. On the other hand, the environmental damage cost function 
should be increasing at a non-decreasing rate as the amount of pollution treatment 
decreases as illustrated in the example provided in Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4  Damage Costs and Treatment Costs for Pollution Emissions. 
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In the case of water pollution as in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed, the damage cost 
function represents the cost to the environment (such as dead fish, reduced recreational 
values, increased downstream water treatment costs) if various amounts of the pollutant 
(phosphorus) enters into the water supply. The treatment cost function represents all the 
costs incurred in the process of removing and / or preventing the pollutant (phosphorus) 
from entering the water course (Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw). The U-shaped total damage 
and treatment cost curve is obtained by vertical summation of the damage and treatment 
cost curves. The optimal level of pollution and treatment occurs at the minimum point of 
the total damage and treatment cost curve, a point at which the marginal treatment cost 
equals the marginal damage cost as illustrated in figure 5 below. Both Figures 4 and 5 
indicate that the optimal level of pollution remaining and removed is 67 and 33 units, 
respectively. 
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Figure 5  Marginal Damage and Marginal Treatment Costs for Pollution Emissions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Background 
 
The main purpose of the study was to determine optimal pasture management practices 
within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed that will effectively control phosphorus, nitrogen, 
and sediment runoff in a way that is least costly to society. The study used a two-step 
modeling approach that combines Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data-based 
biophysical simulations with mathematical programming to estimate the change in 
pasture management practices and producer income from the implementation of different 
environmental pollution standards or Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) and policy 
instruments in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
 
Simulation of Pasture Management Practices in the Watershed  
 
A calibrated GIS-based Soil Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model (Storm et al., 2002; 
Storm and White, 2005) was used to simulate hydrological and biophysical  
characteristics, production, and sediment, nitrogen and phosphorus runoff for 105 
alternative pasture management practices.  The study used daily weather records for 
temperature and rainfall for the period 1950 to 2004, from which three sets of 23 years of 
daily weather (rainfall and temperature) were selected for use in all simulations 
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performed in this study. The first three years in each set comprised of daily weather data 
for the period 1993-95 and were used for warm-up and the base run of the simulation 
model. The other 20 years in each of the three weather data sets consisted of randomly 
selected sequence of years between 1950 and 2004. A series of simulation runs were 
performed for sixty (60) feasible pasture management practices in each HRU. The 
results of each simulation were then used to generate HRU specific coefficients 
for production, phosphorus runoff, nitrogen runoff and sediment runoff for each  
pasture management practice in each HRU.  The respective coefficients obtained from 
the SWAT model were then used to develop a mathematical programming model used 
to select the most efficient pasture management practice for each HRU. The SWAT 
model delineated the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed into 90 subbasins with a total of 2416 
hydraulic response units (HRUs) and 27 major soil types as indicated in Table 5 and 
Table 6 below.   
 
Clarksville is the dominant soil type, covering about 44 percent of the watershed area, 
followed by Nixa which accounts for approximately 14 percent. Captina and Doniphan 
cover approximately 7 percent of the watershed area each. The soil types Razort and 
Tonti account for about 6 and 4 percent of the area, respectively.  The other 21 major soil 
types account for about 18 percent of the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed area. 
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Table 5  Number of Subbasins and HRUs in the Eucha Watershed by Soil Type. 
 
Soil Type 
Number of 
Subbasins* 
Number of 
Hrus 
Area 
(hectares) 
Share of 
Total Area (%) 
Britwater 
Captina 
Carytown 
Cherokee 
Clarksville 
Doniphan 
Eldorado 
Elsah 
Healing 
Hector 
Jay 
Linker 
Macedonia 
Mountainburg 
Newtonia 
Nixa 
Noark 
Peridge 
Razort 
Secesh 
Shidler 
Stigler 
Taft 
Taloka 
Tonti 
Waben 
Water 
50 
48 
4 
3 
78 
36 
2 
21 
14 
1 
15 
4 
21 
1 
14 
33 
16 
19 
49 
20 
1 
13 
2 
16 
34 
5 
14 
178 
241 
11 
4 
605 
167 
2 
39 
28 
1 
43 
5 
109 
1 
83 
249 
65 
78 
159 
49 
1 
36 
2 
63 
165 
9 
23 
1,974 
6,456 
152 
20 
41,388 
6,160 
26 
444 
216 
6 
1,134 
44 
2,116 
1 
3,063 
12,785 
2,417 
1,544 
5,165 
537 
1 
427 
1 
2,324 
3,724 
47 
942 
2.12 
6.93 
0.16 
0.02 
44.45 
6.62 
0.03 
0.48 
0.23 
0.006 
1.22 
0.05 
2.27 
0.001 
3.29 
13.73 
2.60 
1.66 
5.55 
0.58 
0.001 
0.46 
0.001 
2.50 
4.00 
0.05 
1.01 
Grand Total 90 2416 93,115 100.0 
* Some soil types are found in more than one subbasin in the watershed. 
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Table 6  Soil and Land Use Delineation in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
 Land Use and Area (Hectares) 
Soil Type Pasture Forest Range Crop Urban Water 
Britwater 
Captina 
Carytown 
Cherokee 
Clarksville 
Doniphan 
Eldorado 
Elsah 
Healing 
Hector 
Jay 
Linker 
Macedonia 
Mountainburg 
Newtonia 
Nixa 
Noark 
Peridge 
Razort 
Secesh 
Shidler 
Stigler 
Taft 
Taloka 
Tonti 
Waben 
Water 
1,111 
5,150 
127 
19 
5,932 
4,353 
26 
85 
175 
6 
985 
44 
1,460 
1 
2,224 
5,752 
394 
1,339 
1,118 
210 
0 
368 
0 
1,948 
3,039 
44 
5 
593 
404 
0 
0 
32,810 
1,161 
0 
313 
15 
0 
0 
0 
291 
0 
128 
5,659 
1,793 
0 
3,716 
258 
0 
0 
0 
0 
237 
0 
19 
145 
201 
16 
0 
2,327 
398 
0 
33 
7 
0 
32 
0 
111 
0 
84 
994 
220 
2 
306 
30 
0 
0 
0 
60 
145 
0 
3 
5 
316 
0 
0 
11 
73 
0 
0 
17 
0 
89 
0 
168 
0 
566 
1 
0 
122 
2 
2 
0 
36 
1 
271 
70 
1 
0 
27 
383 
8 
1 
152 
172 
0 
4 
2 
0 
27 
0 
86 
0 
61 
377 
9 
80 
22 
33 
1 
23 
0 
44 
230 
2 
2 
91 
2 
1 
0 
156 
3 
0 
9 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
2 
4 
0 
1 
0 
2 
3 
0 
912 
Total 
Share (%) 
35,916 
38.57 
47,396 
50.90 
5,113 
5.49 
1,751 
1.88 
1,747 
1.87 
1,191 
1.28 
 
Table 6 shows land uses in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed by major soil types. An 
HRU represents a combination of a major soil type and land use within a subbasin. It can 
be seen from Table 6 that about 51 percent of the watershed area is forest. Pastureland 
accounts for approximately 39 percent while rangeland is about 5 percent of the 
watershed area. Cropland and urban area account for about 2 percent of the watershed 
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 area each. Water accounts for about 1 percent of the total watershed area. A series of 
simulation runs were performed for a total of one hundred and five feasible pasture 
management practices in each hydraulic response unit (HRU) in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed. Potential alternative pasture management practices were simulated using 
different combinations of land use/land cover, rate of poultry litter application, 
commercial nitrogen, minimum biomass retained during grazing, and stocking rates as 
shown in tables 7, table 8 and table 9 below.   
 
Table 7  Codes for Various Levels of Management Practice Variables Used .        
 
 
Code* 
 
 
 
Land Use   
Litter 
Application 
Rate 
(kg/ha) 
Nitrogen 
Application 
Rate 
(kg/ha) 
Minimum Plant  
Biomass for 
Grazing 
(kg/ha) 
 
Stocking 
Rate 
(AU/ 
acre) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
- 
AGRL 
HPAS 
LHPA 
LLPA 
LMPA 
LPAS 
MPAS 
RNGB 
FRST 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
1,765 
3,529 
5,294 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
- 
1,100 
1,600 
2,000 
 
- 
0.63 
1.00 
1.26 
           * Codes in column 1 mean different things in columns 2 - 6. 
 
Table 7 shows the codes assigned to each management activity simulated. There are 
eight types of land use / land cover, seven levels of litter application rate, five levels of 
nitrogen application rate, three levels of minimum biomass for grazing, and three levels 
of stocking rate. For instance, the numeric activity code 62133 should be interpreted as 
follows: The first digit (6) represents land use (LPAS in this case); the second digit (2) 
represents litter application rate (4,000 kg/ha); the third digit (1) represents nitrogen 
application rate (50 kg/ha); the fourth digit (3) represents minimum biomass for grazing 
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(2,000 kg/ha); and the fifth digit (3) represents stocking rate (1.26 AU/acre).  
 
Table 8  Simulated Fertilizer and Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing. 
 
 
Pasture 
No. 
Pasture 
Condition 
 
 
Litter 
Applied 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Elem-
N 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Total  
N 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Total  
P 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Plant 
Biomass 
Retained 
 (kg/ha) 
 
 
Hydrologic 
Group 
/ SCS-Curve 
Number 
A    B     C    D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
P 
P 
P 
F 
F 
F 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
G 
0 
0 
2,000 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
0 
0 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
0 
50 
0 
100 
50 
0 
150 
200 
100 
150 
200 
50 
100 
150 
200 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
0 
50 
60 
100 
110 
120 
150 
200 
160 
210 
260 
170 
220 
270 
320 
180 
230 
280 
330 
380 
0 
0 
28 
0 
28 
56 
0 
0 
28 
28 
28 
56 
56 
56 
56 
84 
84 
84 
84 
84 
1,100 
1,100 
1,100 
1,600 
1,600 
1,600 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
68  79   86   89 
68  79   86   89 
68  79   86   89 
49  69   79   84 
49  69   79   84 
49  69   79   84 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
39  61   74   80 
 
Table 8 shows simulated pasture conditions resulting from alternative combinations of 
fertilizer and minimum biomass maintained during grazing. These pasture management 
scenarios were evaluated assuming a low stocking rate of 0.63 AU/acre and a medium 
stocking rate of 1.0 AU/acre. A management scenario that maintained minimum biomass 
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during grazing of 1,100, 1,600 and 2,000 kg/ha was considered to represent a poor, fair, 
or good pasture, respectively.   
Table 9. Simulated Fertilizer and Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing. 
 
 
Pasture 
No. 
Pasture 
Condition 
 
 
Litter 
Applied 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Elem-
N 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Total  
N 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Total  
P 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Plant 
Biomass 
Retained 
(kg/ha) 
 
 
Hydrologic 
Group 
/ SCS-Curve 
Number 
A    B     C    D 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
P 
P 
P 
F 
F 
F 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
F/G 
0 
0 
2,000 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
0 
0 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
6,000 
0 
50 
0 
100 
50 
0 
150 
200 
100 
150 
200 
50 
100 
150 
200 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
0 
50 
60 
100 
110 
120 
150 
200 
160 
210 
260 
170 
220 
270 
320 
180 
230 
280 
330 
380 
0 
0 
28 
0 
28 
56 
0 
0 
28 
28 
28 
56 
56 
56 
56 
84 
84 
84 
84 
84 
1,100 
1,100 
1,100 
1,600 
1,600 
1,600 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
68  79   86   89 
68  79   86   89 
68  79   86   89 
49  69   79   84 
49  69   79   84 
49  69   79   84 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
44  65   76   82 
 
Table 9 shows simulated pasture conditions evaluated using the stocking rate of  
1.26 AU/acre. However, a maintained minimum biomass of 2,000 kg/ha was assumed to 
represent a good / fair pasture at the stocking rate of 1.26 AU/acre as shown in Table 9. 
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The NRCS curve numbers were adjusted according to the pasture condition and 
hydrologic group (A, B, C, or D) assigned to each soil type. It is generally assumed that 
poor pastures are more susceptible to runoff because of less land cover. Thus, poor 
pastures were assigned a higher curve number.  A total of 105 alternative pasture  
management scenarios were simulated. Each of the 105 pasture management practices 
was applied to each of the 2,416 HRUs in the watershed.  
 
Row Crops Management (Green Beans and Winter Wheat) 
 
The row crops, that is, winter wheat and green beans were modeled as a graze-out wheat-
and-green bean rotation (green beans followed by winter wheat). It was assumed that 
farmers in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed undertake a generic spring plowing operation, 
apply commercial nitrogen fertilizer to the cropland and then plant green beans in early 
May. Commercial nitrogen fertilizer will be applied at the rate of 0-200 kg / ha 
irrespective and independent of the amount of poultry litter applied.  A metric ton of 
poultry litter was assumed to contain 14 kg of phosphorus and 30 kg of nitrogen. They 
will then harvest and kill the green beans, apply commercial nitrogen fertilizer and till 
(generic fall plowing operation) the cropland in early August. Commercial nitrogen 
fertilizer will be applied at the rate of 0-200 kg / ha irrespective and independent of the 
amount of poultry litter applied.  Farmers are expected to plant winter wheat in early 
September and start a grazing operation in early November and another grazing operation 
in mid February at stocking rates of 0.63, 1.00 and 1.26 animal units (AU) per acre with 
7.4, 11.8 and 14.9 kg of dry biomass consumed per day.  Three levels of biomass 
maintained during grazing were assumed depending on the condition of the pasture. It is 
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assumed that grazing is suspended when dry biomass per hectare falls below 1,100, 
1,600, and 2,000 kg for pastures in poor, fair, and good condition respectively (OSU 
Extension Publication F-2586).  
 
Another grazing operation will be undertaken in mid February. Farmers will then apply 
poultry manure to the winter wheat in early March. Based on fertilization 
recommendations, four litter application rates ranging from 0 to 6,000 kg / ha would be 
modeled, with 2,000 kg / ha as the base application rate. Phosphorus applied on cropland 
is assumed to come solely from poultry litter. Each ton of litter was assumed to contain 
30 kg of nitrogen and 14 kg of phosphorus. Farmers are expected to harvest and kill the 
winter wheat in early May before the spring plowing, fertilizer application and planting 
the green beans. The inclusion of green beans (a legume crop) in the rotation improves 
the soil structure, reduces erosion, and offers farmers the possibility of reducing 
commercial nitrogen fertilizer needs as well as fertilizer costs for the subsequent crop. 
This is because legume crops can replace some of the nitrogen in the soil by fixation. The 
rotation would help reduce the farmers’ cost of production by naturally breaking the 
cycle of weeds, insects, and diseases that are limited by their plant hosts on the cropland 
(USDA, 1993). 
 
Reducing Poultry Litter Application Rate  
Nutrient management plans help farmers use nutrients (mainly nitrogen and phosphorus) 
efficiently for optimum economic benefit to the farmer, while minimizing impact on the 
environment.  However, excessive application of fertilizers resulted in nutrient 
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contamination of water bodies. Recent studies have shown farms where poultry manure is 
the major or only fertilizer source may be suffering from excessive application of 
phosphorus, especially in those where their soils have extremely high phosphorus content 
caused by previous application of manure.  Row crops contribute 49 percent of the total 
phosphorus loading to Lake Eucha. Majority of the non-point source total phosphorus 
loading is attributed to the elevated soil test phosphorus from row crops. The majority of 
soluble phosphorus is due to the application of poultry litter to pastures. Total phosphorus 
and soluble phosphorus loads are expected to decline by 16 percent and 27 percent 
respectively should application of poultry litter cease (Storm et al., 2002). Farmers using 
poultry litter can reduce phosphorus loading in the watershed by reducing the amount of 
poultry litter applied on the cropland. This objective is attainable if farmers could reduce 
the poultry litter application rates applied on the crops they grow. Farmers grow different 
crops on different soils and topography. Therefore, each distinct agricultural HRU would 
have a different optimal litter application rate, crop yield response to nutrients applied 
with the litter, and nutrient run off. The land uses modeled are low-biomass pasture 
(LPAS), medium-biomass pasture (MPAS), high-biomass pasture (HPAS), litter low-
biomass pasture (LLPA), litter medium-biomass pasture (LMPA), and litter high-biomass 
pasture (LHPA), winter wheat (WWHT), green beans (GRBN), rangeland (RNGB) and 
forests (FRST). It is assumed that poultry litter is applied only to pastures and row crops 
in the management simulations. 
 
Low, Medium, and High-Biomass Pasture Management 
The model simulated low-biomass pasture (LPAS), medium-biomass pasture (MPAS), 
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and high-biomass pasture (HPAS) management systems as described in Table 10. 
 
Table 10  Low, Medium and High Biomass Pasture Management Scenarios. 
Item LPAS MPAS HPAS 
Crop used on pastures 
Type of fertilizer 
Grazing period (days) 
BIO_MIN   (kg/ha/day) 
BMEAT (kg/ha/day) 
BMTRMP (kg/ha/day) 
WMANURE (kg/ha/day) 
Tall Fescue 
Litter/Nitrogen 
270.0 
1,100.0 
7.4 
7.4 
2.4 
Tall Fescue 
Litter/Nitrogen 
270.0 
1,600.0 
11.8 
11.8 
3.8 
Tall Fescue 
Litter/Nitrogen 
270.0 
2,000.0 
14.9 
14.9 
  4.8 
 
Table 10 shows that farmers in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed were assumed to graze 
their cattle on Tall Fescue in all three pasture management systems. In the cases of LPAS 
and MPAS systems, we assumed that the tall fescue was seeded in early January and 
cattle put on it beginning of March. The length of the grazing period is 270 days. 
However, the minimum plant biomass for grazing to occur (BIO_MIN) on the LPAS and 
MPAS was maintained at 1,100 kg/ha and 1600 kg/ha, respectively. Due to this 
difference in minimum plant biomass before grazing could be suspended, it was assumed 
that the LPAS yielded more runoff due to less plant cover compared to the MPAS 
system. This was achieved by setting SCS-curve numbers (CN2) for the LPAS higher 
than MPAS depending on the soil hydrologic group. However, it was assumed that the 
amount of biomass removed (BMEAT) and trampled (BMTRMP) were 7.4 kg / ha and 
11.8 kg / ha (dry weight), respectively. The HPAS system also involved tall fescue 
seeded in early January. Farmers were expected to apply commercial nitrogen fertilizer at 
rates ranging from 0-200kg / ha and then start grazing in March. Grazing would be 
suspended when plant biomass was less than 2,000 kg / ha. The length of the grazing 
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period was the same as in the other two systems, but the amount of biomass removed, 
manure deposited and plant biomass trampled daily was set at twice that of the LPAS. 
The SCS-curve number was assumed lower compared to the other two systems. This 
accounted for the fact that the HPAS system had more plant biomass left after grazing 
and thus would have lesser runoff than the LPAS and MPAS.   
 
Litter Low, Medium and High-Biomass Pasture Management 
 
The model simulated three pasture management systems that apply poultry manure on tall 
fescue as shown in Table 11. These are litter low-biomass pasture (LLPA), litter medium-
biomass pasture (LMPA), and litter high-biomass pasture (LHPA). The planting, grazing 
and harvesting operations in these three systems are the same and are carried out as 
described under the HPAS system. In the LLPA, LMPA, and LHPA systems, farmers are 
assumed to apply poultry manure to tall fescue in March before grazing. Based on 
fertilization recommendations, four litter application rates ranging from 0 to 6,000 kg/ha 
will be modeled, with 4,000 kg/ha as the base application rate for grasses. The model 
assumes a choice of nitrogen replacement by commercial fertilizer at litter application 
rates less than the base application rate to maintain the current total nitrogen rate and 
forage production. 
 
 
 
  
 95 
 
Table 11 Litter Low, Medium, and High Biomass Pasture Management Systems. 
Item LLPA LMPA LHPA 
Crop planted (Jan 1) 
Fertilization (Mar 1) 
 
Grazing (Mar 1) (days) 
BIO_MIN   (kg/ha/day) 
BMEAT (kg/ha/day) 
BMTRMP (kg/ha/day) 
WMANURE (kg/ha/day) 
Tall Fescue 
Broiler-Fresh 
Manure 
270.0 
  1,100.0 
14.9 
14.9 
4.8 
Tall Fescue 
Broiler-Fresh 
Manure 
270.0 
1,600.0 
14.9 
14.9 
4.8 
Tall Fescue 
Broiler-Fresh 
Manure 
270.0 
2,000.0 
14.9 
14.9 
4.8 
 
For application rates that exceeded the base rate, the nitrogen applied on the grasses was 
assumed to come from the poultry litter. Both litter and nitrogen application rates were 
based on fertilization recommendations. Phosphorus applied on cropland was assumed to 
come solely from poultry litter. Each ton of litter was assumed to contain 30 kg of 
nitrogen and 14 kg of phosphorus. Grazing was suspended when plant biomass was less 
than 1,100, 1,600 and 2,000 kg /ha for the LLPA, LMPA and the LHPA systems 
respectively. The respective SCS-curve numbers were adjusted depending on the level of 
maintained biomass during grazing and the soil hydrologic group.  
 
Range Management 
The Eucha-Spavinaw basin was modeled as having brushy rangeland. Much of the 
default management parameters for rangeland areas remained unchanged. Two 
management operations were included in this system: planting and harvesting operations. 
The planting operation initiated plant growth in January when the leaf area index of the 
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canopy equals 0.20. The harvesting operation was undertaken at a plant biomass target of 
1,100 kg / ha. The total number of heat units required for the plants to reach maturity was 
estimated at 1,800. The amount of heat units accumulated each day is equal to the 
average daily temperature minus the base temperature of the plant. The base temperature 
is the minimum temperature required by the plant to grow. 
  
Forest Management 
The Eucha-Spavinaw basin was modeled as having mixed forests (existence of both 
deciduous and evergreen trees in the same locality). Much of the default management 
parameters for forested areas remained unchanged. Two management operations were 
included in this system: planting and harvesting / kill operations. The model assumed the 
trees were growing at the beginning of the simulation. The planting operation initiated 
growth of trees at a fraction of base zero potential heat units of 0.150, with a leaf area 
index of the canopy of 0.200. The total number of heat units required for the trees to 
reach maturity was estimated at 2,082. The harvest and kill operation stoped the growth 
of trees at a fraction of base zero potential heat units of 1.200, with a biomass target of 
9.0 kg/ha. It was assumed that no nutrient would be removed with harvested material.  
 
Using Aluminum Sulfate (Alum) to Reduce Phosphorus Loading 
Given elevated phosphorus levels in runoff from agricultural land on which poultry 
manure was used, there is need to determine alternative methods for controlling either 
available phosphorus content of the poultry litter or the phosphorus holding capacity of 
the soil. Our model allows for treatment of poultry litter with alum. A study conducted by 
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Cestti et al, 2003 found that adding aluminum sulfate to poultry litter provided benefits 
for both the farmer and the environment. They reported that the presence of alum in the 
poultry litter allowed it to trap nitrogen in the fertilizer and reduce nitrogen losses 
through ammonia volatilization (Cestti et al, 2003). This increased the level of nitrogen 
available to plants. Moore and Miller (1994) reported that when alum was added to 
poultry litter, it reduced phosphorus runoff by tying up and transforming soil labile 
phosphorus into more stable aluminum phosphate compounds that are insoluble. The 
resultant compounds were not soluble (unless the lake became acidic) and hence were not 
readily available to promote algae growth in the water body. Moore (1999) claimed that 
farmers using alum-treated poultry litter on their cropland could produce runoff with less 
than 75 percent phosphorus content.  
 
Based on studies conducted by Moore (1999) and Moore, Daniel and Edwards (1999; 
2000), it was assumed in this study that Alum is added to litter in the poultry house in a 
ratio of 1 part alum to 10 parts poultry litter. We also assumed that the Alum would 
reduce soluble phosphorus runoff by 75 percent. Since Alum would reduce nitrogen loss 
in the poultry house the average ton of litter would contain 34 kg of nitrogen rather than 
30 kg for untreated litter. Hence only 88 percent as much litter had to be applied for the 
same amount of nitrogen. Alum-treated poultry litter was assumed to impose an 
additional cost of $5.00 per ton to farmers undertaking the agricultural activities in HRUs 
where alum-treated litter is applied. Poultry litter was applied to pastures at levels 
consistent with meeting the nitrogen requirement of the crop. The quantity of poultry 
litter applied was reduced by 88 percent to account for increased nitrogen in the litter 
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while the amount of soluble phosphorus runoff from the SWAT simulation runs was 
reduced by 75 percent to account for the tied up phosphorus in Alum-treated poultry litter 
and not readily available for plant uptake.   
 
Mandatory (Command-and-Control) Phosphorus Abatement Policies 
 
Soil Test Phosphorus (STP) – Based Litter Application Policy 
This criterion allowed litter application only to those soils where the STP was not higher 
than a specified cut-off value. Crop yield reaches a plateau at this critical STP value. 
Continued application of phosphorus above the critical STP would not increase crop 
yield. However, it would increase phosphorus levels in the soil, a high proportion of 
which may runoff during storm events.  Farmers may improve crop yields while 
preventing the runoff of the excess phosphorus during the storm events by applying 
poultry litter only to soils with STP values lower than the given threshold.  This is a 
“command-and-control” regulatory approach, where threshold standards are set and 
enforced to reduce total phosphorus loading in the entire Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
 
The amount of phosphorus needed in a fertilizer or manure program for obtaining 
optimum yield is measured using an STP index. This is a value at which the soil has 
sufficient phosphorus that could be used for plant uptake. Based on OSU fertilization 
recommendations, Oklahoma soils require, on average, 120 lbs of available P per acre 
(STP value of 120). It was assumed in this study that farmers do not apply poultry 
manure to pastures and row crop on soils with STP higher than 120, but had an option of 
meeting nitrogen requirement using commercial nitrogen fertilizer. The STP for all 
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pastures and row crop was assumed to be the same across sub-basins.  Forest STP was 
assumed constant in all the management practice simulations.  
 
Uniform Conversion vs Targeted Land Use Conversion Policy 
Previous studies have concluded that overgrazed pasture and row crop contribute 
relatively more to the phosphorus loading compared to that from hay and well-maintained 
pasture.  Storm et al. (2002) estimated row crop contributed 49 percent of the total 
phosphorus loading in the Eucha-Spavinaw basin. The study found that this contribution 
of total phosphorus loading from row crop fields is disproportionately high relative to 
pasture. It further indicated that changing row crop to pastures would reduce total 
phosphorus loads by almost 50 percent. Producers, therefore, may significantly reduce 
total phosphorus loading in the watershed by changing land use.  Thus, it is assumed in 
this study that low-biomass pasture (LPAS) and medium-biomass pasture (MPAS) will 
be converted to high-biomass pasture (HPAS); litter low-biomass pasture (LLPA), litter 
medium-biomass pasture (LMPA), and row crops will be converted to litter high-biomass 
pasture (LHPA). These conversions were modeled assuming both mandatory uniform 
conversion and site-specific land use conversion policy which takes into account 
economic characteristics, biophysical conditions and phosphorus runoff potential of the 
agricultural land.  
 
Determination of the Value of Biomass Consumed During Grazing 
The value of hay and pasture consumed during grazing was derived based on a 100 cow 
unit size cow-calf enterprise budget obtained from Oklahoma State University 
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Cooperative Extension Service as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12.  100 Herd Cow Calf Enterprise Budget. 
Production Weight Unit Price / Cwt Qty Revenue 
Steer Calves 470 Lbs./hd $107.42 18.91 $9,547 
Heifer Calves 470 Lbs./hd $100.04 7.49 $3,522 
Cull Cows 1150 Lbs./hd $44.27 12 $6,109 
Cull Replacement 825 Lbs./hd $84.34 12 $8,350 
Cull Bulls 1750 Lbs./hd $58.58 1 $1,025 
Stockers  623 Lbs./hd $112.00 40 $27,910 
Total Receipts     $56,463 
Protein Supp. $ Salt 1 hd. $44.40 1.1 $4,884 
Minerals 1 hd. $14.07 1.1 $1,548 
Vet Services 1 hd. $7.14 1.1 $785 
Vet Supplies 1 hd. $1.16 1.1 $128 
Marketing 1 hd. $6.91 1 $691 
Mach. Fuel,Oil, Repairs 1 hd. $24.09 1.1 $2,650 
Machinery labor 1 hrs. $9.25 2.65 $2,451 
Other labor 1 hrs. $9.25 3 $2,775 
Other expense 1 hd. - 1.1  
Annual Operating Capital  Dollars 0.0825 184.62 $1,523 
Total Operating Costs     $17,435 
Other Fixed Costs     $12,926 
Net Return to Hay and Pasture  $26,102  
   lbs/day days/yr lbs/yr kg/yr 
Cow  25 365 9125 4139 
Bull  25 365 365 166 
Replacement Heifer  18 365 788 358 
Stocker  14 100 560 254 
Hay and Pasture Required Per Cow Unit    4916 
Net Revenue per Mg Biomass Consumed  ($26,102/100hd/4.92)    $53.05 
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We assumed that part of the calf crop were kept beyond weaning and sold later as 
stockers. The cattle prices used were based on Oklahoma direct feeder cattle sales for the 
trade period May 12 through May 18, 2007. Table 12 above shows the modified OSU 
100 herd cow-calf enterprise budget with the net return to hay and pasture estimated at 
$26,102. The hay and pasture required per cow unit was estimated at 4916 kg per year. 
Based on these estimates, the value of biomass consumed during grazing was estimated at 
$53.05 per metric ton. 
 
Development of the Transportation Matrix 
 
The development of the transportation matrix required knowledge and information 
regarding the location and amount of litter produced from poultry operations in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. Based on the work done by Storm and White (2001), this 
study assumed that there are 1,053 broiler houses in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed with 
an estimated output of approximately 89,500 tons of litter per year. Figure 6 and Figure 7 
below show chicken farms as well as sub-basins and chicken farm centroids that were 
established as litter shipment points in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed for the purpose of 
developing the transportation matrix. Three hundred chicken farms were assigned into 
twenty four groups ensuring that no chicken farm was located more than two miles from 
a group centroid as shown in Fig. 7. This exercise allowed us to limit the number of 
transportation activities in the mathematical programming model. 
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        Source: Storm et al. (2002).  
 
Figure 6 Chicken Farms in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed.   
 
  
 
         Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 7  Sub-basins and Chicken Farm Centroids in Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
 
Four distance calculations were performed. The average distance from each chicken farm 
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to the centroid of the group to which it was assigned was determined using ArcView 
Version 3.3; the distance from each chicken farm centroid to a point on the nearest road 
was estimated using the nearest feature algorithm; the distance from the point on the road 
nearest each chicken farm to a point on the road nearest each sub-basin centroid was 
estimated using a multi-path script; and lastly the nearest feature algorithm was used to 
determine the distance from the road to the sub-basin centroid. We used the same process 
to create a transportation matrix from each chicken farm centroid to Jay, Oklahoma for 
location of a possible litter-to-energy processing plant. This approach resulted in a matrix 
with 2208 possible transportation activities constituted from each of the 24 chicken farm 
centroids supplying litter to each of the 92 sub-basin centroids. Cost estimates for 
transporting litter from chicken farm centroids to subbasin centroids were based on 
information supplied by BMPs Inc. The cost for loading and coordinating a haul ranged 
from $7.50 to $8.00 per ton.  The cost of hauling ranged from $3.25 to $3.50 per loaded 
mile per truckload. Each truck averaged 23 tons per load. The loaded mileage was a one-
way distance.  No direct cost for spreading, but BMPs, Inc. would coordinate spreading at 
an average of $6 per short ton  
(BMPs, Inc 2006).  
 
The estimated litter transportation costs, value of biomass consumed during grazing as 
well as crop yield or grazed plant biomass, and nutrient runoff estimates from each HRU 
for each simulated pasture were then input into a spatial mathematical programming 
model discussed in the next section. The programming model was then used to select the 
most efficient pasture management practice and litter transportation pattern for each HRU 
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in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed that maximized producer income while ensuring that 
the overall agricultural phosphorus pollution target is reached at least social cost. 
 
The Stochastic Optimization Model for the Watershed 
 
The HRU specific coefficients for production, sediment yield, nitrogen runoff and 
phosphorus runoff for each pasture management practice obtained from the SWAT 
simulations were used to develop a spatial mathematical programming model.  The linear 
programming model was used to determine the optimal pasture management practice for 
each HRU and pattern of litter shipments so that total watershed pollution target is met at 
least social cost.  Based on the works of Tauer (1983), Teague et al. (1995) and Qiu, 
Prato and Kaylen (1998), this study employed a modified Target MOTAD model to 
determine the optimal spatial allocation of the alternative pasture management practices 
and a pattern of litter shipments that maximizes producer income subject to not exceeding 
maximum allowable total sediment yield, total phosphorus runoff and total nitrogen 
runoff for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The theoretical Target MOTAD model (Tauer, 
1983) may be mathematically expressed as:  
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where E(z) is the expected net return of the farm plan; Cj is expected net return of activity 
j; Xj is  level of activity j; akj  is the amount of resource k used per unit of activity j; bk is 
level of resource k available; T is target level of return; Crj is return of activity j for state 
of nature r; yr is return deviation below T for state of nature r; pr is probability that state 
of nature r will occur; λ is risk aversion measure parameterized from M to 0; n is the 
number of activities; m is the number of resource equations or constraints; s is the 
number of states of nature; and M is a large number.  This structure of the Target 
MOTAD model allows the decision maker to choose an optimal farm plan that 
maximizes expected return subject to the constraint that the probability of income being 
lower than the target income does not exceed a specified value.  Thus the model identifies 
farm plans which maximize net returns but maintain risk below a critical level or target. 
Equation (14) maximizes expected return of the solution set. Equation (15) fulfills the 
technical constraints. Equation (16) measures the revenue of a solution under state r.  If 
that revenue is less than the target T, the difference is transferred to equation (17) via 
variable yr. Equation (17) sums the negative deviations after weighing them by their 
probability of occurring, pr (Tauer, 1983; Teague et al., 1995; and Qiu et al., 1998). 
 
For purposes of this study, the Target MOTAD specified in equations (14) to (17) was 
modified into an environmental Target MOTAD, incorporating environmental risks 
associated with nitrogen and phosphorus losses in runoff from each HRU and allowing 
for litter transportation activities within and outside the watershed. The objective function 
(equation 14) was modified and specified to represent all the feasible pasture 
management practices in each HRU and all possible litter shipment activities between 
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chicken farm centroids and subbasin centroids in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  Thus, 
this study maximizes net returns from grazing less subbasin transportation costs for 
poultry litter subject to a limit on total nitrogen and phosphorus loading from the entire 
watershed within a specified tolerance level. The reformulated objective function may be 
mathematically expressed as: 
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subject to a set of resource and operational constraints specified below in equation (15a) 
to equation (20); where E(z) is the expected net agricultural income for the watershed; Rij 
is the net income from the jth management practice in the ith HRU; Xij represents amount 
of land allocated for the jth management practice in the ith HRU; Tkb is the quantity of 
litter transported from the kth chicken farm centroid to the bth subbasin centroid; Ckb is the 
cost
 
of transporting poultry litter from the kth chicken farm centroid to the bth subbasin 
centroid. Equation 2 was modified to represent the amount of available land resource 
(Area) in each HRU that can be allocated for use under any feasible pasture management 
system as follows: 
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Equations 16 and 17 were modified to incorporate the environmental risks associated 
with phosphorus and nitrogen losses in runoff in the watershed. The new equations reflect 
the relationship between total allowable phosphorus loading, PHmax, ( NITmax , for 
allowable nitrogen losses) for the entire watershed, the amount of phosphorus runoff 
(measured as elemental phosphorus), PHij ( NITij , for amount of nitrogen runoff) from 
each HRU (i) under the different pasture management practices (j) and phosphorus runoff 
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deviation, δpr , (δNr, nitrogen runoff deviation) above the maximum allowable load for the 
watershed under each state of nature (r). The average annual phosphorus and nitrogen 
runoff levels must not exceed a specified limit or target for the entire watershed while 
average annual phosphorus and nitrogen runoff deviations above a set target must not 
exceed a specified tolerance level (λ). The modifications to the equations representing 
environmental risk may be mathematically expressed as: 
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Furthermore, a set of constraints is added to the model to balance demand and supply of 
poultry litter in the entire watershed. The model allows for shipments of litter from 
chicken house centroids to subbasin centroids in the watershed. All litter must be shipped 
from each chicken farm centroid such that the amount of litter shipped to each subbasin 
must be equal to the quantity of litter applied in each subbasin. These constraints may be 
mathematically expressed as: 
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where Sk is the quantity of litter supplied at the kth chicken farm centroid; Qjb is the 
quantity of litter required by the jth management practice in the bth subbasin; and Xjb is the 
amount of land allocated to the jth management practice in the bth subbasin. The non-
negativity constraints for production and transportation activities are: 
0,0 ≥≥ kbij TX        (20) 
Figure 8 below presents a schematic diagram of the integrated simulation-optimization 
model used in this study. The diagram shows the SWAT model input data as well as the 
outputs generated by the SWAT simulation model. The SWAT model outputs for specific 
management practices in a given HRU were used in the input-output coefficient matrix of 
the Target MOTAD risk programming model together with other necessary production 
and economic input data. Figure 8 also outlines the expected output from the Target 
MOTAD optimization model as applied for purposes of achieving the objectives of this 
study. 
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       Figure 8  Schematic Diagram of the Integrated Simulation-Optimization Model 
SWAT MODEL 
INPUT DATA 
 
 - GIS data layers of elevation, 
   soils, land use / land cover 
-  Daily temperature and precipitation 
-  Individual Management operations 
-  Soil nutrient availability 
 - Observed stream flow 
 
SWAT MODEL 
OUTPUTS 
 
   - Simulated crop / plant biomass yield for 
      each management practice in each HRU 
 
    - Simulated mean and annual phosphorus 
       and nitrate loads for each management 
       practice in each HRU 
 
TARGET MOTAD MODEL 
 INPUT DATA 
- Simulated crop / plant biomass yield for each management 
   practice in each HRU 
- Simulated mean and annual phosphorus and nitrate loads for each 
   management practice in each HRU 
- Estimated total amount of litter available from each chicken farm centroid 
- Estimated total amount of litter required by each management practice 
- Estimated distances between chicken farm centroids and subbasin centroids,  
   and to litter-to-energy processing plant.  
- Unit prices of commercial nitrogen, aluminum sulphate, cattle and 
   plant biomass consumed by cattle during grazing. 
- Per unit litter transportation and handling costs 
- Probability of each state of nature occurring 
- Maximum allowable phosphorus loss values for the watershed  
  and specified phosphorus deviations above target   
 
TARGET MOTAD MODEL 
 OUTPUTS 
- Optimal pasture management practice (combination of litter and  
   commercial nitrogen applied, maintained minimum biomass during  
   grazing and stocking rate) for each HRU 
- Optimal quantity of phosphorus loss abated by each HRU 
- Optimal amounts of litter shipped from each chicken centroid to each subbasin 
   centroid in the watershed and to litter-to-energy processing plant at Jay,  OK  
- Estimated total producer income from grazing for the entire watershed 
- Shadow price (marginal contribution to net income) for each agricultural HRU 
- Shadow price (marginal abatement cost) on each phosphorus loss constraint  
SWAT 
MODEL 
Used as Input-Output 
Coefficients in 
Target MOTAD 
TARGET MOTAD 
MODEL 
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Determination of Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
 
This study applied the environmental Target MOTAD risk programming model described 
above to select the best litter and pasture management practice for each HRU in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed so as to reduce aggregate phosphorus emissions from 
pastures from the current undesirable level (estimated at about 40 tons per year) to 
alternative lower phosphorus runoff levels (35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year) at least 
social cost. These socially optimum points are assumed to occur at points where the 
marginal abatement cost equals the marginal cost of damage to the environment and the 
sum of treatment and damage costs are minimized. However, various policy instruments 
and pollution reduction programs not only cause different allocative effects but also 
impose different financial burdens for polluters, victims, and society. We should note that 
there is no such thing as “the cost” of abatement or of environmental damage; both values 
depend on the level of pollution emissions or pollution emissions reduction, respectively. 
Thus, the (implicit) price of pollution and pollution prevention vary-often considerably-
with the intensity of pollution (Sterner, 2003).  
 
Total Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
 
In the case of water pollution from phosphorus emissions as is the case in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed, the treatment or abatement cost function represents all the costs 
incurred in the process of removing and / or preventing the pollutant (phosphorus) from 
entering the water course (Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw). However, for purposes of this 
study, we determined total abatement costs in terms of reduction in producer income 
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from crops, pasture and range. Total abatement costs were estimated as the difference in 
the value of the objective function (representing total agricultural net returns for the 
watershed) of the Target MOTAD programming model (specified above) subject to the 
estimated current level of phosphorus loading for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed (40 
tons per year) and the value of the objective function at each of the alternative annual 
phosphorus loading targets (that is, at 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year) and a specified 
phosphorus deviation limit above a given phosphorus loading target. The upper limit on 
the phosphorus runoff deviation above annual phosphorus loading was varied from 10 
tons to 2 tons per year.  For instance, if you subtract the value of the objective function 
when the maximum allowable phosphorus loading is reduced to 35 tons per year from the 
value of the objective function under the current estimated phosphorus loading of 40 tons 
per year, you obtain the total cost of treating/abating 5 tons of phosphorus loading per 
year in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed for a given phosphorus pollution reduction 
strategy. The total abatement cost curve could be traced out using a mathematical 
function that maps the alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets to corresponding 
reductions in the value of the objective function (representing reductions in total 
agricultural net returns due to a given pollution reduction strategy or total pollution 
abatement costs).   Typically, the total abatement cost function increases with increased 
abatement (or decreases with increased pollution emissions). 
 
Marginal Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
 
The marginal phosphorus treatment/abatement cost may be defined as the change in total 
phosphorus pollution abatement costs from an additional unit of phosphorus 
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treated/abated. Optimal pollution abatement requires that the marginal abatement costs in 
production be set equal to the marginal benefit of the abatements as measured by a 
reduction in environmental damage (Tietenberg, 2003; Sterner, 2003). For purposes of 
this study, we determined the marginal phosphorus pollution abatement cost using the 
shadow price on the binding average annual phosphorus runoff constraint obtained from 
the solution of the economic model specified above. This shadow price may be 
interpreted in economic terms to represent the amount by which the value of the objective 
function (or the total agricultural net return for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed) is 
reduced as the maximum allowable annual phosphorus runoff is restricted by an 
additional unit per year. The marginal abatement cost curve could be traced using a 
mathematical function that maps the alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets to 
corresponding shadow prices or marginal abatement costs. Typically, the marginal 
abatement cost function increases with increased abatement (or decreases with increased 
pollution emissions) whereas the marginal damage cost function increases with pollution 
emissions. The intersection of the curves for the marginal costs of pollution damage and 
the marginal costs of pollution abatement determines the optimal levels of pollution 
emissions and their shadow cost (Steiner, 2003; Tietenberg, 2003).   
 
Generalized Linear Econometric Model Specification 
 
A generalized linear econometric model was specified to summarize the simulation 
results of the SWAT in terms of the controlled management and weather variables. The 
regression model was specifically used to determine the relationship between phosphorus 
runoff in the current period and soil type, RKLS-factor, curve number (CurV), minimum 
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biomass maintained during grazing (BmMin), stocking rate (StkRate), amount of 
litter/phosphorus applied (Papl), amount of commercial nitrogen applied (Napl) and the 
amount of phosphorus runoff in the previous period (LagPloss). The general econometric 
model may be mathematically specified as: 
 itk
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Where Pit represent expected phosphorus runoff in the current period, Xit represent the 
independent variables outlined above, βk are parameters to be estimated, vi is a cross-
section specific residual, et is a time-series specific residual, εit is a classical error term 
with zero mean and a homoskedastic covariance matrix, N is the number of cross-
sections, T is the length of the time series for each cross section, and K is the number of 
explanatory variables included in the model. 
 
Data and Sources 
 
Large amounts of spatial and non-spatial data are required in the two-step GIS-based 
modeling approach used in this study. The study required data on topography, land use or 
land cover, soil types, weather, management systems and stream flow. The most current 
GIS data for topography, soils, land cover, and stream flows were used in the SWAT 
model. These data were obtained from various sources including public agencies, County 
extension offices, and via personal communications.  The inputs to the SWAT model 
were accumulated from hydrographic and geographic databases and maps. 
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Topographic data are necessary for delineation of the watershed and its subbasins.  
30-meter digital elevation model (DEM) (1:24,000) for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed 
were used to define topography in this study. These were obtained from the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) topographical database. A DEM is a digital record of terrain 
elevations for ground positions at regularly spaced horizontal intervals that is derived 
from USGS maps.  The DEM was used to define layout and number of subbasins, the 
stream network and its characteristics and derive subbasin parameters such as slope, 
slope length, and aspect of catchments.  Land cover can change spatially and temporally 
over a short period of time. It is important that these data be based on the most current 
data available. Land cover data used in the model was derived from the Arkansas and 
Oklahoma Gap Analysis Program (GAP) data available online at 
  http://www.gap.uidaho.edu/About/Overview/GapDescription/default.htm#Products . 
The GAP data was simplified into land cover categories suitable for this study namely; 
Generic Agricultural Land (AGRL), low-biomass pasture (LPAS), medium-biomass 
pasture (MPAS), high-biomass pasture (HPAS), litter low-biomass pasture (LLPA), litter 
medium-biomass pasture (LMPA), litter high-biomass pasture (LHPA), rangeland 
(RNGB), forests (FRST), urban (URBN) and water (WATR). 
 
SWAT requires soil GIS data to define soil types. The Natural Resource Conservation 
Service (NRCS) developed a GIS coverage for soils nationwide. STATSGO are the 
default soil data used with SWAT. The model uses STATSGO data to define soil 
attributes for all soils.  This study used the soils layer representing the Oklahoma and 
Arkansas portion of the watershed derived from the STASGO data. The GIS data used in 
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this study contained S5ID (Soils5id number for USDA soil series) that linked an area to 
the STASGO database. When no observed weather data are available, SWAT can 
stochastically simulate the weather data using a database of weather statistics from 
stations across the United States (Storm et al., 2001). The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) maintains records from numerous National 
Weather Service Cooperative Observing Network (COOP) station data. Weather data 
used in this study were obtained from websites of the Oklahoma Mesonet and the NOAA. 
Because of the spatial and temporal variability of precipitation, multiple climate stations 
with at least 20-year period of records were selected. This study used observed daily 
precipitation data from 50 stations located within, or near Eucha-Spavinaw watershed for 
the period 1/1/1950-12/31/2004. Daily maximum and minimum temperatures were 
obtained from 7 weather stations. Each subbasin was assigned the nearest climate station. 
However, all of the stations used had time periods where data were missing. SWAT 
generates simulated weather when missing data are detected at a station. However, 
missing data in the Eucha-Spavinaw model were filled with corresponding data from the 
nearest station or estimated.  
 
Stream flow data were obtained from USGS stream gauge stations. The measured stream 
flow time series was split into calibration and validation periods. During the calibration 
period, model inputs were allowed to vary across the basin until acceptable fit to 
measured flow at the basin outlet was obtained. The model was calibrated for surface 
runoff, base flow and for phosphorus loads. The model was then run using the same input 
parameters for the validation period and goodness-to-fit was determined (Arnold et al. 
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2000). Observed water quality data collected by the City of Tulsa and stream flow 
records from the U.S Geologic Survey (USGS) were used to estimate phosphorus loads in 
the Lake Eucha and Lake Spavinaw basin. The net income from agricultural activities 
was estimated by using data from the SWAT model (yield and biomass data), cost 
estimates from Oklahoma State University Enterprise Budgets and various USDA 
published and unpublished sources.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS 
A total of 105 grazing management practices were simulated and tested in each of the 
agricultural HRUs in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  Three 20-year simulations were 
made for each management practice. The weather years were randomly selected with 
replacement from 55 years of annual weather data from 1950 to 2005. We examined the 
effects of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons 
per year on optimal litter and pasture management systems under two scenarios. The first 
scenario assumed three possibilities: that all or part of the poultry litter produced within a 
given subbasin can be applied on land as fertilizer, or all or part of the poultry litter 
produced within a given subbasin can be sold to producers in another subbasin for use as 
crop fertilizer, or all or part of the poultry litter produced within a given subbasin can be 
sold to a possible litter-to-energy power plant located at Jay, Oklahoma. The second 
scenario allowed for the possibility of using Alum-treated poultry litter on pastures in 
addition to the three possibilities stipulated in the first scenario. The environmental target 
MOTAD risk programming model was solved for each of the possible mean annual 
phosphorus runoff targets (40Mg, 35Mg, 30Mg, 25Mg, and 20Mg) and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits (10Mg, 8Mg, 6Mg, 4Mg, and 2Mg) above target for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed to maximize producer income while meeting the mean phosphorus 
load limits within a specified margin of safety at minimum cost to society. The 
 118 
optimization model assigned a specific management practice to each of the 2,416 HRUs 
in the watershed given conditions stipulated in the two scenarios outlined above.  
  
Empirical Estimation of the Generalized Linear Econometric Model  
The ANOVA regression model was used as a convenient method of summarizing the 
SWAT simulation results. Table 13 shows the analysis of variance (ANOVA) results and 
Table 14 below presents parameter estimates of the generalized linear econometric model 
fitted using the SAS Generalized Linear Model (GLM) Procedure. Current phosphorus 
runoff was regressed on soil type, KLSCP- factor, curve number (CurV), phosphorus 
applied in the current period (Papl), phosphorus runoff in the previous period(LagPloss), 
nitrogen applied in the current period (Napl), the minimum biomass maintained during 
grazing (BmMin) and the stocking rate (StkRate). The overall model had a significant  
F-Value and explained 96 percent of the variation in simulated phosphorus loss in the 
watershed. The Type III sum of squares were statistically significant, implying that 
individual independent variables contribute significantly to phosphorus runoff in the 
watershed. Specifically the ANOVA shows the soil types explained a significant portion 
of the variation in phosphorus loss from each HRU in the presence of the KLSCP- factor, 
curve number, and management variables.  The soil type parameter estimates shown in 
Table 14 have been sorted in descending order to show the relative contribution of each 
soil type, KLSCP-factor, curve number and management variables to phosphorus runoff 
in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The SWAT estimates the amount of soil erosion using 
the modified universal soil loss equation (MUSLE) (Williams, 1975), an adaptation of the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE). The KLSCP-factor is the value calculated in the 
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USLE (Wischmeiner and Smith, 1978). This factor incorporates a soil erodibility factor 
(K), topographic or soil slope length gradient factor (LS), cover and management factor 
(C), and a support practice factor (P) (Williams, 1975; Arnold, 1992).  
 
Table 13  Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
 
The GLM Procedure :Dependent Variable: Ploss 
 
                            Sum of 
Source              DF     Squares     Mean Square    F Value   Pr > F 
Model               30   88933889.72   2964462.99     128444    <.0001 
Error           143586    3313925.44        23.08 
Corrected Total 143616   92247815.17 
 
               R-Square     Coeff Var      Root MSE    Ploss Mean 
               0.964076      47.86849      4.804136     1.003611 
 
Source              DF  Type III SS    Mean Square    F Value   Pr > F 
Soil                23  2013399.115      87539.092    3792.90   <.0001 
KLSCP                1  1846277.007    1846277.007   79995.6    <.0001 
CurV                 1    93480.874      93480.874   4050.35    <.0001 
BmMin                1    14547.613      14547.613    630.32    <.0001 
StkRate              1  4333374.674    4333374.674    187757    <.0001 
Papl                 1     8487.762       8487.762    367.76    <.0001 
Napl                 1     4995.617       4995.617    216.45    <.0001 
LagPloss             1    24242.337      24242.337   1050.37    <.0001 
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Table 14  Estimated Regression Coefficients of the Linear Econometric Model. 
Effect Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr>|t| 
Intercept -47.8379 5.0665 -9.44 <.0001 
Britwater* 3.0772 1.3424 2.29 0.0219 
Razort* 2.3981 1.1362 2.11 0.0348 
Clarksville* 2.0253 0.9638 2.10 0.0356 
Captina* 1.6864 0.4134 4.08 <.0001 
Secesh* 1.4292 0.7230 1.98 0.0481 
Healing* 1.4078 0.4822 2.92 0.0035 
Cherokee 1.3653 0.7232 1.89 0.0590 
Noark 1.3210 0.6886 1.92 0.0551 
Nixa 1.0697 0.6202 1.72 0.0846 
Macedonia* 0.9691 0.3104 3.12 0.0018 
Peridge* 0.8471 0.2761 3.07 0.0022 
Tonti 0.7468 0.4137 1.81 0.0711 
Stigler* 0.6987 0.1757 3.98 <.0001 
Doniphan 0.2024 0.1395 1.45 0.1467 
Jay 0.1896 0.2092 0.91 0.3648 
Eldorado* 0.1441 0.0202 7.15 <.0001 
Taloka 0.1133 0.1100 1.03 0.3033 
Elsah 0.0615 0.1052 0.58 0.5590 
Hector -0.1190 0.4494 -0.26 0.7912 
Newtonia -0.2618 0.1368 -1.89 0.0593 
Linker* -0.6358 0.2075 -3.06 0.0022 
Carytown* -1.4204 0.3809 -3.73 0.0020 
Mountainburg* -2.0916 0.7242 -2.89 0.0039 
Waben 0.0000 . . . 
KLSCP* 32.6432 0.1154 282.83 <.0001 
StkRate* 14.3768 0.0332 433.31 <.0001 
LagPloss* 0.2650 0.0082 32.41 <.0001 
CurV* 0.2492 0.0039 63.64 <.0001 
Papl* 0.0108 0.0006 19.18 <.0001 
BmMin* -0.0020 0.0001 -25.11 <.0001 
Napl* -0.0036 0.0002 -14.71 <.0001 
* regression coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
All the “effects” in Table 14 marked with an asterisk (*) have regression coefficients that 
are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. This means a change in 
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any of these variables will have a statistically significantly higher or lower phosphorus 
loss from pastures than the Waben soil. Only 13 of the 24 soil types (marked with an 
asterisk) had a significant effect on phosphorus runoff in the watershed. Six of the 13 
soils had significantly higher phosphorus loss (Britwater, Razort, Clarksville, Captina, 
Secesh and Healing) than the Waben soil. An additional hectare of pasture on any of 
these soils was predicted to increase phosphorus loss by at least 1.5 kg per hectare over 
the Waben soil.  For instance, the model predicted that putting one more hectare of 
Britwater under pasture will increase phosphorus loss by 3 kg per hectare while an 
additional hectare of pasture on Razort, Clarksville and Captina soils will increase 
phosphorus runoff by 2.4, 2.0, and 1.7 kg per hectare over the Waben soil, respectively. 
One more hectare of pasture on either Secesh or Healing will increase phosphorus runoff 
by 1.4 kg per hectare over the Waben soil. Eleven of the 24 soils used in this study did 
not have significant different phosphorus loss values than the Waben soil when the curve 
number, KLSCP-factor, and other management variables were accounted for. This 
implies that it may be necessary to consider soil type and develop phosphorus reduction 
programs that target specific soil types within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed rather than 
continue with the current uniform policy of limiting litter application rates strictly by soil 
test phosphorus. Besides soil type, all the other explanatory variables in the model were 
found to affect phosphorus runoff significantly. As expected, the results show a 
significant positive relationship between phosphorus loss (Ploss) and the KLSCP-factor, 
curve number (CurV), stocking rate (StkRate), the amount of phosphorus loss in the 
previous period (LagPloss) and the amount of phosphorus applied (Papl) in the current 
period. The results also suggest a significant inverse relationship between phosphorus 
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loss (Ploss) and the minimum biomass maintained during grazing (BmMin) and amount 
of nitrogen applied on the pastures (Napl). For example, the model predicted that if the 
stocking rate increases by 1AU / ha, phosphorus runoff will increase by about 14 kg per 
hectare. An increase of carryover phosphorus from the previous year by one kilogram per 
hectare would increase phosphorus loss in the current period by 0.27 kg per hectare while 
a one unit increase in the KLSCP factor would increase phosphorus loss by about 33 kg 
per hectare.  
 
The Efficient Allocation of Phosphorus Pollution 
 
Phosphorus is one of the nutrients for which the environment has some absorptive 
capacity. That is, the environment has some ability to absorb phosphorus. However, 
phosphorus does accumulate in the environment when the emissions load exceeds its 
absorptive capacity. The presence of excessive amounts of phosphorus in the 
environment leads to environmental degradation, a damage cost incurred by the society. 
The damage costs are expected to rise with the cumulative phosphorus emissions load in 
the environment. Therefore, phosphorus pollution control measures need to be put in 
place to counter this negative externality. This intervention would impose pollution 
control or abatement costs on the polluter and thus reduce phosphorus emissions load in 
the environment. The treatment or abatement costs incurred by the polluter are expected 
to rise with the cumulative phosphorus emissions treated or controlled. An efficient 
policy response must therefore not only determine the appropriate level of phosphorus 
pollution that balance control and damage costs. It must also specify how the 
responsibility for achieving that phosphorus level should be allocated among the various 
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sources of phosphorus emissions when reductions are needed in the watershed. The 
mathematical programming model used in this study addressed the two issues based on 
the general framework illustrated in Figure 9 to determine the efficient amount of 
phosphorus pollution for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. In Figure 9, MC represents 
marginal costs,  MAC represents marginal abatement cost, MDC represents marginal 
damage costs, TAC represents total abatement costs, TDC represents total damage costs; 
Z is the total amount of phosphorus pollution emissions. MC* represents the marginal 
cost at which MAC = MDC and T* represents the optimal phosphorus pollution tax rate. 
 
 
Figure 9  Optimal Level of Phosphorus Pollution (Z*). 
 
 
A movement along the X-axis of Figure 9 from left to right refers to less control and 
more pollution emitted. The marginal damage cost (MDC) resulting from an additional 
unit of pollution is shown to increase with the quantity of pollution emitted. A movement 
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in the opposite direction implies greater control and less pollution emitted into the 
environment. The marginal abatement cost (MAC) resulting from an additional unit of 
pollution is shown to increase with the quantity of pollution abated. Under these 
conditions, Figure 9 demonstrates that the optimal level of phosphorus pollution is not 
zero. An efficient allocation of phosphorus pollution requires that marginal benefit be 
equated to marginal cost. This efficiency condition holds at the quantity of pollution 
where the damage cost resulting from an additional unit of phosphorus pollution is equal 
to the marginal cost of abating that extra unit of pollution. Thus, point Z* in Figure 9 
represents the optimal level of phosphorus pollution in the watershed. The area of triangle 
OEZ* represents the total damage costs (TDC) while the area of triangle ZEZ* represents 
the total abatement costs (TAC). 
 
Cost-Effective Allocation of Phosphorus Pollution in the Watershed 
 
We assumed five alternative levels of maximum allowable mean annual phosphorus 
loads for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed in this study. The base mean annual phosphorus 
load was assumed to be 40 Mg per year. The mean phosphorus load was then gradually 
reduced by 5 Mg per year until it reached 20 Mg per year. This study aimed at achieving 
a specific phosphorus emission reduction for the entire watershed.  At each mean annual 
phosphorus load, the “pollution authority” had to decide how to allocate the 
responsibility for meeting these predetermined pollution levels among all the polluters in 
the watershed at minimum cost to society. Polluters had different options for controlling 
the amount of phosphorus pollution they emitted into the environment. A total of 105 
possible pasture management practices were available for reducing phosphorus emissions 
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in each of the agricultural HRUs in the watershed. Some of these pasture management 
practices would be relatively cheaper to implement than others. Given these alternative 
pasture management practices, different soil types and hydrology characteristics of the 
2,416 HRUs in the watershed, the cheapest method of phosphorus control will differ 
widely not only among subbasins but also among HRUs in the same subbasin.  
An environmental Target MOTAD risk programming model was used as a systematic 
method for finding the lowest cost means of maximizing producer income from grazing 
while meeting the maximum allowable mean annual phosphorus load for the watershed 
within a specified margin of safety. The optimization model applies the cost-effectiveness 
equimarginal principle (illustrated in Figure 10) to select least-cost management practices 
for each HRU such that total cost of pollution reduction for the watershed is minimized. 
Figure 9 assumes that there are only two polluters (Hru1, Hru2) in the watershed emitting 
a total of Z units of phosphorus into the environment. The marginal control costs for 
Hru1 (shown as MAC1) are relatively lower than those for Hru2 (shown as MAC2). The  
cost-effective allocation of phosphorus pollution control among the two HRUs requires 
that their marginal abatement costs be equal (that is, MAC1 = MAC2). This condition 
holds at point Q* in Figure 10, implying that Hru1 will abate phosphorus emissions 
amounting to ZQ* while Hru2 abates the remaining OQ*.   
 126 
               
Figure 10  Cost-Effective Allocation of Phosphorus Pollution Among Two HRUs.  
 
It is worth noting that the total costs of pollution reduction were minimized by allocating 
more phosphorus control to Hru2 with lower marginal abatement costs and less to Hru1 
with higher marginal treatment costs.  The optimization model used a similar technique to 
allocate phosphorus control across the 2,416 agricultural HRUs in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed to minimize total cost of pollution control. The cost of achieving a given 
reduction in phosphorus emissions was minimized by selecting management practices 
that equalized the marginal costs of control across all HRUs in the watershed.  
 
One of the constraints imposed on the optimization model specified in equation (14a) was 
to select a specific pasture management practice for each of the HRUs in the watershed. 
The value of the Lagrange multiplier (or the shadow price) on that constraint for a given 
HRU represented the additional monetary contribution from that agricultural land that 
would be added to the objective function were an additional identical HRU created in the 
Hru1 Hru2 
Q* 
T* = MC* 
Marginal
Cost  
($ / unit) 
Quantity of Pollution Reduced (Units) 
 
0 
MAC2 MAC1 
Z 
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watershed.  Given this environmental-economic optimization model, the more profitable 
agricultural production was on a particular HRU, the higher the associated shadow price. 
Similarly, the higher the phosphorus loss from a particular HRU, the lower the 
corresponding shadow price. These two situations imply that HRUs may contribute 
differently toward net agricultural income and total phosphorus loading for the 
watershed. Therefore, in this optimization model, preference for selection into the 
optimal solution set is given to HRUs with both the highest contribution to net 
agricultural income and least contribution to total phosphorus loading in the watershed. 
Such HRUs will have high shadow prices per hectare. On the other hand, HRUs that 
contribute marginally to net agricultural income and heavily to total phosphorus loss in 
the watershed will be characterized by very low per hectare shadow prices. These shadow 
prices may even be negative for some HRUs if their contribution to total phosphorus loss 
outweighed their contribution to net agricultural income.  All HRUs in the watershed that 
exhibit negative and very low per hectare shadow prices could be targeted for inclusion in 
a phosphorus pollution reduction program for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
following sections present the effects of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the 
watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year on optimal litter and pasture 
management systems under the first scenario (Scenario I).  
 
Scenario I: Land Application and Trading of Untreated Poultry Litter 
In this option we examined the effects of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year on optimal litter and pasture 
management systems when the available method of litter allocation is hauling within the 
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watershed and to a possible litter-to-energy power plant located at Jay, Oklahoma.  The 
poultry litter was untreated (no Alum was added to the poultry litter).  
  
Optimal Grazing Management Practices for the Watershed 
 
The model selected the best grazing management practice for each HRU in the watershed 
that maximized total net agricultural income from grazing less transportation costs while 
total watershed phosphorus pollution target was met at least cost within a specified 
deviation over the target.  Table 15 below shows a wide range of grazing management 
practices identified for optimal level of phosphorus abatement in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed. No single grazing management practice dominated in all the HRUs of the 
watershed. Instead, optimal phosphorus abatement for the watershed was achieved 
through a combination of various site-specific grazing management practices at each  
mean annual phosphorus loading target and phosphorus runoff deviation limit tested in 
this study.    
   
Table 16 to Table 20 below show the optimal grazing management practices selected by 
the economic optimization model and amount of land allocated for each selected 
management practice when the mean annual total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed was limited to 40 Mg, 35Mg, 30Mg, 25Mg and 20Mg per year, 
respectively, with phosphorus deviation limits above target varied from 10 Mg to 2 Mg 
per year.  
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Table 15  Data Coding for Alternative Grazing Management Practices 
BMP 
Poultry Litter 
Applied  
Elemental Nitrogen 
Applied 
Minimum Biomass 
Maintained  During Grazing 
Stocking 
Rate 
Code (tons/ha) (kg/ha)  (tons/ha) (AU/ha) 
0011 0 0 1.1 0.63 
0012 0 0 1.1 1.00 
0013 0 0 1.1 1.26 
0221 0 100 1.6 0.63 
0222 0 100 1.6 1.00 
0223 0 100 1.6 1.26 
0331 0 150 2.0 0.63 
0332 0 150 2.0 1.00 
0333 0 150 2.0 1.26 
0111 0 50 1.1 0.63 
0112 0 50 1.1 1.00 
0113 0 50 1.1 1.26 
1011 2 0 1.1 0.63 
1012 2 0 1.1 1.00 
1013 2 0 1.1 1.26 
1231 2 100 2.0 0.63 
1232 2 100 2.0 1.00 
1233 2 100 2.0 1.26 
1121 2 50 1.6 0.63 
1122 2 50 1.6 1.00 
1123 2 50 1.6 1.26 
2021 4 0 1.6 0.63 
2022 4 0 1.6 1.00 
2023 4 0 1.6 1.26 
3031 6 0 2.0 0.63 
3032 6 0 2.0 1.00 
3033 6 0 2.0 1.26 
3231 6 100 2.0 0.63 
3431 6 200 2.0 0.63 
3432 6 200 2.0 1.00 
3433 6 200 2.0 1.26 
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Table 16  Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum Average 
Phosphorus Target is 40 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above the Mean 
Phosphorus Load were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year.  
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 40Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10 8 6 4 2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
0011 0 0 L L 1753 1923 963 694 126 
0012 0 0 L M 6608 7397 6947 6335 6896 
0013 0 0 L H 3933 3793 3005 2470 1086 
0221 0 100 M L 1 2 2 164 337 
0222 0 100 M M 0 0 1 645 2432 
0223 0 100 M H 1 1 1 3 129 
0331 0 150 H L 1 3 0 56 883 
0332 0 150 H M 1 0 0 112 33 
0333 0 150 H H 0 0 1 127 327 
0111 0 50 L L 1 2 55 23 512 
0112 0 50 L M 1401 1100 4217 5777 4375 
0113 0 50 L H 1 1 2 2 1 
1011 2 0 L L 4 32 124 15 23 
1012 2 0 L M 4541 4294 2853 1186 115 
1013 2 0 L H 2 2 1 0 4 
1231 2 100 H L 2 1 0 4 3 
1232 2 100 H M 0 1 0 0 0 
1233 2 100 H H 1 1 0 0 0 
1121 2 50 M L 1 1 2 1 0 
1122 2 50 M M 2 222 362 66 0 
1123 2 50 M H 0 0 0 1 1 
2021 4 0 M L 1759 1939 2288 3821 5778 
2022 4 0 M M 15988 13962 12676 10694 6373 
2023 4 0 M H 0 1 0 47 1707 
3031 6 0 H L 1 1065 1597 2424 2652 
3032 6 0 H M 1 1 4 3 2 
3033 6 0 H H 1 1 1 1 2 
3231 6 100 H L 171 309 938 1353 1855 
3431 6 200 H L 1 0 0 4 118 
3432 6 200 H M 0 1 1 49 133 
3433 6 200 H H 3 6 6 44 646 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)   40 40 38 35 31 
Ave. P Deviation(Mg/yr)   9.4 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal units/ha). See Table 13 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
 
 
Table 16 above shows that when mean annual phosphorus load for the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed is limited to 40 Mg per year with an upper limit on phosphorus deviation 
above mean load of not more than 10 Mg per year, BMP 2022 received the largest land 
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allocation of about 16,000 hectares of pastureland. Under this grazing management 
practice, the pasture received 4 tons of poultry litter per hectare and no commercial 
nitrogen fertilizer was applied at all. However, producers maintained minimum biomass 
of 1,600 kilograms per hectare during grazing at a stocking rate of 1.00 AU per hectare. 
When the mean phosphorus loss was restricted to 40 Mg, the average deviations above 
this mean averaged 9.4 Mg per year. As the upper limit on phosphorus deviations above 
the maximum mean load was reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year, more land was 
transferred from BMP 2022, BMP 1012, and BMP 0013 and put under BMP 2021, BMP 
0112, BMP 0222 and BMP 0012. These changes represented combinations of less litter, 
more commercial nitrogen, more biomass retained after grazing, and reduced stocking 
rates. The amount of pastureland that received no poultry litter at all increased from about 
14,000 to 17,000 ha whereas the amount of land that received 4 tons of poultry litter per 
hectare declined from about 18,000 to 14,000 ha. The amount of land that received from 
50-150 kg/ha of commercial nitrogen fertilizer increased from approximately 1,400 to 
11,000 hectares. However, the amount of pastureland on which a minimum biomass of 
1,100 kg/ha was maintained during grazing declined from 18,000 to 13,000 hectares 
whereas the land on which a minimum biomass of 1,600 kg/ha and above was maintained 
during grazing increased from about 18,000 to 27,000 hectares.    The amount of land that 
was stocked at a rate of 1.00 AU/ha and above declined from approximately 33,000 to 
24,000 hectares while that which was stocked at a lower rate of 0.63 AU/ha increased 
from 4,000 to 12,000 hectares. Actual mean phosphorus loss declined from 40 Mg to  
31 Mg per year. Thus the model shows the most cost effective method to reduce average 
positive deviations to 2 Mg over 40 Mg is to reduce average annual phosphorus loss to  
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31 Mg per year.  
 
Table 17 below shows the optimal grazing management practices selected by the 
economic optimization model and amount of land allocated for each selected 
management practice when the mean annual total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed was reduced from 40 Mg to 35 Mg per year, with phosphorus 
deviation limits above target were systematically reduced from not more than 10 Mg to 2 
Mg per year. The results indicate the least costly changes in management practices to 
meet the limits in each case.  For example the area allocated for BMP 2022 
(4MgL,0N,mMB,mSR) declined from 16,000 to 12,000 hectares and remained the largest 
share of total area under pasture until the phosphorus deviation limit above target was 
reduced from not more than 10 Mg to 4 Mg per year. However, both the reduction of the 
mean annual phosphorus runoff target and phosphorus runoff deviation limits further 
transferred more land from BMP 2022, BMP 1012, and BMP 0013 and put it under BMP 
2021, BMP 0112, BMP 0222 and BMP 0012. The later management activities represent 
less poultry litter, more commercial N, and less intensive grazing than the former. As 
shown in Table 17, the amount of pastureland that received no poultry litter at all 
increased further from about 14,000 to 18,000 ha whereas the amount of land that 
received 4 tons of poultry litter per hectare declined from about 18000 to 11000 ha. 
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Table 17  Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum Average 
Phosphorus Target is 35 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above the Mean 
Phosphorus Load were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 35Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10 8 6 4 2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
0011 0 0 L L 2057 2104 1203 1351 915 
0012 0 0 L M 7593 7901 7773 7528 5683 
0013 0 0 L H 2708 2715 2612 1180 731 
0221 0 100 M L 13 12 51 252 35 
0222 0 100 M M 152 132 456 1114 4046 
0223 0 100 M H 20 21 2 5 344 
0331 0 150 H L 2 0 56 342 954 
0332 0 150 H M 1 0 11 79 113 
0333 0 150 H H 0 0 3 357 2083 
0111 0 50 L L 4 4 128 16 483 
0112 0 50 L M 2669 2672 3861 4796 2665 
0113 0 50 L H 0 0 4 2 1 
1011 2 0 L L 3 4 10 11 6 
1012 2 0 L M 1159 1149 1337 447 9 
1013 2 0 L H 2 4 2 1 1 
1231 2 100 H L 0 3 1 1 1 
1232 2 100 H M 0 0 1 0 0 
1233 2 100 H H 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 2 50 M L 1 0 0 0 0 
1122 2 50 M M 5 7 40 6 4 
1123 2 50 M H 1 1 1 1 1 
2021 4 0 M L 5846 5892 4222 5034 7637 
2022 4 0 M M 12256 12308 11189 8222 2906 
2023 4 0 M H 99 101 60 572 883 
3031 6 0 H L 1115 1049 2236 3311 4367 
3032 6 0 H M 3 4 2 2 1 
3033 6 0 H H 1 2 0 1 0 
3231 6 100 H L 224 245 973 1583 1892 
3431 6 200 H L 1 0 0 12 122 
3432 6 200 H M 0 1 1 79 218 
3433 6 200 H H 2 3 6 65 571 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)    35 35 35 32 26 
Ave. P Deviation(Mg/yr)  8.4 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal units/ha). See Table 13 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
 
 
The amount of land that received from 100-150 kg/ha of commercial nitrogen fertilizer 
increased from approximately 5 to 9,000 hectares. However, the amount of pastureland 
on which a minimum biomass of 1,100 kg/ha was maintained during grazing declined 
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from 18,000 to 10,000 hectares whereas the land on which a minimum biomass of 2,000 
kg/ha was maintained during grazing increased drastically from about 181 to 10,000 
hectares. The amount of land that was stocked at a rate of 1.00 AU/ha and above further 
declined from approximately 33,000 to 20,000 ha while that which was stocked at a 
lower rate of 0.63 AU/ha further increased from about 4,000 to 16,000 ha.  
 
Table 18 below shows the optimal grazing management practices selected by the 
economic optimization model and amount of land allocated for each selected 
management practice when the mean annual total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed was reduced from 40 Mg to 30 Mg per year, with phosphorus 
deviation limits above target varied from not more than 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year. 
The area allocated for BMP 2021 drastically increased from 1800 to 9000 hectares, the 
largest share of total area under pasture.  Under this grazing management practice, the 
pasture received 4 tons of poultry litter per hectare and no commercial nitrogen fertilizer 
was applied at all. However, producers maintained minimum biomass of 1600 kilograms 
per hectare during grazing at a stocking rate of 0.63 AU per hectare. BMP 2022 and  
BMP 0012 are second, each of them allocated about 6000 ha. The grazing management 
practices BMP 0011 and BMP 3031 were each allocated about 3000 hectares of land. 
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Table 18  Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum Average 
Phosphorus Target is 30 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above the Mean 
Phosphorus Load were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 30Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10 8 6 4 2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
0011 0 0 L L 3470 3470 3470 1606 1568 
0012 0 0 L M 5954 5954 5903 6603 5349 
0013 0 0 L H 838 838 831 822 2 
0221 0 100 M L 360 360 365 98 990 
0222 0 100 M M 2575 2575 2447 3957 3870 
0223 0 100 M H 189 189 168 188 1736 
0331 0 150 H L 66 66 59 10 729 
0332 0 150 H M 13 13 14 42 499 
0333 0 150 H H 69 69 221 1214 4009 
0111 0 50 L L 1 1 124 1 7 
0112 0 50 L M 2717 2717 2897 2631 1782 
0113 0 50 L H 0 0 2 1 1 
1011 2 0 L L 4 4 8 7 7 
1012 2 0 L M 109 109 100 11 5 
1013 2 0 L H 2 2 3 2 1 
1231 2 100 H L 0 0 1 0 1 
1232 2 100 H M 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 2 100 H H 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 2 50 M L 0 0 1 0 0 
1122 2 50 M M 1 1 2 2 2 
1123 2 50 M H 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 4 0 M L 8911 8911 8115 6782 5939 
2022 4 0 M M 6091 6091 6463 5101 910 
2023 4 0 M H 1245 1245 939 1140 632 
3031 6 0 H L 3041 3041 3504 3805 4903 
3032 6 0 H M 2 2 7 4 1 
3033 6 0 H H 0 0 1 0 0 
3231 6 100 H L 379 379 424 1853 2432 
3431 6 200 H L 0 0 0 78 191 
3432 6 200 H M 1 1 1 60 199 
3433 6 200 H H 1 1 4 31 502 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)  30 30 30 29 26 
Ave. P Deviation(Mg/yr)  7.5 7.5 6.0 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal units/ha). See Table 13 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
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Table 19  Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum Average 
Phosphorus Target is 25 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above the Mean 
Phosphorus Load were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year. 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 25Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR       10         8          6    4 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
0011 0 0 L L 4356 4356 4354 2917 
0012 0 0 L M 3081 3081 3096 4441 
0013 0 0 L H 1 1 2 3 
0221 0 100 M L 1107 1107 1080 1185 
0222 0 100 M M 3926 3926 3813 3605 
0223 0 100 M H 824 824 828 994 
0331 0 150 H L 1 1 1 15 
0332 0 150 H M 576 576 573 542 
0333 0 150 H H 3367 3367 3600 3949 
0111 0 50 L L 2 2 1 1 
0112 0 50 L M 1007 1007 1020 1070 
0113 0 50 L H 1 1 0 1 
1011 2 0 L L 2 2 3 10 
1012 2 0 L M 7 7 8 6 
1013 2 0 L H 2 2                3 1 
1231 2 100 H L 0 0 1 0 
1232 2 100 H M 0 0 0 0 
1233 2 100 H H 0 0 0 0 
1121 2 50 M L 0 0 0 0 
1122 2 50 M M 3 3 2 2 
1123 2 50 M H 0 0 0.4 1 
2021 4 0 M L 8174 8174 8338 7655 
2022 4 0 M M 1620 1620 1613 1304 
2023 4 0 M H 1679 1679 1671 1218 
3031 6 0 H L 6582 6582 6579 5576 
3032 6 0 H M 4 4 4 2 
3033 6 0 H H 1 1 1 18 
3231 6 100 H L 441 441 441 1658 
3431 6 200 H L 27 27 26 112 
3432 6 200 H M 0 0 1 37 
3433 6 200 H H 1 1 1 6 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)   25 25 25 25 
Ave. P Deviation(Mg/yr)           6.2             6.2               6.0       4.0          6.2 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal units/ha). See Table 13 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
 
 
 Table 19 shows the optimal grazing management practices selected by the economic 
optimization model and amount of land allocated for each selected management practice 
when the mean annual total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed was 
 137 
reduced from 40 Mg to 25 Mg per year, with phosphorus deviation limits above target 
varied from not more than 10 Mg to 4 Mg per year. When the mean annual phosphorus 
runoff was limited to 25 Mg per year, the area allocated for BMP 2021 declined slightly, 
but it remained the largest share of total area under pasture followed by BMP 3031 and 
BMP 0011.   The amount of land allocated for BMP 0011, BMP 0222, BMP 0333, and 
BMP 3031 increased. Table 20 shows the optimal grazing management practices selected 
by the economic optimization model and amount of land allocated for each selected 
management practice when the mean annual total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed was reduced from 40 Mg to 20 Mg per year, with phosphorus 
deviation limits above target varied from not more than 10 Mg to 4 Mg per year. When 
the mean annual phosphorus runoff was limited to 20 Mg per year, the area allocated for 
BMP 0333 drastically increased to about 9,000 hectares, receiving the largest share of 
total area under pasture. The amount of land allocated for BMP 2021 declined to about 
5,000 hectares, but ranked second to BMP 0333. Land allocated for BMP 3031 declined 
while that allocated for BMP 0222 remained relatively the same.  The amount of land 
allocated for BMP 0221 increased significantly. The amount of pastureland that received 
no poultry litter at all increased from about 14,000 to 26,000 hectares whereas the amount 
of land that received 4 tons of poultry litter per hectare declined from about 18,000 to 
5,000 hectares.  
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Table 20  Comparison of Optimal Management Practices(Ha) When Maximum Average 
Phosphorus Target is 20 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above the Mean 
Phosphorus Load were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year. 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 20Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10       8         6     4 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
0011 0 0 L L 1772 1772 1772 1775 
0012 0 0 L M 1966 1966 1966 1978 
0013 0 0 L H 2 2 2 4 
0221 0 100 M L 4129 4129 4129 4158 
0222 0 100 M M 3287 3287 3287 3369 
0223 0 100 M H 3124 3124 3124 3145 
0331 0 150 H L 1 1 1 8 
0332 0 150 H M 1884 1884 1884 1872 
0333 0 150 H H 8881 8881 8881 8879 
0111 0 50 L L 7 7 7 7 
0112 0 50 L M 554 554 554 569 
0113 0 50 L H 0 0 0 3 
1011 2 0 L L 3 3 3 9 
1012 2 0 L M 6 6 6 7 
1013 2 0 L H 2 2 2 4 
1231 2 100 H L 0 0 0 1 
1232 2 100 H M 0 0 0 1 
1233 2 100 H H 1 1 1 0 
1121 2 50 M L 0 0 0 1 
1122 2 50 M M 4 4 4 5 
1123 2 50 M H 0 0 0 1 
2021 4 0 M L 5278 5278 5278 5079 
2022 4 0 M M 13 13 13 150 
2023 4 0 M H 144 144 144 164 
3031 6 0 H L 4674 4674 4674 4382 
3032 6 0 H M 3 3 3 3 
3033 6 0 H H 1 1 1 1 
3231 6 100 H L 301 301 301 368 
3431 6 200 H L 31 31 31 31 
3432 6 200 H M 25 25 25 26 
3433 6 200 H H 1 1 1 4 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)  20 20 20 20 
Ave. P Deviation(Mg/yr)         5.3               5.3            5.3          4.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal units/ha). See Table 13 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
 
 
The amount of land that received no commercial nitrogen fertilizer dropped from 
approximately 35,000 to 14,000 hectares whereas the land that received from 100 - 150 
kg / ha of commercial nitrogen fertilizer increased from approximately 5 to 22,000 
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hectares. However, the amount of pastureland on which a minimum biomass of 1,100 
kg/ha was maintained during grazing declined from 18,000 to 4,000 hectares whereas the 
land on which a minimum biomass of 1,600 kg/ha and above was maintained during 
grazing increased from about 18,000 to 32,000 hectares. The amount of land that was 
stocked at a rate of 1.00 AU/ha and above declined from approximately 33000 to 19000 
hectares while that which was stocked at a lower rate of 0.63 AU/ha increased drastically 
from 4,000 to 16,000 hectares. 
 
Total Annual Phosphorus Runoff from Pastures Under Alternative Mean Annual 
Phosphorus Loads and Deviations Above Mean Phosphorus  
 
Figure 11 shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and deviation limits 
above target on predicted mean total annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
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 Figure 11  Predicted Annual Phosphorus Runoff for the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
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The annual phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year. The 
maximum allowable phosphorus deviation above the set annual phosphorus runoff target 
was varied in reductions of 2 tons from 10 to 2 tons per year. To meet the maximum 
deviations above the target the model could adopt management practices with small 
positive deviations and / or had a lower mean phosphorus loss. However, it was not 
feasible to impose a phosphorus deviation limit lower than 4 tons per year above target in 
the case of lower phosphorus runoff targets such as 25 tons and 20 tons per year. The 
imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above mean annual phosphorus 
runoff target affected estimated total annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland 
differently depending on the specified annual phosphorus runoff target and maximum 
allowable phosphorus deviation above that target. In general, the imposition of an upper 
limit on phosphorus deviation above target resulted in further reduction of predicted 
annual phosphorus runoff when the maximum allowable total phosphorus runoff for the 
entire watershed was set equal to or greater than 25 tons per year. When the target level 
of annual phosphorus runoff was set at 40 tons per year, setting a maximum allowable 
phosphorus deviation equal to or greater than 8 tons per year above this target did not 
affect the estimated total annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland. The imposition of 
upper limits on phosphorus deviation of 6, 4, and 2 tons per year above target resulted in 
further reduction of predicted annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland to 38 tons per 
year (5 percent reduction), 35 tons per year (13 percent reduction) , and 31 tons per year 
(23 percent reduction), respectively. The total annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland 
remained unchanged when the annual phosphorus loss targets were set at 35, 30 and 25 
tons per year until the maximum allowable phosphorus deviation above these targets was 
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reduced from 10 to 4 tons per year.    
 
When the target level of annual phosphorus runoff was reduced by 25 percent to 30 tons 
per year, setting a maximum allowable phosphorus deviation equal to or greater than 6 
tons per year above this target did not affect the estimated total annual phosphorus runoff 
from pastureland. The imposition of upper limits on phosphorus deviation of 4 and 2 tons 
per year above target resulted in further reduction of predicted annual phosphorus runoff 
from pastureland to 29 tons per year (28 percent reduction) and 26 tons per year (36 
percent reduction), respectively.  When the target level of annual phosphorus runoff was 
reduced by 50 percent to 20 tons per year, the imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus 
deviation above this annual phosphorus runoff target for the entire watershed had no 
effect on the estimated total annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland and yielded an 
amount of phosphorus loss abatement for the entire watershed equivalent to the specified 
annual phosphorus loading target for the entire watershed. The 50 percent reduction in 
the phosphorus loading target for the watershed resulted in a 58 percent reduction of the 
optimal annual phosphorus loss from 1.2 to 0.5 kilograms per hectare.  
 
Estimated Poultry Litter Use for the Watershed 
 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 below show the effect of alternative annual phosphorus runoff 
targets and phosphorus deviation limits above target on optimal poultry litter use in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. As the maximum allowable total annual phosphorus loading 
for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year without imposing an 
upper limit on the phosphorus deviation above target, the amount of poultry litter applied 
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on pastures in the entire watershed declined from about 43,000 to 11,000 tons per year 
(approximately 76 percent reduction in litter applied as fertilizer) or from an average of 
about 1.2 to 0.3 tons per hectare).  The imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus 
deviation above the set phosphorus loading target for the watershed resulted in further 
reduction of the optimal amount of poultry litter applied in the entire watershed 
depending on the set phosphorus loading target and the tolerance or maximum allowable 
phosphorus runoff deviation above the specified phosphorus runoff target. The lower the 
maximum allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above a specified target the larger the 
reduction in the estimated annual phosphorus runoff from pastureland in the watershed.  
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Figure 12  Estimated Total Quantity of Litter Applied in Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
 
 
Also, the lower the maximum allowable total annual phosphorus runoff target for the  
watershed the lesser the reductions in the estimated annual phosphorus runoff from 
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pastureland resulting from the imposition of an upper phosphorus runoff deviation above 
the specified target.  As shown in Figure 12 and  Figure 13, as the maximum allowable 
total annual phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons 
per year with an upper limit of 4 tons per year imposed on the phosphorus deviation 
above target, the amount of poultry litter applied on pastures in the entire watershed 
declined from about 43,000 to 2,300 tons per year (approximately 95 percent reduction in 
litter applied as fertilizer) or from an average of about 1.2 to 0.06 tons per hectare). 
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Figure 13  Estimated Quantity of Litter Used Per Ha in Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
 
  
Estimated Poultry Litter Shipments to Litter-to-Energy Power Plant 
 
Figure 14 below shows the effect of alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus deviation limits above target on optimal litter shipments from chicken farm 
centroids in the watershed to the possible litter-to-energy processing plant with and 
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without upper phosphorus deviation limits above target. As the allowable total annual 
phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year, the 
optimal amount of poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant (located 
at Jay, Oklahoma), increased depending on the tolerance or allowed deviation above the 
specified average total phosphorus target. When the mean phosphorus loading target was 
reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year without imposing an upper limit on the phosphorus 
deviation, the estimated amount of poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing 
plant increased from 46 to 79 thousand tons per year. The imposition of an upper limit on 
phosphorus deviation of not more than 4 tons per year above the phosphorus loading 
target of 20 tons per year for the watershed resulted in further increases of the optimal 
amount of poultry litter shipped to the processing plant to about 87 thousand tons per 
year. 
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Figure 14  Quantity of Litter Shipped From Chicken Farm Centroids to Energy Plant.  
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The lower the maximum allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above a specified target 
the larger the increase in the estimated amount of poultry litter shipped to the litter- to- 
energy processing plant. However, the lower the maximum allowable total annual 
phosphorus runoff target for the watershed the lesser the increase in the amount of 
poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant resulting from the imposition 
of upper phosphorus runoff deviations above the specified target.  
 
Estimated Litter Application Rates For Selected Major Soil Types 
A closer look at how the different soil types in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed 
performed in terms of optimal litter application rates and phosphorus runoff under 
alternative phosphorus loss targets revealed considerable variation within and across the 
different targets.  The SWAT model delineated 27 soil types in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed. Six of the identified soil types are shown in Table 21 below and cover about 
73 percent of the total area of the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
 
Table 21 Major Soil Types in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed   
 
Soil Type Share of Total Watershed Area (%) 
Clarksville 
Nixa 
Captina 
Doniphan 
Tonti 
Newtonia 
17 
16 
14 
12 
8 
6 
 
 
For discussion purposes, we focus on these six major soils to highlight the variation 
between the amounts of litter that can be applied to and amount of predicted phosphorus 
runoff from different soil types given alternative phosphorus runoff targets and 
 146 
phosphorus runoff deviations above the specified targets.  Figure 15 below shows the 
effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus runoff deviation limits 
above target on optimal litter application rates for the Clarksville soil. The overall 
quantity of poultry litter applied per hectare on the Clarksville soil declined as the annual 
phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year.  
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Figure 15  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Clarksville Soil. 
 
 
However, the amount of litter applied per hectare declined rapidly when the phosphorus 
runoff target was reduced from 40 to 30 tons per hectare and then continued to decline 
steadily at lower phosphorus runoff target levels. Reducing the target phosphorus runoff 
from 40 to 30 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 2 tons per 
year above the target reduced the average amount of litter applied on pastures from 2.8 to 
1.6 tons per hectare. A 50 percent reduction in the phosphorus loss target from 40 to 20 
tons per year with a phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year above 
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the target reduced the average amount of litter applied on pastures from 2.8 to 1.4 tons 
per hectare.  Figure 16 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets 
and phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on optimal litter application rates for 
the Doniphan soil.  
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Figure 16  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Doniphan Soil. 
 
 
The overall quantity of litter applied per hectare on the Doniphan soil declined as the 
phosphorus loss target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year. However, the amount of 
litter applied for this soil declined slightly from an average of about 4.3 to 4.1 tons per 
hectare when the phosphorus loss target was reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year. The 
amount of litter applied per hectare declined rapidly for phosphorus runoff targets lower 
than 30 tons per year. A 50 percent reduction in the phosphorus loss target with an upper 
phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year yielded an optimal litter 
application rate of 1.8 tons per hectare for the Doniphan soil. The optimal litter 
application rate is higher on a Doniphan soil than a Clarksville. The optimization model 
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allocated a higher litter application rate on a Doniphan soil because the marginal cost of 
removing an additional unit of phosphorus runoff on a Doniphan soil is lower than the 
marginal cost of abating an additional unit of phosphorus runoff on a Clarksville soil.   
 
Figure 17 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on optimal litter application rates for the Captina soil.  
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Figure 17  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Captina Soil. 
 
 
The Captina soil showed a response pattern different from Clarksville and Doniphan 
soils. Though the overall quantity of poultry litter applied declined from 4.5 to 1.9 tons 
per hectare as the phosphorus loss target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year with an 
upper phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year, the amount of litter 
applied per hectare increased when the phosphorus loss target was reduced from 40 to 35 
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tons per year. The amount of litter applied per hectare declined rapidly for phosphorus 
runoff targets lower than 35 tons per year.  
 
Figure 18 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on optimal litter application rates for the Nixa soil. 
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Figure 18  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Nixa Soil. 
 
  
The Nixa soil showed a response pattern very sensitive to the annual phosphorus runoff 
target for the watershed and phosphorus deviation limits above target. The overall 
quantity of litter applied declined drastically as the phosphorus runoff target was reduced 
from 40 to 20 tons per year and the phosphorus deviation limit above target reduced from 
10 to 2 tons per year. For this soil, a 25 percent reduction in the annual phosphorus runoff 
target from 40 to 30 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation limit above target of not 
more that 2 tons per year reduced the litter application rate from 0.34 to 0.10 tons per 
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hectare. However, a 50 percent reduction in the annual phosphorus runoff target resulted 
in complete cessation of litter application on pastures.  
 
Figure 19 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on optimal litter application rates for the Tonti soil. 
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Figure 19  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Tonti Soil. 
  
 
The Tonti soil showed a response pattern very similar to that observed in the case of the 
Nixa soil. The amount of poultry litter applied was very sensitive to the annual 
phosphorus runoff target for the watershed and phosphorus deviation limits above target. 
The overall quantity of litter applied declined drastically as the phosphorus loss target 
was reduced, such that very minimal amounts of litter were applied on pastures at a 
phosphorus runoff target of 25 tons per year. No litter was applied at all when the 
phosphorus loss target reached 20 tons per year for the Tonti soil.   
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Figure 20 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on optimal litter application rates for the Newtonia 
soil. The quantity of poultry litter applied on the Newtonia soil declined steadily from 3.9 
to 2.6 tons per hectare as the annual phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 to 20 
tons per year. The imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above the set 
phosphorus loading target for the watershed further reduced the optimal amount of litter 
applied per hectare at all phosphorus loading targets. However, the amount of litter 
applied per hectare remained higher than in other soils when the phosphorus runoff target 
reached 20 tons per year. 
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Figure 20  Estimated Litter Application Rates for the Newtonia Soil. 
 
 
The preceding discussion shows the variation in the amount of poultry litter applied by 
soil type in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. A 50 percent reduction of the phosphorus 
loss target from 40 to 20 tons per year for the entire watershed resulted in an overall 
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decline in the quantity of litter applied per hectare for all major soil types in the 
watershed. However, the degree and response pattern to reductions of the phosphorus 
runoff target from 40 to 20 tons per year and reduced upper limits on phosphorus runoff 
deviations from 10 to 2 tons per year was different for different soils. This result suggests 
that uniform phosphorus reduction policies and programs in the case of these major soil 
types in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed are not cost effective and efficient in achieving 
the desired phosphorus reduction goals to ensure clean water in the lakes at least cost.   
 
Optimal Minimum Biomass Retained During Grazing For Major Soil Types 
 
Figure 21 shows the effects of alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets and deviation 
limits on minimum biomass maintained during grazing for the Clarksville soil in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
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Figure 21  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Clarksville Soil.  
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The Clarksville soil is one of the six major soil types in the watershed and accounts for 
about 17 percent of the total land area of the watershed.  The minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing on this soil steadily increased as the maximum allowable total 
annual phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per 
year with or without imposing an upper limit on the phosphorus deviation above target. 
The average amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing rose from an 
average of approximately 1.2 to 1.7 tons per hectare.  
 
The imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above the set phosphorus 
loading target for the watershed further increased the optimal amount of minimum 
biomass maintained during grazing depending on the set phosphorus loading target and 
the tolerance or maximum allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above the specified 
phosphorus runoff target. The higher the annual phosphorus runoff target the lesser the 
effect of imposing an upper phosphorus runoff deviation limit equal to or greater than 6 
tons per year on the estimated minimum biomass maintained during grazing. When the 
target level of annual phosphorus runoff was reduced by 50 percent to 20 tons per year, 
the imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above this annual phosphorus 
runoff target for the entire watershed had no effect on the estimated minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing.  
 
Figure 22 below shows the effects of alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets and 
deviation limits on minimum biomass maintained during grazing for the Nixa soil in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. The Nixa soil accounts for about 16 percent of the total land 
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area of the watershed. The minimum biomass maintained during grazing on this soil 
increased as the maximum allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the entire 
watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year with or without imposing an upper 
limit on the phosphorus deviation above target. The amount of minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing rose from an average of approximately 1.1 to 1.5 tons per 
hectare. 
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Figure 22  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Nixa Soil. 
 
 
However, the estimated amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing 
remained relatively the same as the target level of annual phosphorus runoff varied from 
40 to 25 tons per year with and without an upper limit imposed on the phosphorus 
deviation above target. The imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above 
phosphorus loading targets of 40, 35, 30, and 25 tons per year further increased the 
optimal amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing depending on the set 
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phosphorus loading target and the tolerance or maximum allowable phosphorus runoff 
deviation above the specified phosphorus runoff target. The estimated minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing was highest (1.5 tons/ha) when the target level of annual 
phosphorus runoff was reduced by 50 percent to 20 tons per year. The imposition of an 
upper limit on phosphorus deviation above this annual phosphorus runoff target for the 
entire watershed had no effect on the estimated minimum biomass maintained during 
grazing. Figure 23 below shows the effects of alternative annual phosphorus runoff 
targets and deviation limits on minimum biomass maintained during grazing for the 
Captina soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
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Figure 23  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Captina Soil. 
 
 
The Captina soil accounts for about 14 percent of the total land area of the watershed.  
The minimum biomass maintained during grazing on this soil steadily increased as the 
maximum allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was 
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reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year with and without imposing an upper limit on the 
phosphorus deviation above target. The amount of minimum biomass maintained during 
grazing rose from an average of approximately 1.6 to 2.0 tons per hectare. The estimated 
minimum biomass maintained during grazing was highest (2.0 tons/ha) when the target 
level of annual phosphorus runoff was reduced by 50 percent to 20 tons per year. The 
imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above this annual phosphorus 
runoff target for the entire watershed had no effect on the estimated minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing. Figure 24 below shows the effects of alternative annual 
phosphorus runoff targets and deviation limits on minimum biomass maintained during 
grazing for the Doniphan soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
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Figure 24  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Doniphan Soil. 
 
 
The Doniphan soil accounts for about 12 percent of the total land area of the watershed.  
The minimum biomass maintained during grazing on this soil increased as the maximum 
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allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 
to 20 tons per year with and without imposing an upper limit on the phosphorus deviation 
above target. The amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing rose from an 
average of approximately 1.2 to 1.7 tons per hectare. The estimated minimum biomass 
maintained during grazing remained relatively the same when the target level of the total 
annual phosphorus runoff for the watershed was reduced to 25 and 20 tons per year.  
Figure 25 below shows the effects of alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets and 
deviation limits on minimum biomass maintained during grazing for the Tonti soil in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. The Tonti soil accounts for about 8 percent of the total land 
area of the watershed.  The minimum biomass maintained during grazing on this soil 
increased as the maximum allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the entire 
watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year with and without imposing an upper 
limit on the phosphorus deviation above target. 
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Figure 25  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Tonti Soil. 
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The amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing rose from an average of 
approximately 1.5 to 1.8 tons per hectare. The imposition of an upper limit on 
phosphorus deviation above the annual phosphorus runoff target of 20 tons per year had 
no effect on the estimated minimum biomass maintained during grazing. Figure 26 below 
shows the effects of alternative annual phosphorus runoff targets and deviation limits on 
minimum biomass maintained during grazing for the Newtonia soil in the Eucha-
Spavinaw Watershed. The Newtonia soil accounts for about 6 percent of the total land 
area of the watershed. The minimum biomass maintained during grazing on this soil 
increased slightly as the maximum allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the 
entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year with and without imposing an 
upper limit on the phosphorus deviation above target. 
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Figure 26  Minimum Biomass Maintained During Grazing for Newtonia Soil. 
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The amount of minimum biomass maintained during grazing rose from an average of 
approximately 1.5 to 1.6 tons per hectare. The estimated minimum biomass maintained 
during grazing remained unchanged at 1.6 tons per hectare when the target level of the 
total annual phosphorus runoff for the watershed was reduced to 25 and 20 tons per year. 
 
Optimal Amount of Phosphorus Loss For Selected Major Soil Types 
 
Figure 27 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff on the 
Clarksville soil. The estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the 
Clarksville soil declined steadily as the annual phosphorus runoff target was reduced 
from 40 to 25 tons per year and then declined significantly when the target reached 20 
tons per year with an upper phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year. 
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Figure 27  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Clarksville Soil. 
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Reducing the target phosphorus runoff from 40 to 30 tons per year with a phosphorus 
deviation limit of not more than 2 tons per year above the target reduced the average 
amount of phosphorus runoff from pastures from about 0.9 to 0.7 kilograms per hectare. 
A 50 percent reduction in the phosphorus loss target from 40 to 20 tons per year with a 
phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year above the target reduced the 
average amount of phosphorus runoff on pastures from 0.9 to 0.5 kilograms per hectare.  
 
Figure 28 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff for the 
Nixa soil. The estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the Nixa soil 
declined relatively faster than in the case of the Clarksville soil as the annual phosphorus 
runoff target was reduced from 40 to 25 tons per year and the phosphorus runoff 
deviation limit above target was varied from 10 to 2 tons per year.  
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Figure 28  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Nixa Soil. 
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The estimated amount of phosphorus runoff was sensitive to both the annual phosphorus 
runoff target and phosphorus deviation limit above target. Reducing the target 
phosphorus runoff from 40 to 30 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation limit of not 
more than 2 tons per year above the target reduced the average amount of phosphorus 
runoff from pastures from about 0.7 to 0.6 kilograms per hectare. A 50 percent reduction 
in the phosphorus loss target from 40 to 20 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation 
limit of not more than 4 tons per year above the target reduced the average amount of 
phosphorus runoff on pastures from 0.9 to 0.4 kilograms per hectare.  Figure 29 below 
shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus runoff deviation 
limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff for the Captina soil.  
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Figure 29  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Captina Soil. 
 
 
The estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the Captina soil exhibited a 
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response pattern to changes in the annual phosphorus runoff target and phosphorus runoff 
deviations limits similar to that observed in the case of the Clarksville soil.  The amount 
of phosphorus runoff declined steadily as the annual phosphorus runoff target was 
reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then declined rapidly at lower annual phosphorus 
runoff target levels and phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target. Reducing the 
target phosphorus runoff from 40 to 30 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation limit of 
not more than 2 tons per year above the target reduced the average amount of phosphorus 
runoff from pastures from about 1.0 to 0.7 kilograms per hectare. A 50 percent reduction 
in the phosphorus loss target from 40 to 20 tons per year with a phosphorus deviation 
limit of not more than 4 tons per year above the target reduced the average amount of 
phosphorus runoff on pastures from 1.0 to 0.6 kilograms per hectare.   
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Figure 30  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Doniphan Soil. 
 
 
Figure 30 above shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff for the 
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Doniphan soil. The estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the Doniphan 
soil was not very sensitive to changes in both the annual phosphorus runoff target and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits. The estimated amount of phosphorus runoff declined 
steadily from 1.7 to 1.3 kilograms per hectare when the target phosphorus runoff was 
reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then dropped much faster at annual phosphorus 
runoff targets lower than 30 tons per year. 
 
Figure 31 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff for the 
Tonti soil. The estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the Tonti soil 
exhibited a response pattern similar to that observed in the case of Nixa.  
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Figure 31  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Tonti Soil. 
 
 
The estimated amount of phosphorus runoff was sensitive to changes in both the annual 
phosphorus runoff target and mean phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target. The 
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amount of phosphorus runoff per hectare declined relatively faster than in other major 
soils as the annual phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 to 25 tons per year and 
the mean phosphorus runoff deviation limit above target was varied from 10 to 2 tons per 
year. Reducing the target phosphorus runoff from 40 to 30 tons per year with a 
phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 2 tons per year above the target reduced the 
average amount of phosphorus runoff from pastures from about 0.9 to 0.7 kilograms per 
hectare. A 50 percent reduction in the phosphorus loss target from 40 to 20 tons per year 
with a phosphorus deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year above the target 
reduced the average amount of phosphorus runoff on pastures from 1.0 to 0.6 kilograms 
per hectare. 
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Figure 32  Estimated Amount of Phosphorus Runoff on the Newtonia Soil. 
 
 
Figure 32 above shows the effect of alternative phosphorus runoff targets and phosphorus 
runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus runoff for the 
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Newtonia soil. The overall quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare on the Newtonia 
soil declined as the phosphorus loss target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year. 
However, the amount of phosphorus runoff for this soil declined slightly from an average 
of about 0.8 to 0.6 kilograms per hectare when the phosphorus loss target was reduced 
from 40 to 30 tons per year. Then the amount of phosphorus runoff declined much faster 
at target levels of 25 tons per year and lower such that the average amount of phosphorus 
runoff was estimated at 0.4 kilograms per hectare when the target annual phosphorus 
loading for the watershed reached 20 tons per year with an upper phosphorus deviation 
limit of not more than 4 tons per year.   
  
Optimal Elemental Nitrogen Application Rates 
Figure 33 below shows the effect of alternative phosphorus loss targets and phosphorus 
 runoff deviation limit above target on optimal elemental nitrogen use in the watershed. 
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Figure 33  Optimal Elemental Nitrogen Application Rates in the Watershed. 
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As the allowable total annual phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced 
from 40 to 20 tons per year, the optimal amount of elemental nitrogen applied in the 
entire watershed increased depending on the tolerance or allowed deviation above the 
specified average total phosphorus target. Reducing the phosphorus loading target from 
40 to 20 tons per year increased the optimal amount of elemental nitrogen used from 
about an area-weighted average of  2 kg/ha to 75 kg/ha for the entire watershed. 
Generally, the imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above the set loading 
target for the watershed resulted in further increases of the optimal amount of elemental 
nitrogen applied in the watershed. 
 
Total Agricultural Income from Grazing  
 
Figure 34 below provides an aggregate summary of the effects on agricultural income 
from grazing of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the entire Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25 and 20 tons per year with mean phosphorus runoff deviation 
limits above these targets varied from 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 tons per year. The total producer 
income from grazing for the entire watershed declined from about $3.1 million to $1.3 
million as the phosphorus runoff limit was reduced from 40 tons to 30 tons per year. A 
further reduction of the phosphorus runoff limit to 20 tons per year with an upper mean 
phosphorus runoff deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per year further reduced total 
agricultural income from grazing to $0.6 million. Reducing the upper limit on the 
phosphorus runoff deviation above the target loading from 10 tons to as low as 2 tons per 
year further reduced agricultural income at all load levels. However, reductions in total 
agricultural income from grazing were larger at higher phosphorus runoff limits than at 
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lower limits. Also, the lower the upper limit on phosphorus deviation above the target 
phosphorus loading the larger the reduction in agricultural income from grazing at that 
target load. 
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Figure 34  Estimated Producer Income from Grazing in Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed. 
 
 
Total Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs for the Watershed 
 
Figure 35 and Figure 36 below provide an aggregate summary of the effects on 
phosphorus pollution abatement costs of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the entire 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25 and 20 tons per year with phosphorus runoff 
deviation limits above these targets varied from 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 tons per year.  The total 
phosphorus pollution abatement costs in the watershed increased rapidly as the 
phosphorus runoff limit was reduced from 40 tons to 20 tons per year.  
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Estimated Reduction In Agricultural Income From Grazing for the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 35  Reductions in Total Net Returns from Grazing in the Watershed. 
 
 
Total abatement costs rose from zero to $1.7 million when phosphorus limit was reduced 
from 40 tons to 30 tons per year. The total abatement costs for the watershed further 
increased to $2.5 million when the phosphorus runoff limit was further reduced to 20 tons 
per year with an upper phosphorus runoff deviation limit of not more than 4 tons per 
year. Reducing the upper limit on the phosphorus runoff deviation above the target 
loading from 10 tons to as low as 2 tons per year further increased total abatement costs 
at all load levels. However, increases in total abatement costs due to reductions in upper 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target were larger at higher phosphorus runoff 
limits than at lower limits. 
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Estimated Reduction in Per Hectare Agricultural Income From 
Grazing in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 36  Reductions in Per Hectare Net Returns from Grazing in the Watershed. 
 
 
Marginal Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs for the Watershed 
 
Figure 37 below shows the cost of removing one additional kilogram of phosphorus as 
the mean annual phosphorus runoff was limited to 40, 35, 30, 25 and 20 tons per year and 
the phosphorus runoff deviation above target was limited to 10, 8, 6, 4, and 2 tons per 
year. The cost of removing an additional kilogram of phosphorus increased as the mean 
annual phosphorus runoff limit was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year. It further 
increased at all total phosphorus runoff targets for the watershed when an upper limit 
imposed on phosphorus runoff deviation above the target was reduced from 10 to 2 tons 
per year. The marginal abatement cost rose from $28 to $385 when the upper limit on 
phosphorus runoff deviation limit was reduced from not more than 10 to 2 tons per year 
given an annual phosphorus runoff limit of 40 tons per year for the watershed. Given a 
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phosphorus runoff deviation limit of not more than 10 tons per year above the target 
phosphorus loading, reducing the total phosphorus runoff limit for the watershed from  
40 to 20 tons per year increased the cost of removing an additional kilogram of 
phosphorus from $28 to $334. However, the cost of removing an additional kilogram of 
phosphorus from $334 to $456 as the upper limit on phosphorus runoff deviation was 
reduced from not more than 10 to 4 tons per year above the phosphorus runoff limit of 20 
tons per year for the watershed. The marginal abatement cost reached a high of $635 
when the annual total phosphorus runoff limit for the watershed was reduced from 40 to 
30 tons per year with phosphorus runoff deviation limit of not more than 2 tons per year 
above the target phosphorus loading.  Ancev et al. (2006) also found that marginal 
abatement costs rose rapidly when annual phosphorus loadings were reduced from 25 Mg 
to 20 Mg in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
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Figure 37  Marginal Abatement Costs in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
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Optimal Shipment Pattern of Poultry Litter Between Subbasins  
 
Figure 38 and Figure 39 below show the effect of alternative phosphorus loss targets for 
the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed on optimal shipment pattern of poultry litter from chicken 
farm centroids to subbasin centroids and to the possible litter-to-energy processing plant 
at Jay, Oklahoma. The allocation of poultry litter between the processing plant and the 
use on pasture land within the watershed subbasins varied with the different phosphorus 
loss targets.  
 
 
Figure 38  Litter Shipment Pattern Given Phosphorus Loss Target of 40,000 kg /yr. 
 
 
As can be seen from the both figures, as the allowable maximum phosphorus loss target 
was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year, the amount of litter transported from the 
chicken farm centroids to the litter-to-energy plant drastically  increased (while the 
amount of litter applied as fertilizer on pasture land in the watershed subbasins declined). 
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Figure 39  Litter Shipment Pattern Given Phosphorus Loss Target of 20,000 kg /yr. 
 
The increase in the amount of litter shipped to the processing plant is shown by the 
increased intensity of transportation lines that directly connect chicken farm centroids to 
the processing plant at Jay, Oklahoma as the allowable level of phosphorus runoff is 
reduced by 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively. As indicated previously, reducing the 
phosphorus loading target from 40 to 20 tons per year without imposing an upper limit on 
the deviation above the target, increased the amount of poultry litter transported from the 
chicken farms in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed to the possible litter-to-energy 
processing plant at Jay, Oklahoma by about 140 percent. This is a rise from the initial 
simulated amount of about 35,000 to 84,000 kilograms per year. However, the imposition 
of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation above the set loading target for the watershed 
resulted in further increase of the optimal amount of poultry litter transported to the litter-
to-energy processing plant from chicken farm centroids in the entire watershed. Larger 
increments in optimal amount of litter shipped were predicted at phosphorus loading 
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targets of 40 tons (litter shipments rose by 56 percent) and 30 tons (litter shipments rose 
by 23 percent) per year compared to that obtained when the loading target was set at 20 
tons (litter shipments increased by 1 percent) per year for the entire watershed. The 
overall phosphorus loss in the watershed declined because most of the poultry litter was 
shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant and the rest was hauled and applied on 
pasture land in the subbasins within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
 
Scenario II: Land Application of Alum-Treated Litter and Trading Option 
 
In this option we examined the effects of limiting total phosphorus runoff for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed to 40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year on optimal litter and pasture 
management systems with an option to use alum-treated litter on pastures as well as 
hauling litter within the watershed and to a possible litter-to-energy power plant located 
at Jay, Oklahoma.   The basic assumptions were that Alum would reduce soluble 
phosphorus runoff by 75 percent. Also, since Alum would reduce nitrogen loss in the 
poultry house the average ton of litter would contain 34 kg of nitrogen rather than 30 kg 
for untreated litter. Hence only 88 percent as much litter had to be applied for the same 
amount of nitrogen. Alum-treated poultry litter was assumed to impose an additional cost 
of $5.00 per ton to farmers undertaking the agricultural activities in HRUs where alum-
treated litter was applied. Poultry litter was applied to pastures at levels consistent with 
meeting the nitrogen requirement of the crop. 
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Optimal Grazing Management Practices for the Watershed 
 
Table 22 below shows the codes and description of management activities that entered 
the solution set at different levels of soluble phosphorus runoff. The addition of the 
possibility to use alum-treated litter on pastures reduced the number of optimal 
management practices in the solution set at all levels of soluble phosphorus runoff for the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. No commercial nitrogen was applied to pastures in this 
scenario. Poultry litter was applied to pastures at levels consistent with meeting the 
nitrogen requirement of the crop. There are only 2 pasture management systems in the 
solution set (codes 46 and 56) that do not involve the use of alum-treated poultry litter. 
 
Table 22. Optimal Management Activities Given Alum-Treated Litter Option.  
BMP 
Code 
Poultry Litter 
Applied 
(tons/ha) 
Elemental 
Nitrogen Applied 
(kg/ha) 
Minimum Biomass 
Maintained During Grazing 
(tons/ha) 
Stocking Rate 
(AU/ha) 
46 4 0 1.6 1.26 
56 6 0 2.0 1.26 
61 1.765 0 1.1 0.63 
66 1.765 0 1.1 1.00 
76 3.529 0 1.6 0.63 
81 3.529 0 1.6 1.00 
86 3.529 0 1.6 1.26 
91 5.294 0 2.0 0.63 
96 5.294 0 2.0 1.00 
101 5.294 0 2.0 1.26 
 
Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25 show the range of pasture management practices that 
entered the solution when the annual mean soluble phosphorus runoff was limited to 40, 
30, and 20 tons per year respectively, with mean phosphorus deviation limits above target 
varied from 10 to 2 tons per year. When the soluble phosphorus runoff was limited to 40 
 175 
tons per year, 21,000 ha of land was allocated to pasture that received 4 tons of untreated 
litter per ha, stocked at 1.26 AU/ha and the biomass maintained during grazing was 
1,600kg/ha. Approximately 15,000 ha of pastureland were allocated to management 96. 
This management practice represented application of alum-treated poultry litter at the rate 
of about 5 tons per ha, with cattle put on pasture at the stocking rate of 1.00 AU/ha. 
Biomass maintained during grazing was estimated at 2,000kg/ha. However, as the soluble 
phosphorus runoff limit was reduced to 20 tons per year, more land was moved out of 
management 46 and 56 (both use untreated litter) and allocated largely to management 
systems 96, 81 and 66 in that order. All these three management systems that came into 
the solution set represented the use of alum-treated litter, maintaining at least 1,600kg/ha 
of biomass during grazing and a stocking rate of 1.00 AU/ha.  
 
Table 23. Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum 
Average Soluble Phosphorus Target is 40 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above 
the Mean were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg Per Year. 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 40Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10 8 6 4 2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
46 4.0 0 M H 20774 18873 14027 12009 4583 
56 6.0 0 H H 5473 6173 4954 3020 1025 
61 1.8 0 L L 0 0 0 0 0 
66 1.8 0 L M 0 0 0 0 58 
76 3.5 0 M L 0 0 0 0 350 
81 3.5 0 M M 0 0 0 1303 11715 
86 3.5 0 M H 0 0 0 0 53 
91 5.3 0 H L 0 0 316 1174 21029 
96 5.3 0 H M 15208 16797 22833 23951 21029 
101 5.3 0 H H 1647 1611 1689 1445 3394 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)   40 40 36 32 22 
Ave. P. Deviations(Mg/yr)   8.4 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal Units/ha). See Table 22 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
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Table 24. Comparison of Optimal Management Practices (Ha) When Maximum 
Average Soluble Phosphorus Target is 30 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above 
the Mean were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg Per Year. 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 30Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR      10     8    6       4      2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
46 4.0 0 M H 14724 14724 10012 7314 71 
56 6.0 0 H H 1284 1284 1821 720 176 
61 1.8 0 L L 0 0 0 0 350 
66 1.8 0 L M 0 0 0 0 1433 
76 3.5 0 M L 0 0 0 125 797 
81 3.5 0 M M 36 36 34 1468 21696 
86 3.5 0 M H 0 0 0 32 1799 
91 5.3 0 H L 0 0 316 1050 226 
96 5.3 0 H M 24270 24270 27862 29607 16291 
101 5.3 0 H H 2739 2739 3144 2908 108 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)   30 30 30 26 18 
Ave. P. Deviations(Mg/yr)   6.5 6.5 6.0 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal Units/ha). See Table 22 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
 
 
Table 25. Comparison of Optimal Management Practices(Ha) When Maximum 
Average Soluble Phosphorus Target is 20 Mg / year as Average P Loss Deviations Above 
the Mean were Reduced from 10 Mg to 2 Mg Per Year. 
 
Optimal Management Practice Deviation Above Maximum 20Mg Phosphorus Loss (Mg) 
Code PL Nit. MB SR 10 8 6 4 2 
 
Mg kg   Hectares Where Management Practice was Optimal  
46 4.0 0 M H 1676 1676 1676 402 0 
56 6.0 0 H H 375 375 375 283 0 
61 1.8 0 L L 7 7 7 7 0 
66 1.8 0 L M 0 0 0 58 20679 
76 3.5 0 M L 176 176 176 125 0 
81 3.5 0 M M 9258 9258 9258 10396 17852 
86 3.5 0 M H 848 848 848 1702 0 
91 5.3 0 H L 647 647 647 1277 0 
96 5.3 0 H M 29682 29682 29682 28191 4605 
101 5.3 0 H H 252 252 252 595 0 
Ave. P Loss (Mg/yr)   20 20 20 20 13 
Ave. P. Deviations(Mg/yr)               4.2 4.2   4.2 4.0 2.0 
* Abbreviations used: PL=Poultry Litter Applied (Mg/ha); Nit. = Commercial Nitrogen 
Applied (kg/ha);  MB= Minimum Biomass (L=1.1,M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha); SR = Stocking 
Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal Units/ha). See Table 22 for the best management 
practice (BMP) associated with this BMP code. 
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Optimal Amount of Poultry Litter Used As Fertilizer on Pastures 
 
The option of using alum-treated poultry litter on pastures lead to a drastic reduction in 
the litter shipments from the watershed to the possible litter-to-energy power plant in Jay, 
Oklahoma. Most of the poultry litter produced in the watershed was hauled between 
subbasins within the watershed and applied on land as crop fertilizer.  Figure 40 and 
Figure 41 below show the effect of alternative annual soluble phosphorus runoff targets 
and phosphorus deviation limits above target on optimal poultry litter use in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed. As the maximum allowable total annual soluble phosphorus loading 
for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year, the amount of poultry 
litter applied on pastures in the entire watershed declined from about 46,000 to 17,000 
tons per year (approximately 63 percent drop in litter applied as fertilizer) or from an 
average of about 1.3 to 0.5 tons per hectare).  The imposition of an upper limit on 
phosphorus deviation above the set phosphorus loading target for the watershed resulted 
in further decline of the optimal amount of poultry litter applied in the entire watershed 
depending on the set soluble phosphorus loading target and the tolerance or maximum 
allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above the specified phosphorus runoff target. The 
lower the maximum allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above a specified target the 
larger the decrease in the estimated amount of poultry litter applied in the watershed. 
Also, the lower the maximum allowable total annual soluble phosphorus runoff target for 
the watershed the lesser the decrease in the estimated amount of poultry litter applied in 
the watershed for a given upper phosphorus runoff deviation above the specified target.   
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Total Quantity of Litter Applied as Fertilizer in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed (tons/yr)
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Figure 40  Quantity of Poultry Litter Applied as Fertilizer in the Watershed (tons/yr). 
 
  
Quantity of Litter Applied as Fertilizer in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed (tons/ha)
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Figure 41  Quantity of Poultry Litter Applied as Fertilizer in the Watershed (tons/ha) 
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Optimal Poultry Litter Shipments to Litter-to-Energy Power Plant 
 
Figure 42 below shows the effect of alternative annual soluble phosphorus runoff targets 
and phosphorus deviation limits above target on optimal litter shipments from chicken 
farm centroids in the watershed to the possible litter-to-energy processing plant with and 
without upper phosphorus deviation limits above target. As the allowable total annual 
soluble phosphorus loading for the entire watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per 
year, the optimal amount of poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant 
(located at Jay, Oklahoma) rose depending on the tolerance or allowed deviation above 
the specified average total phosphorus target. As the mean annual soluble phosphorus 
loading target was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year, the optimal amount of poultry 
litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant increased from about 43,000 to 
72,000 tons per year. 
Total Quantity of Litter Shipped From Chicken Farm Centroids in the 
Watershed To a Proposed Processing Plant at Jay, Oklahoma  
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Figure 42  Quantity of Litter Shipped From Chicken Farm Centroids to Energy Plant. 
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The imposition of an upper limit on phosphorus deviation of not more than 4 tons per 
year above the phosphorus loading target of 20 tons per year for the watershed resulted in 
further increase of the optimal amount of poultry litter shipped to the processing plant. 
The lower the maximum allowable phosphorus runoff deviation above a specified target 
the larger the increase in the estimated amount of poultry litter shipped to the litter- to- 
energy processing plant. However, the lower the maximum allowable total annual soluble 
phosphorus runoff target for the watershed the lesser the increase in the amount of 
poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy processing plant resulting from the imposition 
of upper phosphorus runoff deviations above the specified target. 
 
 
Figure 43 to Figure 50 below show the optimal allocation of poultry litter applied on 
pastures by subbasin as the total soluble phosphorus runoff limit was reduced from the 
base phosphorus load (40 Mg per year with maximum allowable phosphorus deviation 
above limit of 10 Mg/yr) to 30Mg, 25 Mg, and 20Mg/yr with maximum allowable 
phosphorus deviations above limit set to 6Mg, 6Mg, and 4Mg per year, respectively. 
These phosphorus loads were selected because they represented mean phosphorus load 
targets for the watershed at which there was approximately a 20-25 percent chance of 
exceeding the mean phosphorus target in any particular year. As can be seen from Figure 
43 to Figure 50, different subbasins responded differently to the alternative soluble 
phosphorus runoff standards that were imposed. For instance, Figure 43 and Figure 44 
show that some subbasins (subbasins 50, 51, 52, 75, 76, 77, 85, 86, 87, and 88) in the 
watershed did not apply poultry litter on pastures when the phosphorus runoff was 
limited to 40 tons per year. A total of 37,220 tons of non-Alum-treated poultry litter was 
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applied as fertilizer on pastures. Twenty-one of the 90 subbasins used non-Alum-treated 
poultry litter only (See Appendix for more details on the responses of individual 
subbasins to various phosphorus loss targets). Sixty-five percent of the untreated poultry 
litter was shared between 11 subbasins. Subbasins 21 and 5 used about 14 and 11 percent 
of untreated poultry litter, respectively, while subbasins 8 and 63 applied about 6 percent 
each.  Subbasins 1 and 13 used approximately 5 percent of the untreated poultry litter 
each.  A total of 25,707 tons of Alum-treated poultry litter was applied on pastures as 
fertilizer.  Fifty-eight percent of the Alum-treated litter was shared between 8 subbasins, 
with subbasins 54, 39, and 32 receiving about 15 percent, 10 percent, and 9 percent of the 
total supply of Alum-treated litter, respectively. Subbasins 72 and 44 received 
approximately 7 percent and 5 percent of Alum-treated litter respectively, while 
subbasins 3, 11, and 26 used about 4 percent each.  
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 43  Amount of Untreated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 40 Mg and   
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 10 Mg per year. 
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 44  Amount of Alum-Treated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 40 Mg and   
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 10 Mg per year.  
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 45  Amount of Untreated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 30 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 6 Mg per year. 
 
 185 
 
Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 46  Amount of Alum-Treated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 30 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 6 Mg per year. 
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The amount of non-Alum-treated litter declined to 21,415 tons per year while that of 
Alum-treated poultry litter rose to 53,415 tons per year when the mean soluble 
phosphorus load was limited to 30 Mg / yr with a maximum allowable phosphorus 
deviation above limit of 6 Mg/yr as shown by Figure 45 and Figure 46 above. The 
distribution pattern remained relatively the same.  
 
 
When the mean soluble phosphorus runoff limit was reduced to 25 Mg per year and the 
phosphorus deviation above limit reduced to 6 Mg per year, the amount of non-Alum-
treated litter was further cut down to about 15,000 tons per year while the amount of 
Alum-treated poultry litter used rose significantly to about 65,000 tons per year (See 
Figure 47 and Figure 48 below.  More details are provided in the Appendix.). Sixty-three 
percent of the untreated poultry litter was shared between 5 subbasins. Subbasins 21 used 
31 percent of untreated litter, followed by subbasins 8 and 4 with a share of about 10 
percent each. Subbasins 9 and 29 used approximately 7 percent and 6 percent of 
untreated poultry litter, respectively. 29 percent of the Alum-treated litter was shared 
between 5 subbasins, with subbasins 54, 13, and 5 receiving about 6 percent of Alum-
treated litter each. Subbasins 40 and 72 applied about 5 percent each. Another 21 percent 
of Alum-treated litter was shared between 7 subbasins (subbasins 1, 14, 21, 29, 33, 67 
and 71), each receiving about 3 percent. An additional 20 percent of Alum-treated litter 
was shared almost equally between 10 other subbasins. The rest of the remaining Alum-
treated litter was used on pastures across the watershed in relatively smaller amounts per 
subbasin. 
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 47  Amount of Untreated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 25 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 6 Mg per year. 
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 48  Amount of Alum-Treated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 25 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 6 Mg per year. 
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The amount of non-Alum-treated litter further declined to about 780 tons per year when 
the mean soluble phosphorus load was further limited to 20 Mg / yr with the maximum 
allowable phosphorus deviation above limit reduced to 4 Mg/yr. The quantity of Alum-
treated poultry litter used increased significantly to approximately 86,000 tons per year 
(See Figure 49 and Figure 50. More details provided in the Appendix). .  The distribution 
pattern for Alum-treated litter remained relatively the same. In the case of non-Alum-
treated poultry litter, 29 percent was allocated to subbasin 14. Another 22 percent was 
allocated to subbasins 23 (8 percent) and 24 (14 percent), while Subbasin 1 used about 7 
percent of the non-Alum-treated litter. Subbasins 21 and 37 received about 5 percent 
each. An additional 20 percent was shared almost equally between subbasins 8, 12, 15, 
and 26. The remaining 17 percent of non-Alum treated litter was shared thinly amongst 
the remaining few subbasins in the watershed. 
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 49  Amount of Untreated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 20 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 4 Mg per year. 
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Source: Adapted from Storm et al. (2002). 
 
Figure 50  Amount of Untreated Litter Required at P. Runoff Limit of 20 Mg and 
Deviation Above Mean Limit of not more than 4 Mg per year. 
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Table 26  Aluminum Sulphate (Alum) Required by Optimal Management Practice at 
Various Mean Soluble Phosphorus Load Limits and Deviations Above Limit (tons/yr). 
  
Optimal Management Practice and Management Variables 
61 66 76 81 86 91 96 101 
 
1.8* 
LL0 
 
1.8* 
LM0 
 
3.5* 
ML0 
 
3.5* 
MM0 
 
3.5* 
MH0 
 
5.3* 
HL0 
 
5.3* 
HM0 
 
5.3* 
HH0 
 
Mean 
Soluble 
Phosphorus 
Loss Limit 
(Mg/yr) 
Deviation 
Above 
P. loss 
Limit 
(Mg/yr) Amount of Aluminum Sulphate (Alum) Used (tons/yr) 
40 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,319 793 
40 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,084 775 
40 6 0 0 0 0 0 152 10,989 813 
40 4 0 0 0 418 0 565 11,527 695 
40 2 0 9 112 3,758 17 10,121 10,121 1,633 
35 10 0 0 0 11 0 0 9,958 572 
35 8 0 0 0 11 0 0 9,958 572 
35 6 0 0 0 0 0 152 12,510 775 
35 4 0 0 0 467 3 565 13,591 447 
35 2 23 36 109 5,073 129 607 10,192 388 
30 10 0 0 0 12 0 0 11,681 1,318 
30 8 0 0 0 12 0 0 11,681 1,318 
30 6 0 0 0 11 0 152 13,409 1,513 
30 4 0 0 40 471 10 505 14,249 1,400 
30 2 56 230 256 6,960 577 109 7,840 52 
25 10 0 0 0 232 417 152 15,221 962 
25 8 0 0 0 232 417 152 15,221 962 
25 6 0 0 0 232 417 152 15,221 962 
25 4 0 0 207 1,178 94 505 15,320 875 
25 2 31 1,147 47 8,943 160 0 3,393 0 
20 10 1 0 57 2,970 272 312 14,285 121 
20 8 1 0 57 2,970 272 312 14,285 121 
20 6 1 0 57 2,970 272 312 14,285 121 
20 4 1 9 40 3,335 546 615 13,568 287 
20 2 0 3,318 0 5,727 0 0 2,216 0 
* Abbreviations used: Decimal number =Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied  
(1.8, 3.5, and 5.3 Mg/ha); First letter = Minimum Biomass (L=1.1, M=1.6,H=2.0 Mg/ha;  
Second letter = Stocking Rate (L=.63, M=1.0, H=1.26 Animal Units/ha); and the 
last number = Commercial Nitrogen Applied ( kg/ha).  
 
Table 26 above shows that only eight management practices that involved Alum-treated 
litter were optimal (that is, management 61, 66, 76, 81, 86, 91, 96 and 101). These 
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management practices represent the use of at least 1.8 Mg/ha of Alum-treated poultry 
litter. Generally, more Alum-treated litter was used as the mean annual soluble 
phosphorus load limit and deviations above the limit were reduced. Management 
practices 61, 66, and 76 used relatively less Alum-treated litter compared to 
other management practices in the optimal solution set. These management practices 
represent the use of 3.5Mg/ha or less of Alum-treated litter, low to medium biomass 
maintained during grazing (1600kg/ha or less) and low to medium stocking rates (1.0 
AU/ha or less). Management practices 81, 91, 96 and 101 used more Alum-treated litter 
compared to other management practices in the optimal solution set. However, 
management practice 96 consistently used more Alum-treated litter at all levels of mean 
soluble phosphorus load limits investigated. This management practice represents the use 
of Alum-treated litter at the rate of 5.3 Mg/ha, the highest biomass maintained during 
grazing (2,000 kg/ha) and a medium stocking rate of 1.0 animal unit per hectare.  
 
Total Annual Phosphorus Runoff from Pastures Under Alternative Mean Annual 
Soluble Phosphorus Runoff and Deviations Above Mean Phosphorus 
 
Figure 51 below shows that phosphorus pollution in the watershed can be reduced to 
levels below the set annual soluble phosphorus runoff when the alum-treated poultry litter 
option is considered. Significant reductions in phosphorus runoff were achieved by 
varying expected phosphorus deviation above target at each soluble phosphorus level 
without reducing the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target. As the soluble phosphorus 
load limit was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year, predicted phosphorus runoff from 
pastures declined from 40 to 12.5 tons per year. Soluble phosphorus runoff levels well 
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below the expected annual phosphorus runoff target were obtained by varying only the 
phosphorus deviation limits above the specified target. Soluble phosphorus runoff levels 
from all soil types in the watershed significantly declined when alum-treated litter was 
used on pastures. Tonti and Nixa still produced the least amount of soluble phosphorus 
runoff whereas levels from Doniphan and Clarksville soils remained relatively higher. 
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Figure 51  Predicted Annual Soluble Phosphorus Runoff from Pastures. 
 
 
Figure 52 below shows the area-weighted average phosphorus runoff from pastures 
which declined from about 1.1 kg/ha given a phosphorus loss target of 40Mg per year to 
approximately 0.35 kg/ha when the phosphorus loss was limited to 20Mg per year. 
 
 
 195 
Area-Weighted Average Per Hectare Soluble Phosphorus Loss 
For the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 52  Weighted Average Soluble Phosphorus Loss From Pastures. 
 
 
Optimal Amount of Phosphorus Loss For Major Soil Types 
 
Figure 53 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus 
runoff per hectare for the Clarksville soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
estimated quantity of soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Clarksville soil 
remained unchanged as the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 
to 30 tons per year. However, the amount of phosphorus loss declined sharply at annual 
soluble phosphorus runoff targets lower than 30 tons per year. The amount of phosphorus 
runoff was estimated at 0.36 kg/ha when the annual soluble phosphorus runoff was 
limited to 20 tons per year given a maximum allowable mean phosphorus deviation 
above target of 2 tons per year. The imposition of phosphorus deviation limits above 
target yielded further and larger reductions when the phosphorus runoff was limited to 30 
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tons per year and above. The levels of soluble phosphorus runoff for this soil were 
significantly lower when Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed compared to levels 
obtained when farmers used untreated litter. 
 
Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the 
Clarksville Soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 53  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Clarkville Soil. 
 
Figure 54 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of soluble 
phosphorus runoff per hectare for Nixa soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
estimated quantity of soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Nixa soil declined 
rapidly from about 1.3 kg/ha to 0.7 kg/ha as the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target 
was reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then remained relatively unchanged at lower 
limits of soluble phosphorus runoff.   
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Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the 
Nixa Soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 54  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Nixa Soil. 
 
 
The imposition of phosphorus deviation limits above target yielded further and larger 
reductions when the soluble phosphorus runoff was limited to 30 tons per year and above. 
The levels of soluble phosphorus runoff for this soil were significantly lower when 
Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed compared to levels obtained when farmers used 
untreated litter. However, soluble phosphorus runoff levels for the Nixa soil remained 
relatively lower than those of the Clarksville soil as the total soluble phosphorus limit for 
the watershed was reduced from 40 to 25 tons per year.  
 
Figure 55 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of soluble 
phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Newtonia soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
The estimated quantity of soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Newtonia soil 
declined steadily from about 0.76 kg/ha to 0.65 kg/ha as the annual soluble phosphorus 
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runoff target was reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then declined rapidly at lower 
limits of phosphorus runoff till it reached 0.15 kg/ha when soluble phosphorus runoff was 
limited to 20 tons per year. The imposition of phosphorus deviation limits above target 
yielded further and larger reductions when the soluble phosphorus runoff was limited to 
30 tons per year and above. The levels of phosphorus runoff for this soil were also 
significantly lower when Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed compared to levels 
obtained when farmers used untreated litter. The levels of soluble phosphorus runoff per 
hectare for the Newtonia soil were significantly lower than those attained in both Nixa 
and Clarksville soils at lower soluble phosphorus runoff limits.  
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Figure 55  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Newtonia Soil. 
 
 
Figure 56 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of soluble 
phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Tonti soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
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estimated quantity of phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Tonti soil declined steadily 
from about 0.48 kg/ha to 0.13 kg/ha as the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target was 
reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then remained relatively unchanged at lower 
limits of phosphorus runoff. However, the amount of soluble phosphorus runoff per 
hectare for the Tonti soil remained lower than levels attained in the other soils at 
phosphorus runoff limits of 25 tons per year and above. When the total soluble 
phosphorus runoff for the watershed was limited to 20 tons per year, the amount of 
soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare from the Tonti soil was twice that of the Newtonia 
soil, and about half of the amounts attained in both the Nixa and Clarksville soils. 
Nonetheless, the levels of soluble phosphorus runoff for the Tonti soil were also  
significantly lower when Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed compared to levels 
obtained when farmers used untreated litter as crop fertilizer. 
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Figure 56  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Tonti Soil. 
 
Figure 57 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of phosphorus 
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runoff per hectare for the Captina soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The estimated 
quantity of soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Captina soil declined rapidly 
from about 1.0 kg/ha to 0.70 kg/ha as the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target was 
reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year and then declined steadily at lower limits of soluble 
phosphorus runoff till it reached 0.50 kg/ha when soluble phosphorus runoff was limited 
to 20 tons per year. The imposition of phosphorus deviation limits above target yielded 
further and larger reductions when the soluble phosphorus runoff was limited to 30 tons 
per year and above. The Captina soil produced amounts of soluble phosphorus runoff per 
hectare higher than those for the Tonti soil at all soluble phosphorus runoff limits. The 
levels of phosphorus runoff for the Captina soil were also significantly lower when 
Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed compared to levels obtained when farmers 
applied untreated poultry litter on the pastures.  
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Figure 57  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Captina Soil. 
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Figure 58 below shows the effect of alternative soluble phosphorus runoff targets and 
phosphorus runoff deviation limits above target on estimated amount of soluble 
phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Doniphan soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. 
Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the 
Doniphan Soil in the Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 58  Estimated Soluble Phosphorus Runoff Per Hectare for the Doniphan Soil. 
 
The Doniphan soil had a response pattern to changes in mean phosphorus runoff limits 
similar to that observed in the case of the Clarksville soil. The estimated quantity of 
soluble phosphorus runoff per hectare for the Doniphan soil remained unchanged as the 
annual soluble phosphorus runoff target was reduced from 40 to 30 tons per year. 
However, the amount of phosphorus loss declined sharply at annual soluble phosphorus 
runoff targets lower than 30 tons per year. The amount of phosphorus runoff was 
estimated at 0.44 kilograms per hectare when the annual soluble phosphorus runoff was 
limited to 20 tons per year given a maximum allowable mean phosphorus deviation 
above target of 2 tons per year. This soil produced the largest amount of soluble 
phosphorus runoff per hectare at all total soluble phosphorus runoff limits for the 
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watershed when compared to other major soils. The imposition of phosphorus deviation 
limits above target yielded further and larger reductions when the soluble phosphorus 
runoff was limited to 30 tons per year and above. As observed in other major soils, the 
Doniphan soil also exhibited phosphorus runoff levels that were significantly lower when 
Alum-treated poultry litter was allowed than in the case where farmers used untreated 
poultry litter. 
 
Total Agricultural Income from Grazing  
Figure 59 below indicates that the total annual producer income from pasture 
management systems in the solution set when the annual soluble phosphorus runoff was 
limited to 40 tons per year was estimated at about $2.7 million. A 25 percent reduction in 
the soluble phosphorus runoff limit lowered producer income to about $1.7 million. A 
further reduction of the soluble phosphorus limit to 20 tons per year yielded an annual 
producer income from grazing of about $700,000. 
Total Agricultural Income From Grazing for the 
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Figure 59  Estimated Total Producer Income from Grazing in the Watershed. 
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Total Abatement Costs with Alum-Treated Litter for the Watershed 
 
Figure 60 below shows the respective reductions in agricultural income from grazing at 
each soluble phosphorus runoff target and deviation limit. The reductions in producer 
income were estimated as the difference in the value of the objective function 
(representing total agricultural net returns from grazing in the watershed) at the current 
allowable average phosphorus loading (assumed to be 40 metric tons per year) and the 
value of the objective function at each of the alternative annual soluble phosphorus 
loading targets (that is, at 35, 30, 25, and 20 tons per year) and a specified phosphorus 
deviation limit above a given phosphorus loading target. These reductions in producer 
income represent estimated total phosphorus pollution abatement costs for the watershed. 
We assumed that at the base or current phosphorus loading of 40 tons per year, there are 
no abatement costs incurred in the watershed. Figure 60 shows that estimated total 
abatement costs increased at an increasing rate as the total annual soluble phosphorus 
runoff limit for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed was reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year.  
Total abatement costs rose from zero given a soluble phosphorus runoff limit of 40 tons 
per year to about $800,000 per year when the soluble phosphorus limit was reduced to 30 
tons per year with an allowable phosphorus deviation limit above target of not more than 
2 tons per year. Total abatement costs more than doubled to an amount of about $1.8 
million per year when the soluble phosphorus runoff limit was further reduced to 20 tons 
per year given the same phosphorus deviation limit above target. 
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Reduction In Agricultural Income From Grazing for the 
Eucha-Spavinaw Watershed
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Figure 60  Estimated Total Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
 
 
Marginal Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs for the Watershed 
Figure 61 below presents the estimated cost of abating an additional ton of soluble 
phosphorus pollution per year in the watershed. Marginal abatement costs are shown to 
increase at an increasing rate as the annual soluble phosphorus runoff target and deviation 
limits are reduced. As can be seen from figure 60 below, reducing the annual soluble 
phosphorus runoff limit from 40 tons to 20 tons per year increased marginal abatement 
costs from $19.00 to $59.00 per ton given an allowable phosphorus deviation limit above 
target of 10 tons per year.  When the allowable phosphorus deviation was limited to 2 
tons per year, marginal abatement costs rose drastically from $390 to $3,872 per ton as 
the total annual soluble phosphorus runoff limit for the watershed was reduced from 40 
tons to 20 tons per year.  
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Figure 61  Estimated Marginal Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
 
Marginal phosphorus pollution abatement costs with and without Alum-treated poultry 
litter are compared in Figure 62. Generally the marginal abatement costs increased as the 
mean annual phosphorus loss was restricted from 40 Mg to 20 Mg and phosphorus 
deviations above the mean lowered from 10 Mg to 2 Mg per year.  However, the 
marginal abatement costs rose sharply when the mean phosphorus loss was limited to 
levels lower than 25 Mg per year with or without the Alum-treatment. Marginal 
abatement costs with Alum-treated litter were relatively higher compared to the without 
Alum-treatment scenario.    
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Comparison of Marginal Phosphorus Pollution Abatement Costs 
With and Without Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures
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Note: In the case of Alum-treated litter, no abatement costs were recorded at mean 
phosphorus losses of 20 and 25Mg /yr given mean phosphorus deviation limit above 
target of 2Mg/yr. The solutions were infeasible. 
 
Figure 62  Marginal Abatement Costs With and Without Alum-Treated Litter. 
 
 
Efficient Phosphorus Pollution Control Policies for the Watershed 
 
Based on the efficient allocation of pollution and the cost-effectiveness equimarginal 
principles discussed in earlier sections (see Figure 9 and Figure 10), reductions in 
phosphorus emissions in the Eucha-Spavinaw can be achieved through the use of 
economic instruments. These economic instruments can either be used as a complement 
to or as a substitute for direct regulation practices in the watershed to provide incentives 
to reduce those activities that emit excessive phosphorus loads into the environment. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may (1) issue tradable phosphorus pollution 
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permits, (2) impose per-unit charge or tax on phosphorus emissions, (3) offer a per-unit 
subsidy on each unit of phosphorus the polluter abates, and (4) impose a charge on 
phosphorus emissions and offer pollution control subsidy to polluters. The following 
sections provide more insight on each of these market-based pollution control options.  
 
Emissions Standard / Legal Limit on Phosphorus Emissions 
 
As illustrated in Figure 9, we noted that an efficient allocation of phosphorus pollution is 
that at which the marginal cost of control is equal to the marginal damage cost caused by 
the pollution for each source in the watershed. State or federal agencies might achieve 
that efficient allocation of phosphorus pollution in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed by 
imposing a legal limit on the amount of phosphorus pollution allowed by each source.  
The total quantity of phosphorus pollution allowed on such permits would be limited to 
Z* on Figure 8 (the level of pollution at which the marginal abatement cost equals 
marginal damage cost). The establishment of a system of discharge licenses and 
controlling the allowable amounts of pollution on the permits could limit phosphorus 
pollution emissions in the watershed. Based on the mean annual phosphorus load targets 
used in this study, if the state or federal agency wanted a 50 % reduction in phosphorus 
emissions from the current level assumed to be 40 Mg per year, the total quantity of 
phosphorus pollution allowed on such permits would be limited to 20Mg per year.  
Polluters could be allowed to trade these permits with each other. The tradable permits or 
quota regime allows for the reallocation of the right to pollute among polluters  
(Coase, 1960). This trading arrangement would create an incentive to achieve reductions 
in phosphorus emissions below the legal requirements, enabling a producer to expand, or 
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to sell the resultant phosphorus pollution credits to other polluters needing them in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
 
Per-Unit Phosphorus Emissions Tax or Per-Unit Pollution Control Subsidy  
 
Environmental degradation caused by excessive phosphorus pollution is an externality 
cost borne by society. The private polluters in the watershed do not take such a cost into 
account when making their production decisions. As such, they tend to oversupply the 
product or overuse the input with such a negative externality like poultry litter. The state 
or federal agency might achieve an efficient allocation of phosphorus pollution by 
imposing a tax or charge of a specified amount per unit of phosphorus discharged into the 
environment by each polluter in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. As illustrated in Figure 
9 and Figure 10, the emission charge would be set equal to T*, the tax rate at which 
marginal abatement costs across polluters are the same and equal to marginal damage 
cost (That is, a charge where MC1 =  MC2 = MDC). The total payment any polluter 
would make is determined by multiplying the amount of phosphorus pollution emitted 
times the per-unit effluent fee or tax. This polluter-pays principle would make each 
emitter to internalize the marginal damage caused by each unit of phosphorus emitted. By 
imposing the same emission tax on all emitters in the watershed, it is expected that all 
profit-maximizing polluters would respond to this internalized pollution cost by reducing 
emissions to a point where the marginal abatement cost is equal to the effluent fee or 
emission tax, T*.   When that happens, the resulting phosphorus reduction allocation will 
be consistent with minimizing total phosphorus pollution control costs for the watershed.  
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An alternative approach to an emission charge would be to pay producers for each unit of 
phosphorus pollution they abated. As illustrated in Figure 9 and Figure 10, the payment 
rate or subsidy would be set equal to T*, the subsidy rate at which marginal abatement 
costs across polluters are the same and equal to marginal damage cost (That is, a control 
subsidy where MC1 =  MC2 = MDC) (see Figure 9 and Figure 10) .  
 
In this study, the shadow prices on the phosphorus constraint (obtained from the 
optimization model) provided a guideline for setting the tax rate at each of the mean 
annual phosphorus loads investigated. The per-unit emission tax was set equal to the 
shadow price. Table 27 shows the amount of tax revenue that will likely result from 
implementing the per-unit emission tax policy in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  
Table 27 also shows the total amount of subsidy that will likely result from implementing 
the per-unit control subsidy policy in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The total amount 
any producer could be paid was determined by multiplying the amount of phosphorus 
pollution abated times the per-unit control subsidy. Again, the per-unit subsidy rate was 
set equal to the shadow price on the phosphorus constraint at each of the mean annual 
phosphorus loads investigated. 
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Table 27  Tax Revenue / Subsidy Payments for Various Mean Phosphorus Load Limits. 
 
Mean  
P. Loss 
Limit  
(Mg/yr) 
Mean  
P. Deviation 
Limit  
(Mg/yr) 
Actual  
Mean  
P. Loss 
(Mg/yr) 
Actual  
P. Loss 
Abated 
(Kg) 
Shadow 
Price 
(Tax Rate)  
($/Kg) 
P. Emissions 
Tax  
Revenue 
($) 
Pollution 
Control 
Subsidy  
($) 
40 10 40.0 0 18.54 741,400 0 
40 8 39.7 273 31.69 1,258,798 8,642 
40 6 36.2 3,764 43.84 1,588,610 165,030 
40 4 31.9 8,057 88.37 2,822,838 711,962 
40 2 22.1 17,876 390.43 8,637,865 6,979,495 
35 10 35.0 5,000 21.25 743,890 106,270 
35 8 35.0 5,000 21.25 743,890 106,270 
35 6 33.6 6,444 45.84 1,538,200 295,400 
35 4 29.0 10,990 95.37 2,766,829 1,048,131 
35 2 19.5 20,501 449.65 8,767,753 9,218,327 
30 10 30.0 10,000 25.86 775,890 258,630 
30 8 30.0 10,000 25.86 775,890 258,630 
30 6 30.0 10,000 43.25 1,297,470 432,490 
30 4 25.8 14,178 101.88 2,630,678 1,444,442 
30 2 17.7 22,298 582.45 10,310,374 12,987,786 
25 10 25.0 15,000 35.51 887,750 532,650 
25 8 25.0 15,000 35.51 887,750 532,650 
25 6 25.0 15,000 35.51 887,750 532,650 
25 4 22.9 17,149 106.24 2,427,764 1,821,876 
25 2 15.3 24,687 987.17 15,116,519 24,370,121 
20 10 20.0 20,000 58.54 1,170,800 1,170,800 
20 8 20.0 20,000 58.54 1,170,800 1,170,800 
20 6 20.0 20,000 58.54 1,170,800 1,170,800 
20 4 19.6 20,386 132.14 2,591,800 2,693,760 
20 2 12.7 27,324 3872.22 49,085,642 105,803,118 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary of the Procedures and Results 
The Eucha-Spavinaw watershed, shared by Oklahoma and Arkansas, has been troubled 
by water pollution for years.  Eutrophication of Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw is attributed 
to high phosphorus loading resulting largely from amount and history of land application 
of litter produced by an intensive poultry industry in the area.  The purpose of this study 
was to determine litter and pasture management practices to reduce total phosphorus 
runoff from agricultural non-point sources in the watershed to meet various possible 
annual total phosphorus limits within a specified margin of safety at minimum social 
cost. Ambient-based approaches coupled with policy instruments such as taxes and 
subsidies have been shown to achieve socially efficient outcomes.  USDA programs and 
policies to reduce non-point source agricultural nutrient runoff have relied upon 
voluntary technology-based approaches whereas USEPA programs tend to focus on 
trading technology rather than pollutants or loadings. The ability of these programs to 
meet the goals of water quality improvement is debatable. Mathematical programming 
and SWAT are useful tools in determining the most efficient methods of reducing 
nutrient loading in watersheds. A series of multi-year simulations were conducted where 
alternative management practices were tested in each HRU of the watershed. The BMPs 
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(unique to each HRU) that maximized total producer income while meeting various 
phosphorus load reductions within a specified margin of safety were then selected for 
implementation in the watershed. 
 
 
The objective of this study was to integrate GIS-based biophysical simulation modeling 
with a spatial mathematical programming model to identify pasture management 
practices suitable for specific sites that maximize net agricultural income for the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed while meeting maximum average annual phosphorus loads entering 
Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw within specified margins of safety.  A GIS data base 
containing topography, hydrology, soils, and land use and crop histories was created and 
used as basic sources of input parameters for the SWAT modeling. The Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed was subdivided into 90 subbasins based on topography and hydrology in the 
area, and further subdivided into 2416 hydraulic response units (HRUs) according to 
major soil type and land use in each subbasin. SWAT simulated sediment, crop yields, 
and nutrient yields at the watershed and each subbasin outlet. The simulations were 
performed on current and alternative pasture management practices. SWAT outputs 
allowed for geographical and temporal examination and comparison of sediment, crop 
yield, nutrient discharges, and potential for nutrient contamination of surface and 
groundwater within a given management practice and across different pasture 
management systems.   
 
A set of 105 feasible grazing management practices was simulated and tested in each 
HRU in the watershed. These were constituted from different combinations of Alum-
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treated and non-Alum treated poultry litter and elemental nitrogen application rates, 
maximum biomass maintained for grazing, and stocking rates on pasture land. The 
SWAT output was input into a Target MOTAD risk programming model that selected the 
best management practice for each HRU in the watershed to maximize agricultural 
income from grazing while meeting maximum average annual phosphorus loads entering 
Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw within specified margins of safety.  The model allowed for a 
possibility of transporting poultry litter from chicken farms to phosphorus deficient sub-
basins within the watershed and to a litter-to-energy processing plant. Thus, the economic 
model optimally allocated best management practice(s) to non-point sources in each 
HRU and determined optimal quantities of litter transported between subbasins and 
optimal quantity of litter transported from each subbasin to the processing plant.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the findings of this study. First, pasture 
management systems using poultry litter as fertilizer generate potential nitrate and 
phosphorus contamination for the surface and ground water in the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed. Excessive land application of litter, phosphorus runoff, and water quality 
issues in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed can be addressed in a modeling framework that 
takes into account environmental and economic aspects in the area. An integrated 
environmental-economic modeling approach, that combines the use of the SWAT model 
and mathematical programming can be used to assess the impact of current and 
alternative farming practices on water quality in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The 
integrated biophysical-hydrologic-economic–modeling framework developed for this 
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dissertation research reflected the major hydrologic and economic processes related to 
poultry litter supply, grazing management systems and phosphorus runoff in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed. This decision-support tool could be used to assist policymakers in 
their strategic phosphorus loss reduction and water quality improvement decisions and in 
setting realistic and efficient Total Maximum Daily Loads for the watershed. 
 
Second, the environmental-economic optimization model assigned various site-specific 
pasture management systems and litter allocations on the basis of relevant environmental 
and economic factors in that part of the watershed. There was no single management 
practice that dominated in all parts of the watershed. While it is straight forward to 
analyze the effects of using a single BMP in all HRUs, our findings suggest that meeting 
the TMDL for an entire Eucha-Spavinaw watershed at least-cost means that the best 
pasture management practice for each HRU must be individually chosen. This can be 
accomplished in a mathematical programming model that permits a choice of BMP 
unique to each HRU using the necessary coefficients which are derived from results 
obtained from the SWAT simulation model. The SWAT simulation model is not an 
optimization model. Optimization is required to determine least cost combinations of 
pasture management practices for each HRU to meet the TMDL for the Eucha-Spavinaw 
watershed at least-cost to society.  The environmental-economic optimization model used 
in this study showed that least-cost abatement policies may differ significantly from 
uniformly applied command-and-control policies and be much less costly than the 
imposition of uniform restrictions across all HRUs in the watershed. The shadow prices 
obtained from the agricultural land area constraint of the optimization model provided 
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relevant economic and environmental information that can be used to select HRUs and 
target specific areas in the watershed for inclusion in a phosphorus pollution reduction 
program. The shadow prices on the phosphorus constraint in the optimization model 
provided a guideline as to how pollution control policies could be implemented using 
economic instruments such as tradable phosphorus emission permits, per-unit phosphorus 
emissions tax or charge, and per-unit phosphorus control subsidies.     
 
Third, optimal poultry litter application rates and phosphorus runoff varied from one soil 
to another within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  The econometric model determined 
that not all soil types in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed contributed uniformly to the 
phosphorus runoff problem in the area. The optimization model however indicated that 
the least-cost way to reduce phosphorus loss in the watershed required equating marginal 
abatement costs across HRUs. A cost effective and efficient phosphorus runoff reduction 
program may comprise of producers controlling non-uniform amounts of phosphorus 
emissions depending on their marginal costs of controlling pollution.  Producers with 
lower marginal phosphorus pollution abatement costs in the watershed will control large 
amounts of phosphorus pollution than others.  
 
Soils such as Britwater, Razort, Clarksville, Captina, Secesh and Healing contributed 
significantly higher amounts of phosphorus than the Waben soil. An additional hectare of 
pasture on any of these soils increased phosphorus runoff by 1.5 kg per hectare on 
average. The phosphorus runoff problem worsened when pastures on these soils were 
heavily grazed at stocking rates exceeding 1.00 AU/ha and the plant biomass maintained 
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during grazing was lower than 1600 kg/ha. The other soils that appeared not to generate 
significant levels of phosphorus runoff received higher optimal litter application rates 
compared to the set of soils specified above.  Though reduction of litter application rates 
on pastures reduced total phosphorus runoff for the watershed, complete elimination of 
all fertilizer was found to actually increase total phosphorus loss on some soils because of 
increased erosion and sediment bound phosphorus owing to reduced plant biomass on the 
field.  This implied that farmers must supplement litter nitrogen with commercial 
nitrogen on the pastures. It may be more cost effective to develop phosphorus reduction 
programs that target specific soil types within the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed rather than 
continue with the current uniform policy of limiting litter application rates strictly by soil 
test phosphorus. Based on considerable variation of litter application rates and 
phosphorus runoff by soil type, an approach that targets areas in the watershed for 
phosphorus loss reduction by focusing only on quantities of poultry litter used as 
fertilizer and estimated phosphorus runoff may not necessarily be effective in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed.  
 
Fourth, implementation of environment-friendly grazing management systems (those that 
represented less use of untreated poultry litter, maintaining high levels of plant biomass 
during grazing, and low stocking rates on pastures) played a major role in reducing 
phosphorus loss in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. However, it should be noted that in 
our simulation, the pastures were modeled as grazing units. The livestock removed 
phosphorus with the grass during grazing and then returned a sizeable amount of that 
phosphorus back onto the soil surface when they deposited manure on the field. Thus, 
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grazing operations removed phosphorus from the deeper soil layers onto the soil surface 
where it was most likely to be washed off during storm events. Cattle also contributed to 
increased runoff by trampling on the plants and compacting the top soil. However, the 
imposition of restrictions on maximum allowable phosphorus loss for the watershed 
allowed for a choice of the best management practice for each location that resulted in 
overall phosphorus loss reduction and maximized agricultural income from grazing for 
the entire watershed.      
 
Fifth, reduction of litter application rates on pastures resulted in producers applying more 
commercial nitrogen to maintain higher biomass pastures. When the mean phosphorus 
loss was restricted to 20 Mg per year, nearly all litter nitrogen was replaced by 
commercial nitrogen. Large increases in the use of elemental nitrogen to replace poultry 
litter (and reduce phosphorus runoff) increased nitrogen loss and potential nitrate 
contamination of surface and ground water.   
 
Sixth, the use of alum-treated poultry litter appeared to be a very cost effective 
phosphorus runoff reduction strategy even at high annual phosphorus loss limits for the 
watershed. As the mean phosphorus loss limits were reduced, the pasture management 
practices that were adopted included those that encouraged (1) the use of alum-treated 
litter to meet the nitrogen requirement for the crop, (2) lowering stocking rates on the 
pastures (to maintain 1 AU/ha or less) and (3) retaining higher levels of plant biomass 
during grazing (at 1600kg/ha or above). However, the use of alum-treated litter would 
reduce phosphorus runoff in the short term. It is a temporary solution because continued 
 218 
use of alum-treated litter would lead to a long-term build-up of phosphorus in the soil. 
The increased phosphorus load over time would eventually result in increased levels of 
phosphorus runoff.     
 
Seventh, the possible litter-to-energy plant received lesser amounts of poultry litter when 
producers had an incentive to use alum-treated poultry litter as fertilizer. The amount of 
poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy plant at Jay, Oklahoma increased at a slower 
rate (compared to the untreated poultry litter option) as the mean annual phosphorus load 
limit was reduced. These results suggested that the possible litter-to-energy processing 
plant at Jay, Oklahoma might not be a viable option on its own merit. There was also 
indication of potential poultry litter trading within the watershed as the mean phosphorus 
load was reduced.  The general direction of litter shipment within the watershed was 
westward towards phosphorus-deficient subbasins. However, when the alum-treatment 
option was removed from the model, the litter-to-energy power plant located at Jay, 
Oklahoma became a more cost effective method of reducing both the level and the 
variability of phosphorus runoff as pollution limits for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed 
were reduced from 40 to 20 tons per year. 
 
Lastly, simulated annual phosphorus loss amounts from the watershed exceeded the 
target mean phosphorus load by larger deviations when it was set at 40,000 kg per year 
than when it was set at lower levels. This implied that compliance with the recommended 
phosphorus load reductions improved as the phosphorus loss target for the watershed was 
reduced. However, small reductions in deviation above target could be achieved without 
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reducing the mean annual phosphorus load for the watershed. Reduction of larger 
deviations would require reducing the phosphorus loss target for the watershed. 
Significant reductions in total phosphorus runoff were achieved by varying phosphorus 
deviation limits above target without changing the mean phosphorus load when the 
Alum-treated poultry litter option was incorporated in the optimization model.   
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
The results of this study would aide in devising a conservation / phosphorus abatement 
program that could be implemented by State water quality agencies in the Eucha-
Spavinaw watershed to maximize total producer income while total phosphorus 
emissions are held below a specified target to improve water quality in the basin. The 
findings of this study suggest that it is possible to reduce the total annual phosphorus load 
from non-point sources in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed from 40 tons to 20 tons per 
year through regulation coupled with other necessary phosphorus pollution reduction 
strategies. The total annual phosphorus load for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed could be 
regulated not to exceed 20 tons per year. This regulation would have to be supported by 
adoption of use of Alum-treated poultry litter, maintaining lower stocking rates (1.00 
AU/ha and lower) to prevent overgrazing and maintaining higher biomass on pastures (at 
least 1600kg/ha) during grazing for cover to prevent erosion and phosphorus runoff. 
However, the economic incentive to voluntarily adopt these improved pasture 
management practices might be minimal unless producers are compensated for adoption 
of these environment-improving measures. Policies that encourage pasture management 
improvements such as reducing litter application rates, use of Alum-treated litter, 
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appropriate nitrogen fertilization, high biomass maintained on pasture during grazing and 
maintaining low stocking rates on pastures would significantly reduce phosphorus 
loading into Lakes Eucha and Spavinaw. Such policies and other relevant agricultural 
pollution abatement programs need to be based on site-specific conditions including soil 
type for them to significantly contribute to reduction of phosphorus loading in the 
watershed.  
 
The results of this study indirectly demonstrated that uniformly applied command-and-
control policies such as the current policy to apply poultry manure based on soil test 
phosphorus were environmentally and economically inefficient in reducing the total 
phosphorus loading for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. This was shown by the fact that 
none of the solutions had uniform application of litter nor did the least-cost solution have 
uniform levels of phosphorus loss. Targeted phosphorus TMDLs for soils such as Tonti 
and Nixa would be very effective and efficient for phosphorus loading reduction in the 
Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.  Providing for non-uniform litter application rates based on 
soil type and predicted amounts of phosphorus runoff would help meet the phosphorus 
loss target for the watershed at least cost to society. 
 
This dissertation research developed and applied a comprehensive decision-support tool, 
an integrated biophysical-hydrologic – economic watershed model, with the ability to 
reflect the dynamic interactions of essential biophysical, hydrologic, agronomic, and 
economic components and to explore both the economic and environmental 
consequences of a wide variety of management practices and policy choices for the 
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Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. It is hoped that this model will assist water quality program 
managers in different locations in the watershed in choosing appropriate poultry litter and 
grazing management practices and policymakers in choosing appropriate phosphorus loss 
reduction programs and policies. It is strongly recommended that optimization models be 
integrated with GIS-based biophysical-hydrologic simulation models and made an 
integral part of the TMDL development process to come up with more realistic and 
efficient conservation and pollution abatement programs for the watersheds.  
 
This study employed a transportation matrix in which poultry litter was being hauled 
from chicken farm centroids to subbasin centroids, including the possible litter-to-energy 
power plant located at Jay, Oklahoma. Results showed that if producers were to adopt the 
use of Alum-treated poultry litter, the desired phosphorus runoff standard will be met and 
thus there will be less poultry litter shipped to the litter-to-energy power plant from the 
watershed. Policies that encourage the use of Alum-treated poultry litter and subsidize 
transportation of litter within the watershed have a great potential to reduce total 
phosphorus loss in the watershed. It should be noted, however, that the use of alum-
treated litter is a short term solution to phosphorus runoff. Continued use of alum-treated 
litter will result in the build-up of phosphorus in the soil and lead to increase in 
phosphorus runoff in the long-term. 
 
Furthermore, when there was no restriction imposed on the maximum allowable 
phosphorus load for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed, the proposed litter-to-energy power 
plant did not appear profitable on its own merit.  Producers did not have an economic 
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incentive to haul poultry litter to the litter-to-energy power plant due to high 
transportation costs.  However, the proposed power plant became a more cost effective 
method of reducing both the level and the variability of phosphorus runoff as total annual 
phosphorus runoff limits for the watershed was reduced. Therefore, if policy makers 
could come up with policies that provide an enabling environment for profitable 
operation of the litter-to-energy power plant and provide economic incentives for hauling 
poultry litter than use it as fertilizer on pastures would drastically reduce the amount of 
phosphorus runoff in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. The litter-to-energy power plant 
could be established and operated as a cooperative and entrusted with the responsibility 
to pick up poultry litter from the respective chicken farm centroids (collection points) 
established in the watershed as modeled in this study. Producers would haul poultry litter 
to the power plant if stricter limits were imposed on total phosphorus load from pastures 
in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed.    
 
Limitations and Directions for Further Study 
Agricultural pollution comes from both point and non-point sources in the watershed. 
This study assumed that point sources in the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed are achieving 
100 percent phosphorus loss abatement and thus focused on agricultural non-point 
sources in the watershed. This may not be the case in real world practice. Furthermore, 
this study does not measure environmental damages and loss of recreational values 
resulting from sediment, phosphorus runoff and eutrophication of the Lakes Eucha and 
Spavinaw. The analysis in this study assumed constant land use and that poultry litter 
produced in the watershed was either applied on pastures as fertilizer or shipped to the 
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possible litter-to-energy power plant located at Jay, Oklahoma. We did not consider 
shipment of poultry litter to destinations out of the watershed, complete non-use of 
current pasture land, possible changes to crop and range land in the watershed. Neither 
did we consider haying operations and the effects of supplementary feeding (e.g with 
winter hay) on total soil phosphorus and levels of phosphorus runoff in this study. Further 
analysis should amend these shortcomings. 
 
The SWAT model is considered a very reliable modeling tool. However, its inherent 
uncertainty of parameter estimates is a major limitation in this study.  This is because 
SWAT, as a biophysical simulation model, is a system of equations that represent a 
simplification of real world processes. There is lack of or incomplete knowledge on some 
of the variables involved (for instance, incomplete knowledge about the fate and transport 
of poultry manure with various handling systems and environments and interactions of 
phosphorus pollution with soil, water, and aquatic ecosystems) that increases uncertainty 
about the variables used in the model.  
 
Several studies have demonstrated that market-based mechanisms can effectively and 
efficiently achieve the desired environmental pollution standard. It will be an essential 
exercise to explore the feasibility and associated transaction costs of establishing a 
phosphorus pollution trading program for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed. Pollution 
trading programs can help achieve efficient targeting of pollution reduction measures.  
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Further studies could look at more alternative litter uses and other best management 
practices to control soil and nutrient loss in the watershed and how costs of reducing 
pollution vary spatially. Overall pollution control cost for the Eucha-Spavinaw watershed 
could be greatly reduced by identifying those areas with low cost of pollution control and 
designing appropriate pollution reduction programs.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1  Amount of Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures by Subbasin at Selected Mean 
Annual Soluble Phosphorus Levels (40Mg, 30Mg, 25Mg, and 20Mg/yr and Deviations 
Above Limit (10Mg, 6Mg and 4Mg /yr). 
  
Mean Annual Soluble Phosphorus Levels With Associated Deviations Above Limits 
 
40:10 30:6 25:6 20:4 
Amount of Poultry Litter Used  (tons/yr) 
Sub-
basin 
Non- 
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
1 1,892 0 1,581 412 248 2,176 52 3,116 
2 1,479 0 776 931 550 1,230 0 2,018 
3 257 1,040 231 1,075 218 1,171 0 1,099 
4 1,423 308 1,423 912 1,369 949 0 1,089 
5 4,037 0 960 4,009 0 4,050 0 6,812 
6 246 0 289 0 313 0 26 323 
7 6 0 6 0 6 0 0 0 
8 2,101 0 2,101 0 1,551 0 34 744 
9 1,573 0 1,573 0 1,020 1,075 0 1,426 
10 769 0 769 0 320 812 7 1,235 
11 8 1,077 8 1,077 8 1,178 8 1,178 
12 46 80 31 93 31 93 31 93 
13 1,770 991 0 2,970 0 4,062 0 4,062 
14 1,382 387 169 1,457 169 1,663 223 1,364 
15 315 273 304 283 304 877 28 1,121 
16 0 137 0 137 0 137 0 137 
17 19 435 0 452 0 598 0 1,466 
18 146 201 91 252 89 429 24 505 
19 142 203 139 207 139 207 0 288 
20 513 925 271 1,139 271 1,139 0 1,378 
21 5,052 0 4,960 121 4,628 1,669 39 2,837 
22 395 0 395 0 0 523 0 523 
23 364 146 164 322 161 810 61 902 
24 858 436 676 597 107 1,127 107 1,127 
25 0 665 0 678 0 678 0 688 
26 141 1,032 85 1,082 85 1,702 33 1,952 
27 226 108 43 269 36 276 4 317 
28 22 770 22 770 22 1,108 22 1,180 
29 1,373 0 859 1,536 817 1,707 0 1,723 
30 560 21 554 502 507 701 13 810 
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Table A1 (Continued) 
Mean Annual Soluble Phosphorus Levels With Associated Deviations Above Limits 
40:10 30:6 25:6 20:4 
Amount of Poultry Litter Used  (tons/yr) 
Sub-
basin 
Non- 
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
31 432 0 432 14 134 408 0 398 
32 0 2,320 0 0 27 0 0 0 
33 338 379 0 2,320 0 2,320 0 2,083 
34 123 0 264 444 264 666 4 895 
35 375 0 123 0 26 0 0 23 
36 874 37 375 326 120 326 0 437 
37 644 58 194 636 104 716 42 771 
38 5 178 429 247 13 615 20 927 
39 0 2,651 0 190 0 190 0 187 
40 0 0 0 3,068 0 3,068 0 2,729 
41 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 3 
42 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 
43 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 48 
44 0 1,331 0 1,331 0 1,331 0 1,727 
45 0 0 0 0 0 131 0 94 
46 0 146 0 146 0 146 0 626 
47 71 0 0 94 0 94 0 63 
48 264 0 0 265 0 265 0 233 
49 102 122 0 122 0 122 0 213 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 598 
52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 55 346 0 478 0 578 0 538 
54 48 3,728 71 4,066 71 4,066 0 3,092 
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
57 112 34 97 141 97 170 0 281 
58 29 613 0 742 0 585 0 1,475 
59 188 0 137 237 137 236 0 362 
60 0 125 122 125 402 143 0 112 
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Table A1 (Continued) 
Mean Annual Soluble Phosphorus Levels With Associated Deviations Above Limits 
40:10 30:6 25:6 20:4 
Amount of Poultry Litter Used  (tons/yr) 
Sub-
basin 
Non- 
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
Non-
Treated 
Alum-
Treated 
61 0 75 0 659 0 659 0 749 
62 284 0 0 844 0 1,094 0 1,411 
63 2,070 0 220 253 213 536 0 2,585 
64 166 257 0 1,004 0 1,004 0 919 
65 59 0 0 539 0 590 0 853 
66 54 0 0 366 0 381 0 502 
67 0 696 0 2,343 0 2,248 0 2,214 
68 0 0 0 73 0 73 0 73 
69 618 165 21 165 0 397 0 763 
70 858 189 0 885 0 629 0 2,172 
71 98 298 98 596 98 2,007 0 1,993 
72 580 1,796 0 5,510 0 3,389 0 4,818 
73 526 6 103 6 7 101 0 663 
74 0 336 0 336 0 336 0 1,623 
75 0 0 0 312 0 547 0 433 
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
77 0 0 0 1,177 0 333 0 1,256 
78 83 0 0 311 0 421 0 624 
79 133 116 63 179 2 306 2 306 
80 0 0 0 328 0 634 0 656 
81 681 82 7 803 244 803 0 918 
82 131 195 117 207 0 329 0 306 
83 21 36 6 36 0 45 0 58 
84 34 39 34 39 11 70 0 56 
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 
86 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 
87 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 28 
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
89 19 0 19 33 8 47 0 78 
90 0 118 0 118 0 118 0 90 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
 
Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied 
on Pastures at 40Mg/yr and Deviation above Limit of not more than 10Mg/yr
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Figure A1.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 40Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 10Mg per year. 
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Figure A1.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 40Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 10Mg per year. 
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Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied 
on Pastures at 30Mg/yr and Deviation above Limit of not more than 6Mg/yr
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Figure A2.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 30Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 6Mg per year. 
 
 240 
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Figure A2.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 30Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 6Mg per year. 
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Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied 
on Pastures at 25Mg/yr and Deviation above Limit of not more than 6Mg/yr
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Su
bb
as
in
Amount of Poultry Litter Applied (tons/yr)
Non-Treated Litter Alum-Treated Litter
 
Figure A3.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 25Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 6Mg per year. 
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Figure A3.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 25Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 6Mg per year. 
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Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied 
on Pastures at 20Mg/yr and Deviation above Limit of not more than 4Mg/yr
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Figure A4.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 20Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 4Mg per year. 
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Figure A4.  Amount of Untreated and Alum-Treated Poultry Litter Applied on Pastures 
At 20Mg/yr and Deviation Above limit of not more than 4Mg per year.
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